Causes and Consequences of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia

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Acronyms

AIAI: Al Itihad Al Islamiyya
AMISOM: African Union Mission in Somalia
ASWJ: Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama
AU: African Union
DRA: Department of Refugee Affairs
ECOMOG: Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
EU: European Union
HIPS: Heritage Institute for Policy Studies
IDP: Internally displaced persons
IGAD: Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
KADU: Kenyan African Democratic Union
KANU: Kenyan African National Union
KDF: Kenyan Defense Forces
LAPSSET: Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor
MP: Members of Parliament
MYC: Muslim Youth Center
NARC: National Alliance Rainbow Coalition
NFD: Northern Frontier District
NFDP: Northern Frontier Democratic Party
NFDP: Northern Frontier Democratic Party

NPM: National political movement

NPPPP: Northern Provinces Peoples Progressive Party

OAU: Organization of African Unity

OCHA: Office For the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

PNL: The People National League

RAF: Royal Air Force

RUF: Revolutionary United Front

SICC: Somali Islamic Courts Council

SNM: Somali National Movement

SPM: Somali, Patriotic Movement

SSDF: Somali Salvation Democratic Front

SYL: Somali Youth League

TFG: Transitional Federal Government

UIC: Union of Islamic Courts

UN: United Nation

UNAMSIL: United Nation Mission in Sierra Leone

UNHCR: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNOSOM: United Nations Operation in Somalia

US: United States

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Russia
Glossary

*Xeer:* Clan customary law in Somalia.

*Shifta:* A pejorative term which today is used to describe any armed banditry.

*Ramadan:* Arabic term used to describe a month of August.
Abstract

The central goal of this study is to scrutinize the causes and consequences of Kenya's military intervention in Somalia in October 2011. It is to exert effort to bridge the gap in literature and to motivate further studies on the issue under study. The study will examine political, economic and social causes that triggered to incursion and the impacts that the military intervention brought. Methodologically, since the research deals with the socio political and economic factors with outcomes of the incursion, it pursued qualitative approaches in terms of data collection and design of analysis. The tools used to collect data were interviews and document analysis. An ethical consideration was employed to make objective analysis, to come up with sound findings and draw valid conclusions. In the course of data analysis, the causes and consequences of Kenya's military intervention in Somalia are described in detail. The findings of the study assert that the incursion was linked to creating a buffer state in Southern Somalia as a strategic solution for assuring security and economic interests of Kenya. Then, the study suggested possible recommendations that are Kenya to develop effective all inclusive national development policies, should approach voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees, develop effective security policies to secure border region, recognize the importance of inclusivity in trying to achieve a stable Somalia and Cross boarder incursion must be the last resort. Somalia should develop policies –strategies concerning returnees of Somali refugees to escape crackdown of stability and deal oil interest with international law. Creating stability in southern Somalia does not mean only by defeating Al-Shabaab. Kenya, with the help of its partners must now develop a political plan that includes attractive incentives for local clans to work together and share the region's wealth and foreign assistance. That will require careful planning and support, as well as continued international involvement in development and capacity-building.
Chapter One

Introduction

1.1 Background of the study

The Somali state was created by the partition of the Horn of Africa by Britain, Italy and France, and the Abyssinian empire, during the scramble for Africa in the nineteenth century (Judith and Judy, 2004). During the colonial period Somalia itself did not exist as a single state, divided as northern British Somaliland and a southern Italian Somaliland. On 26 June 1960 Britain granted independence to the north and four days later the Italian-administered UN Trusteeship Territory of Somalia achieved independence.

On 1 July 1960 the people of the former British and Italian territories united to form the Somali Republic. Aden Abdullah Osman Daar, first president, elected in 1960 but Aden Abdullah Osman Daar, was defeated by the election of 1967 by former prime minister Abdi Raashid Ali Shermark. Since the creation of the Republic of Somalia in 1960, political affiliations quickly developed along clan-based lines. Before independence, two parliaments existed one in the north and one in the south. A unitary parliamentary republic governed the independent Republic (Brons, 2001). The central government of the Republic of Somalia did not yield benefits to members of Somalia society at large. Instead, it was seen as a tool to be used by a few to expropriate from the many. As such, the political system was characterized by constant fragility eventually resulting in a military coup of 1969. General Mohamed Siad Barre’s military coup in October 1969 overthrew the second democratically elected but corrupt civilian government, assassinated President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, suspended the constitution and banned political parties. In their place General Siad Barre set up a Supreme Revolutionary Council of Military and police officials and declared ‘war on ignorance, hunger and tribalism as enemies of the people’(Christopher, 2006). Exploiting the Cold War superpower politics of the time, he declared Somalia a socialist state in 1970 and introduced Soviet-backed ‘Scientific Socialism’ as the ideological framework for the country’s future development. General Mohamed Siad Barre ruled over the revolutionary
council composed of his family’s clans (Judith and Judy, 2004). In some cases, the government provided arms to feuding clans. Siad Barre’s regime significantly damaged strong norms of governance within clans while also eroding governance mechanisms and agreements that had existed between clans. Despite the repressive measures, the informal economy still functioned throughout Somalia and enabled most of the populace to survive. The Siad Barre regime was able to effectively settle Somalia’s meta-game via continued force, coercion, and repression.

At independence the Republic of Somalia was engaged in to irredentism – a rejection of the colonial boundaries and an insistence on the political unity of all the Somali people of the Horn of Africa. It was at the highest point during Siad Barre’s regime. In Kenya, some members of the Somali population in the North-East Province mounted a low-level insurgency against the Kenyan government in the mid-1960s known as the shifta wars, a pejorative term which today is used to describe any armed banditry. The insurgency failed to attract much direct support from the new Somali government because the newly decolonized Somalia was not a bled economically and the movement was quelled. Worse, it resulted in the imposition of emergency rule in North-East Province which was only lifted in 1992. Somali Kenyans felt doubly betrayed by the Somali government, which talked the talk of irredentism but failed to back up the shifta fighters, and by the Kenyan government the administration of North-East province was treated as a form of military occupation (Menkhaus, 2005). This the idea of a rejection of the colonial boundaries and an insistence on the political unity of all the Somali people of the Horn of Africa also brought war with Ethiopia in 1977.

In 1977 Siad Barre invaded the Ogaden region of Ethiopia in an attempt to regain lands and people separated from the Somali state by colonialism. Somalia was heavily defeated when the Soviet Union switched sides and backed Ethiopia in the war (Bahru, 2001). Defeat in the Ogaden was soon followed by the emergence of armed opposition groups within Somalia – first the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) formed in 1978 by military officers from the Majeerteen clan in the north east, and then in 1980 the Somali
National Movement (SNM) drawing support mainly from the Isaq clan in the north-west. But it took another decade to overthrow Siad Barre (Christopher, 2006).

The Barre regime expropriated tens of thousands of hectares of land from mainly Bantu small-holders for large mechanized state farms, and well-placed civil servants exploited new land tenure and registration laws in the early 1990s to engage in massive land-grabs at the expense of villagers. A member of the Marehan clan, President Siad Barre used the authority of the state to advance the clan's power and interests in the Juba regions. Superior fire-power and political muscle allowed the Marehan to engage in expansion in the region. "Marehanization" policy continues to be the source of conflicts today. More broadly, the entire Somali experience of the state for 21 years under Siad Barre was not as a source of rule of law and mechanism of development, but rather as a source of oppression, terror, and expropriation of land, a weapon used by clans in power at the expense of rivals (Menkhaus, 2005).

The policies of the regime resulted in repression and inequitites throughout the country. Over time, dissident groups in various parts of the country formed and obtained the size and strength to wrestle control of certain areas from the regime. These groups included the Somali National Movement (SNM) in the northwest, the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) in the northeast, the United Somali Congress (USC) in central Somalia and the Somali, Patriotic Movement (SPM) in the south. The civil unrest caused by these dissident factions eventually spread to the capital of Mogadishu and resulted in the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. The collapse of the regime resulted in a power struggle among competing clans for control of the central government. While the various dissident groups had agreed to act as a united front in their fight against the Barre regime, cooperation did not continue in the wake of its collapse (Christopher, 2006).

Chaos and violence swept Somalia upon Siad Barre’s abdication, Somaliland’s declaration of independence, the fragmentation of the population along clan and sub-clan lines, the ensuing civil war and the rise of warlords such as Mohammed Farah Aidid all contributed to the displacement of three million Somalis. The conflict in Somalia is a
long-standing one, which has had a profound regional impact. The main conflicts in Somalia include inter-clan clashes and rivalry for power, warlords trying to assert their control over various regions in the country, piracy off the Somali coast, acts of terrorism perpetuated mostly by al-Shabaab and border conflicts with neighboring states, particularly Ethiopia and Kenya. Although conflict in Somalia started prior to 1991, the toppling of military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 and the subsequent collapse of central order accelerated civil unrest, resulting in the country experiencing over two decades of conflict (Samuel, 1993).

During the lengthy conflict, thousands of lives were lost, property was destroyed and people were forced to flee their homes and seek refuge in other countries, while others became internally displaced persons (IDPs) living in Somalia. In 2012, a reported 1,017,649 Somali refugees were being hosted in other countries, mainly in Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Yemen, while approximately 1.4 million people were internally displaced and settled in Somaliland and the south-central regions of the country (NHR, 2012). It is also worth noting that Somalia has come to the end of its transitional process in 2012 and has ushered in a new government and parliament with a new constitution. This progress has raised hope in many regional actors that a stable post-transition government will bring an end to insecurity in the country. The crisis in Somalia has received significant regional and international attention over the years, with a variety of actors intervening in a bid to help restore stability. Amongst the most notable interventions are the various United Nations (UN) operations which were launched periodically from 1992 to 1995. The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), launched in August 1992, was comprised of 500 Pakistani peacekeepers. Its main mandate was to monitor a ceasefire between belligerent warlords in the capital, Mogadishu and protect relief workers operating within Somalia following a humanitarian crisis caused by famine in the country. This UN operation, however, failed to meet its mandate because of the strong resistance from warring factions. This failure necessitated the formation of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the result of collaboration between UNOSOM I and the United States (US), in December 1992 (Kenneth, 1994). UNITAF was mandatated to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
to civilians and to protect food deliveries from warlord attacks. This operation, which ran until 1993, was also referred to as ‘Operation Restore Hope’. The operation formed the basis for Somali resentment of the US as the country was viewed as having sided with one faction of the warring parties over the other during the operation. In 1993, UNITAF was replaced by UNOSOM II, which operated until 1995 when it was withdrawn from Somalia (Chester 1995).

In 2006, neighboring Ethiopia invaded Somalia, sending in its troops at the behest of then president of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Abdullah Yusuf Ahmed, who called upon his eastern neighbors to help fight the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) that was considered a challenge to the government’s operations in the capital. This intervention was widely viewed as one aimed at achieving regime change and the imposition of a Somali government which would be friendly to Ethiopia. Unlike the tense relations between Somalia and Ethiopia following Ethiopia’s intervention in 2006, Kenya’s bilateral relations with Somalia have been guided for the most part by its core foreign policy principles, including the search to be a good neighbor. This approach, until recently, has worked for the two countries as Kenya played a significant role in the Somali peace process. Kenya hosted the Somali peace talks (2002–2004) and provided a base from which the TFG operated until it moved to Mogadishu in 2005. This is not to say that relations between the two states have always been smooth. Kenya and Somalia were involved in a cross-border dispute known as the Shifta Wars between 1963 and 1967. In this dispute, ethnic Somalis in Kenya’s North Eastern Province attempted to secede and now Kenya military intervened in Somalia. In this recent military intervention in Somalia, however, Kenya has demonstrated that international relations aside, state interests will always be pursued first.

1.2 Statement of the problem

The crisis in Somalia since 1991 has received significant regional and international attention over the years, with a variety of actors intervening in a bid to help restore stability. Amongst the most notable interventions are the various United Nations (UN)
operations which were launched periodically from 1992 to 1995. The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), launched in August 1992. This UN operation, however, failed to meet its mandate. The failure necessitated the formation of the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), the result of collaboration between UNOSOM I and the United States (US), in December 1992 (Kenneth, 1994). UNITAF was mandated to establish a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to civilians and to protect food deliveries from warlord attacks.

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Concerning the causes of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia the study by Daniel (2011) reveals Kenyan is motivated by a series of cross-border raids by the Somalia-based Islamist militant group al Shabaab. Anneli (2013) also states Kenya intervened to Somalia due to a number of attacks this began to deteriorate security in Kenya. Fredrick (2012) was also not different from Daniel and Anneli he describes that Kenya’s deployment of troops to Somalia is in pursuit of al-Shabab that has abducted foreign aid workers and tourists in Kenya. According to New African Magazine (2013) the interest of securing LAPSSET Project caused Kenya to intervene to Somalia militarily. The
above sources link the cause of the intervention with security issues but the cause may be beyond that so the researcher is interested to fill the gap by addressing political, economic and social causes.

With regards to consequences of the intervention Crisis Group (2012) stated as the intervention resulted the death of Civilians. The study by HSPI (2013) shows that by the intervention Kenyan forces took Kismayo, al-Shabaab’s home base and strategic seaport of Kismayo from which it generated significant amounts of revenue through the taxation of local economic activities. So consequences of the intervention are more than this and there is shortage of organized work on the issue in point therefore the researcher is interested to fill the gap regarding consequences. This research will answer the following research questions:

- Does Alshabab Challenge Kenya’s Politics?
- Is there economic interest for Kenya’s incursion in Somalia?
- What are the social burdens on Kenya by Somali refugees?
- What are the outcomes of the intervention over Kenya and Somalia?

1.3 Objectives of the study

The overall objective of this study is to understand Kenya’s military interventions in Somalia. Specific Objectives of the study are:

- to discover political causes of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia,
- to investigate economic causes of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia,
- to explore social causes of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia,
- to investigate consequences of Kenya’s military interventions in Somalia.

1.4 Significances of the study

This research is intended to have the following rationales (significance):

- to fill the gap in literatures regarding the causes and consequences of Kenyan military intervention in Somalia.
- to provide an input for any actor who wants to improve the relation of Somalia and Kenya.
- to motivate or inspire further research activities in this same area of Kenyan military intervention in Somalia.
to understand causes and consequences of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia.

❖ to help Kenyan policy makers in formulating their policy towards Somalia.
❖ to help Somalia policy makers in formulating their policy towards Kenya.

1.5 Scope of the study

In this study, the researcher investigated the causes and consequences of Kenyan military intervention in Somalia. Because of the constraints of time and resources, the research is limited geographically and thematically. Regarding the geographical delimitation, it is confined to Kenyan and Somali in east Africa. As far as the thematic delimitation is concerned, also the study is confined to causes and consequences of Kenyan military interventions in Somalia.

1.6 Limitations of the study

This research is subjected to limitation. The big limitation is the shortage of Primary sources. During the proposal stage the researcher had proposed and planned to make trips to the study area (Somalia and Kenya) for collecting primary data but the budget released was not more than paper and pencil. Due to this fact this study is conducted outside the target countries that are Somalia and Kenya. Therefore the researcher depended on secondary source mainly from documented literature; books, journals, news papers, articles, confidential papers, conference proceedings, government/corporate reports, dissertations, internet and magazines. This added more burdens to go through several materials, to find information that are relevant to the study.

1.7 Organization of the Study

The remaining part of the thesis is organized as follows. The second chapter describes about, methodologically relevant issues, procedures of data analysis, ethical considerations and about the study area Somalia and Kenya. The third chapter deals with literatures reviewed. In the fourth chapter an effort is made to conceptualize and theorize military intervention. The fifth chapter critically analyzes the causes and consequences of Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia. Finally chapter six is briefly about recommendation and conclusion.
Chapter Two

2 Methodology and Study Area

2.1 Methodology

For this study the researcher opted qualitative methodological approach as the most suitable method to answer the research questions. A case study design of qualitative method or approach was deemed most suitable for this study because case studies tend to allow one to answer “why” “what” and “how” questions more thoroughly. Also case study design is familiar to social scientists because of its popularity in psychology, law and political science (Black, 1999). The data to explore the issue are collected by using review of documents. For data case this research is relied on secondary data. The secondary sources are mainly from documented literature; books, journals, news papers, articles, confidential papers, conference proceedings, government/corporate reports, dissertations, internet and magazines were critically analyzed.

2.1.1 Review of Documents

The researcher reviewed books, journals, news papers, Conference proceedings, Government/corporate reports, theses and dissertations, Internet and magazines to acquire secondary data for the issue under study.

2.1.2 Media monitoring

Newspapers are a constant feature of the intervention; for the duration of the intervention and thereafter. “The press provides a potentially valuable source of information for research purposes. One reason for this is that newspapers and magazines can supply good, up-to-date information” (Denscombe,1998: 228). So, the researcher reviewed newspapers and media sources like IRIN News ,Business News, The Economist, Somalia Newsroom ,Towards Freedom and African Magazine for writing this thesis because of their relevancy and accessibility.
2.1.3 Procedures of Data Analysis

After collecting the appropriate amount of data an attempt was made to organize, analyze and interpret it in a sound manner. While doing this the following important steps were followed:

Step 1: Data Reduction: At this stage the vital and credible data was filtered out from among the bulks of information collected.

Step 2: Data Display: here the datum holding similar or coherent information was arranged and categorized together in order to make analysis and interpretation easier and simple.

Step 3: Data Analysis and Interpretation: here the datum was systematically organized in a sound and meaningful manner. An attempt was also made to make its analysis and interpretation as logical, objective and reliable as possible.

Step 4: Major Findings, Conclusions and Suggestions: using triangulation technique the researcher developed detail and complete description about the subject of the study. Based on the findings obtained, conclusions were drawn and suggestions were made.

2.1.4 Ethical considerations

It is true that any research in the field of the social science disciplines is vulnerable to bias and subjectivity. Especially, the degree of this problem would be high when the subject is not widely addressed by researches or lacks enough literatures. With regard to this study, however, an effort was made to avoid bias and to be as objective as possible.

2.2 Study Area

2.2.1 Somalia

History: From the 7th to the 10th century, Arab and Persian trading posts were established along the coast of present-day Somalia. Nomadic tribes occupied the interior, occasionally pushing into Ethiopian territory. In the 16th century, Turkish rule extended to the northern coast, and the sultans of Zanzibar gained control in the south. After
British occupation of Aden in 1839, the Somali coast became its source of food. The French established a coal-mining station in 1862 at the site of Djibouti, and the Italians planted a settlement in Eritrea. Egypt, which for a time claimed Turkish rights in the area, was succeeded by Britain. By 1920, a British and an Italian protectorate occupied what is now Somalia. The British ruled the entire area after 1941, with Italy returning in 1950 to serve as United Nations trustee for its former territory (Judith and Judy, 2004).

By 1960, Britain and Italy granted independence to their respective sectors, enabling the two to join as the Republic of Somalia on July 1, 1960. Somalia broke diplomatic relations with Britain in 1963 when the British granted the Somali-populated Northern Frontier District of Kenya to the Republic of Kenya. On Oct. 15, 1969, President Abdi Rashid Ali Shermarke was assassinated and the army seized power. Maj. Gen. Mohamed Siad Barre, as president of a renamed Somali Democratic Republic, leaned heavily toward the USSR. In 1977, Somalia openly backed rebels in the easternmost area of Ethiopia, the Ogaden Desert, which had been seized by Ethiopia at the turn of the century. Somalia acknowledged defeat in an eight-month war against the Ethiopians that year, having lost much of its 32,000-man army and most of its tanks and planes (Bahru, 2001).

President Siad Barre fled the country in late Jan. 1991. His departure left Somalia in the hands of a number of clan-based guerrilla groups, none of which trusted each other. Between Jan. 1991 and Aug. 2000, Somalia had no working government. A fragile parliamentary government was formed in 2000, but it expired in 2003 without establishing control of the country. In Oct. 2002, new talks to establish a government began; in Aug. 2004 a 275-member transitional parliament was inaugurated for a five-year term. Parliament selected a national president in September, Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the president of the breakaway region of Puntland. The new government, however, spent its first year operating out of Kenya Somalia remained too violent and unstable to enter eventually settling in the provincial town of Baidoa and then Mogadishu. Indirect presidential elections were held in Somalia on 10 September 2012. The newly appointed Federal Parliament elected Hassan Sheikh Mohamud as the first
President of Somalia since the dissolution of the Transitional Federal Government (Christopher, 2006).

**Geography:** Somalia, situated in the Horn of Africa, lies along the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It is bounded by Djibouti in the northwest, Ethiopia in the west, and Kenya in the southwest. In area it is slightly smaller than Texas. Generally arid and barren, Somalia has two chief rivers, the Shebelle and the Juba. The terrain is mostly flat to swelling plateau rising to hills in north and the climate is principally arid and semi-arid with four seasons and the total area of 637,657 square kilometers (CIA, 2011).

**Key data and population profiles**

Somalia was ranked the least peaceful country (153/153) in the 2011 Global Peace Index (GPI 2011). The prolonged lack of effective central government has resulted in a chronic lack of basic and sustainable social services. In most areas, there is little or no access to basic health, water, sanitation or education facilities. Despite the lack of a proper banking sector, private money transfer services (Hawala) facilitate vital remittances from Somalis living abroad. Remittances to Somali families are estimated at up to $1 billion a year . According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2010, Somalia is the most corrupt country in the world . The population is 85% Somali and 15% Bantu-speaking African and other non-Somali (including 30,000 Arabs). The largest ethnic Somali groups include Hawiye, Darod, Issaq, Dir and Digil-Mirifle. Djibouti is Somalia’s main export partner (30%), followed by Kenya (8%) (CIA, 2011).

**2.2.2 Kenya**

**History:** Kenya was colonized in 1895. It became part of the British empire. Kenya was maintained as a Protectorate (British sphere of influence), and in 1920 it officially became a British colony. Kenya attained independence in 1963. Jomo Kenyatta was Kenya’s first president and was in power from 1963 – 1978; (died in August 1978) – he was a Kikuyu from Central Kenya (Kevin, 1995). Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi was Kenya’s Second president ruled from 1978 – 2002. He was removed from power through
popular vote. Mwai Kibaki came to presidential power in 2002. On 27 December 2007, Kenyan elections were held for presidency, parliament, and civic positions. The most publicised and controversial race was between incumbent president Mwai Kibaki, Party of National Unity candidate, and his opposer, Raila Odinga, Orange Democratic Movement candidate (the third most popular presidential candidate was Kalonzo Musyoka). The fierce fight for presidency didn’t end when the Electoral Commission of Kenya declared Kibaki’s re-election three days later on 30 December. Odinga had been leading by several hundred votes after the second round of counting, so his loss was met with furious accusations of rigging the election and of Kibaki being sworn in without all the results counted. A recount was conducted, but the outcome was the same and Mwai Kibaki was in presidency up to 2013. The general election held in Kenya on 4 March 2013 brought Uhuru Kenyatta in to presidency and now Kenya is under his rule (Country Profile: Kenya, 2007).

**Geography:** Kenya lies across the equator in Eastern Africa between Somalia and Tanzania and bordering the Indian Ocean. The total area of 580,367 square kilometers (somewhat larger than France) includes 13,400 square kilometers of water, mainly in Lake Turkana (also known as Lake Rudolf) and Kenya’s portion of Lake Victoria (Saadia, 1963). The terrain is low plains along coast rise to central highlands bisected by Great Rift Valley; fertile plateau in west; desert-like conditions in the north. And the climate is arid and semi-arid in the northern and eastern parts of the country, tropical along the coast (Country Profile: Kenya, 2007).

**Key data and population profiles**

Most of the population is highly concentrated in the central and western regions, which contain the most fertile agricultural areas. There are more than 70 tribes or ethnic groups, which are divided into three linguistic groups: Bantu, Nilotes, Cushites. The Kikuyu are the biggest ethnic group (22% of the population) followed by Luhya 14%, Luo 13%, Kalenjin 12%, Kamba 11%, Kisii 6%, Meru 6%, other African 15%, non-African (Asian, European, and Arab) 1%. The majority of the population is Christian, an estimated 10% is Muslim, 10% follow indigenous beliefs. An estimated 50% of the population lives
below the national poverty line. The unemployment rate in 2011 is estimated to be 40%. The Kenyan economy is market-based, with some state owned infrastructure enterprises, and is highly dependent on rain fed agriculture (22% of GNP) and tourism (11% of GNP). Agriculture employs about 75% of the country's population although only 15% of Kenya’s total land is sufficiently fertile to be farmed. According to the UNEP Water Stress Index, Kenya is a water scarce country with only up to 1,000 cubic meters of fresh water available per person per year. Kenya’s inland areas are largely arid with 2/3 of the country receiving less than 500 mm of rainfall per year, limiting agricultural potential. Arid and Semi-Arid Lands are also more prone to harsh weather conditions, mainly droughts. Kenya’s economy is steadily recovering from the global financial crisis with a growth of 4.9% for 2010 and forecasted to reach between 5.3% and 6% annually over the next two years. Despite this, Kenya remains characterized by poor governance combined with political instability. Recent external economic shocks include a surge in oil prices attributed to instability in Middle East and North Africa, and the tsunami and earthquake (CIA, 2011)
Chapter Three

3. Review of Related Literature

With regards to Military intervention the work by Smith examines the key facets of the changing world situation to determine the future applicability of armed intervention. The author argues that armed intervention has been widely applied in the past, however its usefulness is being challenged on a number of grounds; for example, the inherent risk of escalation, which was acceptable during the nuclear age; the respect for sovereignty and international law as exemplified by the United Nations; the absence of situations where vital national interests could be served by such tactics; as well as the adverse domestic and world opinions toward any form of intervention (Smith, 1974). Meanwhile, a study by Chakrabarti seeks to explore the problem of intervention in the context of a contemporary demand for international control. Chakrabarti does a brief survey of the evolving public attitude towards intervention as an instrument of state policy and examines the forces that have been at work in the changing traditional laissez-faire regime (Chakrabarti, 1974).

Ursschwarz (1970) examines intervention and confrontation as doctrine and as practice, in historical perspective but with a contemporary focus. The author treats confrontation as an exercise in mutual deterrence, a means of limiting the use of force and pursuing objectives without resort to war, intervention as a strategy to limit the use of armed coercion and as a strategy to keep events under control of an actor in pursuit of its national goals. Dunér (1995) states that the persistent feature of the state system has been military intervention and although the system has been shaken to its foundations and remodeled, this has not changed military intervention. He goes on to argue that, since the end of the Second World War, there has been an increase in military encroachment and some analysts contend that there is a move towards a world, which is incessantly intervention-prone. The interventionist debate is set out by a number of authors and, in this case, the scholarly work by Stern describes the outgrowth of the need to identify the achievements, the misconceptions and mistakes of the recent past to assess the direction
of international relations, and to identify the changed potentials and consequences of military intervention. This analysis focuses on the limitations of military intervention primarily as an analytical tool. Through a concern with limitations, it is possible to highlight changes that are taking place in the role of force and violence in international relations. Given that conventional, popular and polemic thinking about military forces is fragmentary; this book aims to be more holistic and systemic in examining both consequences and limitations of military intervention (Stern, 1977). Talentino (2005), in a book *Military Intervention after the Cold War: The Evolution of Theory and Practice*, explores how and why this change took place; looking at the ways in which both ideas and actions changed in the post-Cold War period to make military intervention a tool of international security and a defining feature of the international system. Although intervention is often touted as a strategy to rebuild collapsed states, successful interventions are uncommon. The author argues that standards of human rights and responsible governance have become part of the definition of international security and an intrinsic facet of the new interventionist debate. Lyons and Mastanduno (1995), in their work, *Beyond Westphalia: State Sovereignty and International Intervention*, wrote that each nation is perceived to be sovereign, and its borders viewed as sacred. However, with the emergence of global challenges and the incessant interdependence of nations, it has become apparent that what happens or does not happen to one country can have ripple effects elsewhere. This publication brings together a distinguished group of scholars, to explore the questions of whether and how recent political changes have shifted the balance between the sovereign rights of states and the authority of the larger international community.

The UN *Report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change* (2004), envisages a new vision of collective security. The idea is based on the need to address the major threats to international peace and security globally. It is also acknowledged that we live in an age of unprecedented interconnection among threats to international peace and security, and mutual vulnerability between weak and strong states and other actors. Connaughton (1992), in a publication *Military Intervention in the 1990s: A New Logic of War*, takes the opportunity presented by the new international order, to argue how and
why it is possible for multilateral military intervention, as part of a collective security regime in the 1990s, to succeed. Connaughton builds a plausible matrix of theories and principles, which are tested by detailed references to the 1991 Gulf Crisis. This book is the first comprehensive professional study of future interventions in terms of the complexity of political and military issues at the operational level. In a book, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States*, Jackson (2000) addresses crucial normative difficulties that arise when human beings around the world organize their political lives and conduct their political relations on the basis of a society of independent states. The study examines modern international society by taking cognizance of the norms of state sovereignty and the ethics of statecraft, with specific reference to the post-1945 and post-1989 periods. It presents a comprehensive analysis of the most prominent international issues including peace and security, war and intervention, human rights, failed states, territories and boundaries, and democracy. The nexus between interventionist debate and the humanitarian-failed state debates is significant due to its relevance to Africa. Jackson’s work is good example of how earlier realist notions are now supplemented, if not overridden, by the “normative turn” in contemporary writings on intervention.

A study by Krain on *International Intervention and the Severity of Genocides and Politicides*, examines the efficacy of overt military intervention in slowing or stopping the killing during ongoing genocide or politicide. This study provides six hypotheses regarding the potential effects of intervention on the severity of genocide or politicide, which are tested in a cross-national longitudinal analysis of all genocides or politicides from 1995 to 1997. The results of this study suggest that interventions that directly challenge the perpetrator, or aid the target of the brutal policy, are the only effective type of military response. The study also posits that impartial interventions seem ineffective at reducing severity, and interventions to challenge the perpetrator do not make matters worse for the targets of genocide or politicide (Krain, 2005).

In Africa, in *The Logic of a Soft Intervention Strategy: The United States and Conflict Conciliation in Africa*, (Rothchild ,2006) contends that limited interests in Africa and the
nature of public pressures leave few, if any, alternatives to utilizing the soft intervention concept in most cases. This is because, within the category of soft intervention, there seems to be a continuum of means leading to possible migration into coercive intervention. Meanwhile Gegout (2005) in an article *Causes and Consequences of the EU’s Military Intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo: A Realist Explanation* explores European Union (EU) military intervention in the summer of 2003. This article addresses a few questions: why did the EU intervene in the DRC; what were the implications of this EU intervention for co-operation among EU states on military issues, future EU military interventions, and EU presence and role-playing in the world? This article shows that realism can explain the EU policy towards the DRC, despite its stance not to consider military intervention in an African state as plausible. (Smith and Hay’s, 1999) work on *Canada and the Crisis in Eastern Zaire* includes a chapter that explains how Canada, of all countries, came to take the lead in attempting an armed intervention in eastern Zaire, now the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It describes the challenges of middle-power management of a multi-state coalition, the confusion of facts on the ground in a complex emergency, and the lessons that may be drawn from the ambiguous conclusion of this unusual episode. *Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society*, by Wheeler (2000), provides a theoretically informed account of seven interventions: three in the 1970s and four in the 1990s. The author suggests that the failure of the UN to prevent and stop the Rwandan Genocide of 1994 demonstrated the limits of the evolving norm of humanitarian intervention.

The traditional wisdom emerging in the literature was that humanitarian intervention was securing a new legitimacy after the Cold War but as Rwanda showed, this claim exaggerated the impact of the end of the Cold War. Von Hippel (1995) in *The Non-Interventionary Norm Prevails: An Analysis of Western Sahara*, suggests that fears, that the purportedly sacred norm of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states has eroded in the last few years, are not utterly baseless. This is a crucial matter as far as Africa is. Excuses to intervene, which until recently receive sanction by the UN Security Council; include humanitarian concerns, as in Somalia and Rwanda; international peace
and security as in Kuwait and Bosnia; and the denial of democracy, as in Haiti – all of which differ from the intervention in the Cold War years.

Cilliers and Sturman, in their article *The Right Intervention: Enforcement Challenges of the African Union*, argue that sovereignty has often been used to protect leaders at the expense of citizens. The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) allows for intervention without the approval of the target state in a way that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) system of absolute consensus never did. Guaranteeing that intervention is effectual is as imperative as the decision of when and why to intervene. Sanctions, criminal prosecutions and military interventions are the broad options available to the AU. To be effective, though, the AU will need to agree on how intervention will be authorized as well as on mechanisms for its implementation (Cilliers and Sturman, 2002).

In 1990, Somerville’s collation of ten years’ research resulted in a book, *Foreign Military Intervention in Africa*. In this volume, the author focuses on different aspects of political, military and economic development in Africa, as well as the prevalence of foreign intervention in African affairs. This publication’s point of departure is the legacy of colonization, from where it moves on to national wars of liberation to the question of why states intervene, as well as discussing the roots of intervention. Hermann and Kegley state that foreign military intervention is arguably the most frequent type of military force in use and under debate today. Thus, it is, in their words, "one of today's most pressing security issues . As major wars have declined in frequency over recent decades and the efficacy of costly and time-consuming economic sanctions is questioned, foreign military intervention seems to have become a sine qua non of modern statecraft (Hermann and Kegley, 1996).

A survey of literature on the causes and consequences of foreign military intervention discloses varieties of factors as causes for intervention and broad categories of consequences of foreign military intervention. Strategic interests played a crucial role for intervention. The European occupation of Africa was spurred to a significant extent by
pressure from Christian missionary societies to suppress the slave trade and idolatry, and to spread Christianity and "civilization." The philanthropic imperialism with which the European powers entered Africa was regarded as benign at the time, but history allows us to take a more skeptical view with regard to the interests at stake (Alex de and Rakiya, 1994). During the Cold War the promotion of democracy as a motive of an intervention was taken by the United States to preserve or create democratic governance in a target nation James (1996) according to Robert (1967) aspects of socioeconomic development, aspects of political development, characteristics of the military establishment itself and foreign influences can cause foreign military intervention. Pearson (1974) also describes six main policy issue areas or interests which could be affected by or related to interventions and any particular intervention could relate to a variety of interests. These are territorial acquisition or domain, protection of social groups in target, protection of economic interests in target, protection of diplomatic or military interests (embassies, bases) in target, regional power balances and ideology. Territorial and social protective interventions seem likely to occur among neighboring or proximate countries. In many parts of the world, national boundaries separate social groups, leaving groups of one country concerned for their brethren across the border. While territorial claims may often relate to potential economic interests (such as desire for access to natural resources), any given state's existing economic interests are likely to be far-flung, since most states are unlikely to find needed commodities (at suitable prices) or markets close by, and since neighboring small powers are likely to be competitive producers. Super- and great powers (the United States, the USSR, the United Kingdom, France, China, Japan, the People's Republic of China, Germany) are likely to have the most economic, diplomatic, and military interests abroad, and some of these powers, as opposed to middle or small powers, are able to intervene to protect such interests even far from home.

In addition, ideology and concern for regional power balances may spark interventions by large or small powers, but small powers are more likely than major powers to be concerned with regional (Zionism/anti-Zionism, pan-Indonesia, and so on), as opposed to worldwide (Communism/anti-Communism) ideologies (Keith,1990). As regards the nation most likely to intervene in Africa, It is reminded of the close relationship between France and her former colonies, of her strategic and economic aims, and her attempts at
becoming a world power. Military intervention can be initiated for quite varied social (such as anti-drugs crusades), environmental, humanitarian and politico military reasons (Richard, 2002). The stronger the alliance between the secessionists and an external power the greater the risk of military intervention in the secessionist war by the external power. Anne (2007) domestic conflicts attract active foreign military intervention to affect disputes, policies, or conditions in the target state.

With regards to the consequences of foreign military intervention foreign military intervention as the dispatch of national armed forces to another sovereign state has influence on political, economic, or social conditions in the target country (Pearson and Baumann, 199). Foreign military intervention has broader impacts on developing states' governing institutions, their economic performance, and their citizens' quality of life. Some interventions may have far-reaching and long-lasting impacts on the target state, while the effects of others are fleeting at best (Jeffrey, 2006). The American-led operation in Somalia that began when U.S. Marines hit the Mogadishu beaches in December 1992 continues to profoundly affect the debate over humanitarian intervention and led to humanitarian crisis the deaths of 18 U.S. Army Rangers on October 3-4, 1993 (Clarke and Herbst, 1996).

This study pays attention on causes and consequences of Kenyan military intervention in Somalia. Somalia was the center of foreign military intervention since the toppling of military dictator Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991 and this was followed by Operation Provide Relief (UNOSOM I) 15 Aug 1992 - 9 Dec 1992. Its failure initiated operation Restore Hope (UNITAF) 9 Dec 1992 - 4 May 1993 then USFORSOM (UNOSOM II) 4 May 1993 - 31 Mar 1994 (Kenneth, 1994). After years Ethiopia in 2006, partly at the request of the TFG, deployed an unspecified number of ENDF soldiers to Baidoa in July 2006 following the capture of a nearby city by militias loyal to the ICU and to minimize the security threats posed by ICU, which is one of the radical factions in Somalia. On October 16, 2011 the Kenyan army crossed the border into southern Somalia. Therefore very few literatures discusses Kenyan military intervention in Somalia. Therefore this study analyzed the motives and/or causes and consequences of Kenya’s military interventions in Somalia.
Chapter Four

4. Conceptual and theoretical framework of Foreign Military intervention

4.1. Foreign military intervention

A diversity of definitions in relation to military intervention are found in the literature of International Relations. Foreign overt military intervention represents overt military operations undertaken directly by a state’s regular military forces within foreign lands in such a manner as to risk immediate combat, hence war, if they encounter armed resistance. It includes all combat-ready deployments of conventional ground forces, air and commando raids, and naval and artillery shelling, whether or not such operations result in direct bloodshed. It excludes less blatant forms of international interference that do not necessarily risk international war immediately, including covert operations, military alerts, shows of force, pacific military deployments, incidental incursions, cross border small arms fire, aerial or naval encounters, and actions of irregular forces, police units, diplomatic personnel, and international peace forces or international observation groups that do not include overt military operations (Tillema, 1989).

In his renowned work, Non Intervention and International Order, Vincent (1974) defines military intervention as [the] activity undertaken by a state, a group within a state, a group of states or an international organization which interferes coercively in the domestic affairs of another state. It is a discrete event having a beginning and an end, and it is aimed at the authority structure of the target state. It is not necessarily lawful or unlawful, but it does break a conventional pattern of international relations. The brief definition by Vincent contributes to a working definition in this study. Vertzberger (1998) argues that military intervention should be conceptualized in three different ways. He first defines it empirically by submitting that the term intervention means coercive military intrusion into the internal or foreign affairs of another state. Second, Vertzberger
suggests that conceptually defined, foreign military intervention means: State-organized, state-controlled and goal-orientated military coercion by one foreign state in the territory of another. The activities are directed at its political structures with the purpose of preserving or changing that structure thereby influencing its domestic political process or certain of its foreign policies. Third, he argues, operationally defined, military intervention involves the direct, overt commitment of uniformed, combat-ready units and formations to conduct conventional operations in a foreign state. The intervention under study here is organized and controlled by intervening country. In Rwanda in 1990, a foreign intervener, Uganda, changed the political structure. In the same way, in 1996 - 97, the Mobutu regime was removed from power by foreign military intervention, whereas the 1998 intervention was resisted. In Lesotho in 1998, the foreign intervention shored up the existing regime. In spite of theoretical difficulties physical military interventions continued and help to shape the debate. Influenced by an array of definitions provided in the text, a working definition of military intervention (whether just or not) can thus be constructed. For the purpose of the study, military intervention can be defined as coercive military actions by one or more states involving the use of armed force in to another state.

4.1.1 Conceptual Debates on Military Intervention

Hardly any subject receives more attention, or invites more controversy, than the study of war and its causes, importance, and justifications. Military philosophy has characterized war as a definitive experience in international relations and an inherently political act. Since the time of Clausewitz (1977) cited in Philips,(1984), the difficulty of preventing or limiting these most violent and volatile policy instruments has emerged as a principal dilemma for scholars of international relations. Stanley (1984) has remarked that military intervention is practically equivalent to international politics, from the genesis of time to the present. Although studies of war and conflict, in a general sense, have retained their significance, research on military intervention as a particular type of military activity has accelerated in recent years – in large part due to shifts in the nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War (Hoffman,1984)
4.1.2 The Concept of Military Intervention

Rosenau was amongst the first to raise concerns about the inherent ambiguity of the concept of intervention. He attributes the paucity of scholarly writings on the problem of intervention . . . [in developing] systematic knowledge on conditions under which intervention behavior is initiated, sustained, and abandoned”, largely to deficiencies in conceptualization (Rosenau, 1996). Kegley and Hermann (1996) extended Rosenau’s concerns over conceptual ambiguity to competing interpretations of military intervention as well, noting that the same conflict behavior can be classified as military intervention, other intervention, or non-intervention based on differing indices.

In exploring the contribution that just war theory can make to contemporary interventionist ethics, it is essential to be clear about our understanding of the core concept. Throughout human history, intervention has taken many forms. Following the demise of the Cold War era, the totality of military intervention activities has generated new modes of intervention that pose new challenges. One result is that it becomes more complex to comprehend the meaning of the term intervention. Garrett (1999) notes that examples of intervention stretch out almost continually, and in consequence, he argues, that the concept has become “inherently broad and variable”. However, two predominantly pressing reasons can be attributed to this. First is the expanding assortment of motivations that drive intervention; the other is the burgeoning array of interventionist actors, and particularly the emergence of non-state actors as influential political players. In the humanitarian domain, globalization and changes in the international media are clearly relevant, but the creation of aggressively political non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the rise of new humanitarianism are critical (Ibid). It is often argued that intervention now takes so many political forms that it is broadly defined as interference in the political affairs of another society. Encouraged by the broad definitional nuance and dispute that characterize the terrain, writers on humanitarian intervention have already undertaken exercises of defining intervention. Tillema (1989) Military intervention pertained to instances of battles involving regular foreign military forces, generally resulting in fewer than one thousand fatalities; in
subsequent analyses, he expands the criteria to include military operations undertaken
openly by a state’s regular military forces within a specific foreign land, in such a manner
to risk immediate combat. (Ibid) clearly pursues a narrow conceptualization, excluding
less blatant forms of international interference such as covert operations, military alerts,
and shows of force, deployment of units not immediately prepared for combat, and
incursions across international borders that do not involve occupation of territory as out
of bounds, in thinking about military intervention.

4.1.3 The New Interventionist Debate

Ayoob (2002) argues that the notion of intervention has been given a qualitatively new
and different drive in two ways. Firstly, intervention became continually defined in terms
of purposes or goals that were different from the traditional objectives that intervention
was expected to achieve before the 1990s. These goals were supposed to be humanitarian
and universal in nature rather than political and strategic. Secondly, intervention was
sought to be projected as being undertaken by, or on behalf of, the ‘international
community’, instead of a state or a coalition of states.

Contemporary debate over military intervention was influenced by the many practitioners
with experience in the executive or legislative branches. Of significance in this debate,
are prominent figures such as Les Aspin, Collin Powell, George Bush, Bill Clinton,
Madeleine Albright and William Perry – who have expressed views on the question of
when and how to, or not to, use force (Ibid). Stedman (1992) argued that the new
interventionists seek to end civil wars and stop governments from abusing the rights of
their peoples. For them civil war became more prevalent, violent and threatening to
international security than in previous eras. They believe that active international
intervention is necessary to bring a resemblance of order to the post-Cold War world,
based on the dubious presumption that the Cold War's end makes internal violence
somehow more tractable. However, their often contradictory demands for intervention,
either mediation, an active combat role on behalf of a warring side, or simply shielding
civilians caught in the middle, contradict a lack of coherent understanding of peacemaking in internal conflicts.

The new interventionists, being the American and some Western scholars and practitioners alike, advocate a new humanitarian order in which governments are held, by force, if necessary, to higher standards of respect for human life. These advocates contend that the protection of ethnic, religious and other minorities that are endangered by conflict and alienated from a hostile government is now increasingly a recognized obligation of the international community. To the adherents of this approach, sovereignty is no longer a tool for creating international order, but a political constraint on international action (Deng, 1992). In the words of former UN Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, “We are clearly witnessing what is almost certainly an appealing shift in public attitudes toward the belief that the defense of the oppressed in the name of morality should prevail, transcending frontiers and legal documents”( Scheffer,1992:75).

The new interventionists seek to establish guidelines to make certain that the UN polices any regime failing to meet the broadly, and often ill-defined, “humanitarian needs” of its people. Such guidelines are possible because, it is believed, the end of the Cold War has vanquished the ideological constraints on intervention in the domestic affairs of UN member states. Guidelines for intervention would signify a significant shift in the time-honored meaning of the terms of international relations. Sovereignty would no longer be inherent in states, but with the people within them; self-determination would no longer refer to peoples, but to individuals. In contrast to international consensus that characterized the post-war order until 1989, the use of force has, apparently, become an accepted means to conduct international affairs. The Western power establishment reintroduced this concept under the guise of collective enforcement actions supposedly based on the UN Charter but essentially derived from the strategic interests of a small minority of member states, under the leadership of the only remaining superpower.
4.1.4 African Cases of Military Intervention

The previous themes expounded the concept of military intervention, conceptual debates on military intervention and the new interventionist debate. Under this theme the debate on military intervention furthers. African is not exceptional to other parts of the world and experienced a number of military interventions some of those are the 1992 United States (US)-led intervention in Somalia, the 1994 intervention in Rwanda, the intervention in Darfur in 2004 the 2000 intervention by Britain in Sierra Leone and 2008 African Union (AU) intervention in the Comoros. Somalia, Rwanda and Darfur are epitomes of unsuccessful cases of intervention, given that in Rwanda intervention never, or happened much too late after the death of almost a million people; while Somalia is an extreme case of an ongoing conflict amidst numerous military interventions and an almost totally collapsed state. Darfur on the other hand represents a case which followed Rwanda, where in the latter case pronouncements were made to avoid a repeat of the former. Sierra Leone and the Comoros illustrate successful cases of intervention, where a state, in the form of Britain, with the capacity to carry out such an intervention was willing and able to stage an intervention; while the Comoros represents a more contemporary case where the AU intervened successfully.

Since the end of the Cold War, the most contentious revolution in United Nations (UN) activities has been the amplified resort to peace enforcement, i.e. armed intervention, or the threat of armed intervention, pursuant of a UN mandate authorizing the coercive use of military power to induce conformity with UN sanctions or resolutions. While the UN launched only one enforcement operation between 1945 and 1990 – in Korea in 1950 – four have been authorized since then; Kuwait in 1990, Somalia in 1992, Rwanda in 1994 and Haiti in 1994; and two others have been supported; Liberia in 1990 and Northern Iraq in 1991. The emergence of this new practice of UN-sponsored military intervention has generated debate in academia and among political elites concerning the legitimate use of force, the arguments for and against a UN standing army and the conditions for success. Less attention has been given to the question of why a variety of military interventions
were initiated (Jakobsen, 1996). Two African cases of military intervention are taken for further analyzing of the case.

4.1.5 The Case of Somalia, 1992

Due to its geographic location, Somalia drew the attention of super powers for much of the Cold War period. By March 1991 after the demise of the Cold War, Somalia again emerged central to post-Cold War interventions. One and a half years before the 1992 intervention, assistant Secretary of State, Herman Cohen pronounced Somalia a civil strife disaster, at which point the United States Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance began to fund relief efforts. Nonetheless, it was not until the spring of 1992, that Somalia became a major issue in Washington. An admixture of strenuous lobbying by officials within the US executive coupled with increased media attention raised the profile of Somalia during this period. By 14 August 1991 the Bush administration had ordered a major airlift of relief supplies – Operation Provide Relief to Somalia. The airlift represented a major intensification in US involvement with the Somalia crisis. It epitomized George Bush’s political commitment to the country (Livingston, 1995).

According to Talentino, emergency aid became the only currency of an already collapsed economy, thus indicative of a method of acquiring both money and power. As aid poured in, it provided both prospects and competition for resources, and this led to two problems. Firstly, the availability of aid amplified violence as gangs and factions competed for control of international supplies. Secondly, the focus on Mogadishu as a distribution point brought the displaced population into the areas of intense conflict, thus subjecting more desperate people to the zones of warlords. With the situation exacerbating on a daily basis, the distribution of aid became intricate and impossible, threatening the humanitarian operation in its entirety (Talentino, 2005). After a series of interagency meetings, which were called in order to develop policy options for President Bush, three options had been developed. The first was continuing with aid operations and seeking to enhance the UN presence in Somalia. The second involved organizing an international coalition of forces under UN command in which US military airlift, sealift and logistical
and communications support would be offered but not ground troops. The third option was sending in a division of US troops under US command and control (Cusimano, 1995). On 25 November Bush agreed on the third option and proceeded to offer the UN up to 28 000 troops to spearhead an intervention. It was on 4 December that the UN Security Council voted to support intervention, and an announcement was made by Bush that US troops would be sent to Somalia. By 9 December, the first US troops were arriving in Somalia (Robinson, 2001). These troops were subsequently joined by other forces, to create United Task Force (UNITAF), which was charged with restoring security in limited geographic areas to allow the distribution of aid. But not achieved its objectives and finally defeated infamously.

4.1.6 British Intervention in Sierra Leone, 2000

The Lomé peace agreement of 1999 sought an end to the civil war in Sierra Leone via a number of restricted political compromises to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). UN Security Council Resolution 1289 noted the withdrawal of the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) force, with its meaningful contribution towards the restoration of democracy and the maintenance of peace, security and stability, and reinforced the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). At the beginning May 2000, RUF rebels reneged the agreement by returning to arms, attacking UN forces and detaining about 500 people. The United Kingdom decided to intervene seeking to achieve a set of goals: to protect and evacuate almost 500 British nationals, to secure the use of Freetown airport, to provide technical advice to UNAMSIL, and to help stabilize the situation in Sierra Leone (Ortega, 2001).

The British government’s ethical diplomacy ended the violence in Sierra Leone against a population that had been subjected to a particularly brutal war since 1991. The 650 paratroopers who landed in May 2000 to support pro-government forces and the 11 000 UN blue helmets carried the war to the rebels of the RUF, forcing them to sign and abide by a final peace agreement. Nonetheless, peace had been imposed at a heavy price: willingness to overlook the war crimes committed by pro-government forces, an embargo
on aid to RUF zones and the transfer of the most intransigent combatants to Liberia, where some of them were encouraged to overthrow Charles Taylor (Weissman, 2004).

The decision to deploy British troops in the largest unilateral military intervention since the Falklands war was take amid some confusion. Arguably, the Sierra Leonean crisis came when Prime Minister Blair was preoccupied with the situation in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republican Army’s statement on decommissioning. It is argued that the main catalyst stemmed from a panic-stricken report from the UN, claiming that Freetown was poised to fall to the rebels. Nonetheless, it appears as if British military intervention in Sierra Leone was not a foregone conclusion. It is the British presence in major operations outside Europe remained less likely, in part because of its strategy to enhance peacekeeping capacity of African governments, and partly because peacekeeping would most likely assume a profile of infrastructural support for other nations, specifically in Africa (William, 2002). Another inspiring tale of a successful military intervention was staged by the AU in the Comoros in 2007.

The extent to which the media played a role in the events preceding the British intervention in Sierra Leone remains a mystery. Theirs was an intervention driven by the interests of its citizens, as well as a faltering UN mission. Even though what unfolded in Sierra Leone invoked humanitarian concerns by those geared to intervene, these events did not inspire extensive media coverage and its subsequent effect in shaping matters of intervention. This intervention was shrouded in secrecy especially during its planning phase and towards the execution. The role of the media in this case was largely focusing on the successful nature of the intervention, rather than the humanitarian concerns. Another inspiring tale of a successful military intervention was staged by the AU in the Comoros in 2007.
4.2 Theoretical Approaches to Military Intervention

Given the fact that military intervention is an area that has been extensively studied, it is imperative to contextualize my analysis in Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia. However, prior to this task, this section deals with four alternative images or perspectives of international relations, which are found within the security studies literature, namely constructivism, idealism, pluralism and realism. While these perspectives are not mutually exclusive in their evaluations of military intervention, their explanations and emphases are very different. It is argued here that, among all these approaches, realism provides the most vivid explanation for the intervention under study. However, there are other approaches in security studies literature.

4.2.1 Constructivism

Constructivism as a perspective aims to link cultural structures to identities. It focuses on environmental structures, which shape state norms, identities and government policy. The main ingredients of this theory include norms, identities, environmental relations and cultural institutions. The effects of norms are pivotal in shaping national security interests or policies. For that reason, in analyzing the intervention under study, we have to look at the norms and environmental relations that motivated the intervening country. The constructivist approach recognizes cultural similarities among States (Thomas, 1996). Norms, therefore, address issues obscured by approaches that treat interests exogenously, since norms are not static but change with social interaction. Hence, understanding this normative process is crucial for this theory. According to this approach, security cannot be solely defined without reference to inter-subjective perceptions but other factors must be considered as well. Perceptions of security and insecurity are connected to values, beliefs and identities.

Explaining security on the basis on peace and power is regarded as narrow by this approach, which sees security as being broader in scope. The constructivist approach
does not take interests and identities as given. It focuses on how inter subjective practices between actors result in identities and interests being formed in the processes of interaction, rather than those that are formed prior to the interaction. Constructivism sees the concept of sovereignty as a crucial institution in international society. Since sovereignty provides a state with its territorial rights, it also determines its basic political units. The constructivist orientation recognizes the legitimate use of force because it plays a central role in international politics, primary in influencing and shaping state security policies. This view sees the legitimate use of force as influential in structuring the incentives and constraints international actors tend to react to (Wendt, 1992). The approach also focuses on the question of how social norms and ideas influence relations between states. Like neo-liberals, constructivists concentrate on issues likes human rights, multilateralism and the value of international institutions for enhancing world peace. However, constructivism does not explain why the intervener disregarded the multilateral approach and why it did not consult international institutions like the UN and OAU before mounting their intervention. While the theory argues that social norms and values are constantly constructed in order to influence the nation state foreign policy, other international relations approaches recognize the potential salient role of numbers of different actors, not just states, in international relations challenges. The pluralist approach recognizes the role of these actors.

4.2.2 Pluralism

The theory of pluralism exercised a major influence both in the discipline of political science and in the sub-field of international relations. In criticizing the traditional/realist conception of the security studies approach, pluralists argue that, rather than speaking of security and development, it is necessary to recognize that there are many different securities and forms of development. What may be secure for one could be the complete opposite of security for another. Therefore, to seek to impose one view or one understanding upon those who do not support or share that view may in itself be conflict provoking and engendering, promoting insecurity and destabilization rather than security. Pluralists recognize co-operation between states as fundamental in guaranteeing security
for all people and the environment. Therefore, rather than states being mistrustful of each other, they cooperate and adopt peaceful means of transforming the underlying causes of conflict that give rise to insecurity and threat. For this approach, cooperation and peaceful means are important in addressing many of the failings of traditional conceptions of security (Anton, 2001).

Pluralists criticize the view that the state is the main actor in international politics. In criticizing this state orthodox view, they maintain that there is a large degree of convergence in the manner in which life inside and outside the state is contemplated. Therefore, what happens inside determines what happens outside the state and the other way around. This approach advances several arguments that demonstrate the weakness of realists’ approach to international relations. They do acknowledge the major role of state, but also argue that: …states are important, for they set rules of the economic, communications, technology, and other games that occur simultaneously. But by themselves, they do not set the international agenda, nor can they make decisions as if removed from the interests, values, and aspirations of millions of business firms, banks, shipping companies, political parties, citizens groups, and the like. The nation state is seen as one of the players in the pluralistic world. Therefore, pluralists were fundamentally opposed to the traditional doctrine of sovereignty (Francis, 1994).

The approach dismisses the notion of unity and absoluteness of the state on both empirical and normative grounds. They argue that society consists of more than the sum of its parts. For pluralists it is wrong to ignore the role of independent actors, for example, rebel movements. The influences of these groups, according to this approach, are considerable in determining which issues are the most important. Pluralists highlight various protocols that states are increasingly entering into with regional, continental and international bodies, such as the UN Charter. According to this approach, these agreements are legally binding between member states and cannot be violated by them (Brian, 2002). They argue that, in order to improve international relations, it is imperative to relinquish the theory of absolute sovereignty and its corollary, the equality of the state. Despite pluralists conjecture, the doctrine and discourses of the sovereign state continues
to be a dominant mode representing political reality. Since states make rules, as pluralists rightly argue, they have an equal capacity to unmake them and make those that justify their deeds, regardless of whether they are good or bad. They also have the capacity to violate these protocols. While the intervening country under study here is signatory to international protocols regarding the peaceful resolution of conflicts, it appears not to has kept its side of the bargain. The pluralist theory comes short in explaining why this state decided to intervene in other country.

### 4.2.3 Idealism

Like most approaches, idealists argue that traditional security has some limitations because it only addresses security in military terms. The starting point for most idealists derives from the perception that human beings are essentially cooperative. The implication for this statement is very important in analyzing why war occurs and what the society must do to prevent it. According to this view, natural harmony exists between human beings. Therefore war stems not from human nature but from imperfect political institutions and practices. It is these imperfect arrangements, both at the national and international levels, that disrupts harmony between human beings. The crucial task is therefore to identify these imperfect arrangements, practices and institutions to prevent war from recurring. The fundamental bedrock of idealism derives from President Woodrow Wilson’s international reform agenda in which he argues that the world must be made safe for democracy (Wilson, 1994). The approach from the early 1900s to the late 1930s was motivated by the desire to prevent war. Wilson saw democracy as the system that is best placed to ameliorate inter- and intrastate conflicts. According to Wilson, peace could be secured through the establishment of an international body, such as the League of Nations, to regulate international anarchy. The purpose of this body was to use diplomacy to manage international disputes and to protect states from external aggression.

After the Second World War, the UN Charter adopted the above principle of the territorial integrity of states. Therefore, it is necessary to prevent the rampant use of
force in order for stability to obtain within the international system. Idealists argue that
the use of force must be authorized to be legitimate (Hedley, 1996). However, after the
Second World War, the idealist approach was replaced by the realist paradigm. There
was consensus among scholars during this period that realism was superior in its ability
to rationally explain the persistent and ubiquitous struggles for power among nations.
Most critics of idealism argue that it was out of touch with political realities. The
approach is still unable to explain the intervention under study.

4.2.4 Realism

Among dominant traditional international relation theories, realism remains the most
significant in the security studies approach. For this reason the realist approach has been viewed as the main theory of international relations. Realists’ identify power, national interests and state survival as crucial in analyzing inter-state relations (Christopher, 1996). For realists, military capacity is the key for each state to achieve its interests in this anarchic world. The main reason for realists to conceptualize the world in this manner derives from their strongly held view that states will tend to rely on the threat or use of military force to secure their objectives in international politics. Realists also emphasize territorial issues as a direct motivator for intervention. Hans Morgenthau describes a number of territorial-related elements of national power, such as defensive geographical barriers, mountain ranges, bodies of water, natural resources such as industrial minerals, oil or arable land that can be used to feed one’s citizens. Realists see these territorial issues as valuable in increasing state power (Hans, 1948). Following this perspective it could be argued that the Kenyan motive that led to military intervention in Somalia is connected to political, economic and social interests and widely discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter Five

5. Causes and Consequences of Kenyans Intervention in Somalia

5.1 Causes of Kenya’s Military intervention in Somalia

![Kenya’s defense force in Somalia.](image)

Source: Foreign policy blogs, 2011

5.1.1. Political Causes

5.1.1.1 Security threat

The inception of attacks in Kenya is connected with Ossaman bin Laden that was because Sudan hosted bin Laden between 1991 and 1996, before he returned to Afghanistan, which provided him with a valuable opportunity to exploit the crisis and instability in Somalia (from 1991 onwards) to establish al-Qaeda’s East African cell, which allowed al-Qaeda to operate in Nairobi from at least 1993 and in Mombasa from 1994 (Anneli, 2013). Since the mid-1990s, a number of loosely affiliated activist groups operating from Somalia have carried out or facilitated attacks in the region. The first was al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI), a Somali Islamist and nationalist political grouping with some longstanding links to al-Qaeda that aimed to establish an Islamic emirate in the Somali-
inhabited territories of the Horn of Africa. Its strategy relied upon regional and wider international networks linked to the Somali diaspora. Members travelled freely between Kenya and Somalia and elsewhere in the region and built considerable infrastructure for recruitment, fundraising and communication among the Somali populations in Nairobi, Mombasa and North Eastern Province (Crisis Group, 2012).

Throughout its recent history, Kenya has been victim of sporadic attacks. The most prominent of these incidents was on August 7, 1998, when al-Qa’ida attacked the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, killing 213 people. The attack was coordinated simultaneously with the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed 12 people. On November 28, 2002, al-Qa’ida militants attacked the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa, killing 15 people. Almost simultaneously, militants fired two shoulder-launched missiles at an Israeli charter plane in the same city, missing the target (Fredrick, 2013). The recent escalation of militant attacks in Kenya, however, is the direct result of the al-Shabab insurgency in neighboring Somalia. Before October 2011 Kenya experienced a number of attacks this began to deteriorate security in Kenya so that this become the invitation for Kenya’s incursion.

On 11 July 2007 two people, including one suspected of carrying explosives, died outside City Gate Restaurant next to the Hotel Ambassadeur, as the device was suspected to have detonated prematurely, in late September 2009 guests at the Simmers restaurant on Kenyatta Avenue found a Russian made grenade under seats, on 13 June 2010 three grenades exploded at a political rally in Uhuru Park, Nairobi, killing six people and injuring, on 4 December 2010 three police officers were killed in separate grenade attacks in Nairobi and on 20 December 2010 one person was killed and 26 injured in a grenade attack at the Kampala Coach bus terminus in River Road (Anneli, 2013). On October 1, 2011, Marie Dedieu, a 66-year-old disabled French woman, was kidnapped from her home near Kenya’s Manda Island by suspected al-Shabab gunmen. She died while in the assailants’ custody that same month. On October 13, suspected al-Shabab militants kidnapped two female Spanish Médecins sans Frontières aid workers from the Dadaab refugee camp in Kenya, and took them to Somalia. This series of cross-border attacks, as well as prior kidnapping incidents, spurred Kenya’s military to intervene in Somalia on
October 2011 (Daniel, 2011). Claire (2013:7) also states as Kenya faced a serious terrorist threat “The Kenyan government has faced a serious terrorist threat from radical Islamists since at least 1998, when twin bombs exploded at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in neighbouring Tanzania”. Fredrick (2012:12) on his part describes the security threat in Kenya by Shabab “Yet al-Shabab’s advances in Somalia during the last few years have challenged Kenya’s ability to prevent terrorist attacks at home. Kenya’s border with Somalia is long and cannot be secured effectively, and it is easy to smuggle across border weapons or men. Moreover, al-Shabab can rely on radicalized Muslims in Kenya to support its fight in Somalia, and put pressure on the Kenyan government by attacking civilian targets in Kenya”. On 19 October 2011, a junior minister responsible for internal security, Orwa Ojodeh, promised parliament a massive operation to get rid of Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda here in Nairobi. He noted that Al Shabaab is “a big animal with its main network in Kenya and only a fraction of it extending into Somalia” (Ibid:9). Thus from the above discussed points Kenya’s intervention in Somalia can be connected with its national security threat.

5.1.1.2 Defending Territorial integrity

Most conflicts in Africa could be traced back to European colonialism. The Somali people were divided among five separate states by colonialism – namely Ethiopia, Djibouti, British Somaliland, Italian Somalia, and Kenya. At independence, a central pillar of the Republic of Somalia was irredentism – a rejection of the colonial boundaries and an insistence on the political unity of all the Somali people of the Horn of Africa. Certain territories in Kenya were susceptible to this extremist or separatist ideology. Since Kenya’s independence in 1963, it has faced a number of secessionist challenges. From 1963 to 1968, ethnic Somalis in North Eastern Province attempted to secede and become part of “Greater Somalia” in the Shifta War. The war, as well as subsequent violence such as the Wagalla Massacre in 1984, was brutally suppressed by Kenya, creating resentment among Somalis living in Kenya. After the Shifta War, the Kenyan government declared a state of emergency in North Eastern Province that lasted for almost three decades, further alienating Somalis living in Kenya (Fredrick, 2012).
Somalia engaged in to war from 1977–1978 with Ethiopia Known as the Ogaden war which was initiated by Somalia to fulfill its long-awaited dream of creating a Greater Somalia by re-integrating the Ogaden into the Somali republic. The integration of the Ogaden into the larger Somali Republic was meant to boost Somali nationalism and thereby unite the country into one nation-state. Nonetheless, the war turned unpleasant for Somalia in early 1978, when it was defeated by Ethiopia, with the support of the Soviet Union and Cuba (The Journal of Modern African Studies, 2002). Because of this extremist or separatist ideology (irredentism) Kenya like Ethiopia is always watchful from Somalia direction that might seek the re-unification of Somali (greater Pan-Somali). Kenya is fearful that the predominantly ethnic Somali population in the Northern Frontier District may be tempted to separate from Kenya (Ali, 2013).

Al-Shabaab (Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahedeen, meaning Mujahedeen Youth Movement in Arabic) emerged as an organization in 2006, the group’s roots extend back to the 1980s and the nascent stages of the militant political Islamic movement in Somalia. In particular, the militant group Al-Itihad al-Islam (AIAI) provided a platform for the growth of religious extremism and the training of future al-Shabaab leaders in Somalia. Al-Itihad is the foremost Somali Islamist movement, and has its origins in the 1950s. However, it started to function officially after the removal of Barre in 1991, since Barre declared “scientific socialism” outlawing political Islam during his administration. Most of the leaders of Al-Itihad have received religious education in religious institutions of Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Al-Itihad’s objective was to establish an Islamic state constituting all Somali inhabited territories in the Horn of Africa (Kidist, 2009). By 2005, al-Shabaab had emerged as a loose organization of militia leaders running the military wing of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), a conglomeration of religious courts competing for control of south and central Somalia (HSPI, 2013).

The emergence of the UIC is also linked to Al-Itihad. After its defeat by Ethiopian forces and its failure to control political power in Somalia, Al-Itihad changed its strategy from direct politico-military confrontation to expanding its influence as a grass root movement for order, stability, and moral rectitude by establishing the Islamic courts (Kidist, 2009).
As of 2006, the UIC had rapidly become the dominant political body in south and central Somalia, taking full control of Mogadishu. Facilitated in part by financial backing from Persian Gulf and Somali businessmen, The UIC’s increasing strength along with the inclusion of extremist elements, was deemed a threat to Ethiopia and the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, based in Nairobi. In late 2006, with international support, Ethiopia invaded Somalia and ousted the UIC. The collapse of the UIC led to the emergence of several groups engaged in a bloody insurgency against Ethiopian forces. Nonetheless, al-Shabaab dominated the struggle, and by the time Ethiopia withdrew in January 2009, the group had evolved to become Somalia’s most effective fighting force (HSPI, 2013).

Following the 2006 to 09 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, al--Shabaab rose to national prominence as a symbol of resistance against Ethiopian incursion. Filling the void in the wake of Ethiopia’s withdrawal and the collapse of the Islamic Courts Union, the group rapidly expanded becoming Somalia’s dominant governing entity. By August 2010, al-Shabaab controlled the majority of south and central Somalia, and launched its first international attack targeting Uganda’s capital Kampala with multiple suicide bombings. Now al Shabaab inherited the concept of political unity for all the Somali people of the Horn of Africa. Al-Shabaab’s ideology of political unity for all the Somali people of the Horn of Africa was described by different writers Abdi said states “Al-Shabaab’s way of getting things done have not emanated from the religious or the cultural identity of the Somali people. Religious rigidity and narrow interpretations of the Quran and Sunna of the Prophet is alien component in traditional Somali Islam.

The ultimate goals of al-Shabaab are the establishment of Islamic state and implementation of the Sharia laws in Somali (Abdisaid, 2008). Abdi’s statement is supported by Elijah’s Al-Shabaab’s main political ideology is also to establish an Islamic state in Somalia. By that, the Organization aims to overrun Somalia and eventually spill-over its ideology throughout the Horn of Africa. Beyond al-Shabaab pursued the establishment of an Islamic Emirate in Somalia including the north-eastern region of Kenya, the Ogaden region of Ethiopia as well as Djibouti (Elija, 2013). Kenya's interior minister, George Saitoti connected the move of al-Shabaab with the issue of
Kenya's territorial integrity "This is a serious provocation on Kenya's territorial integrity by the al-Shabaab with negative effects on the tourism industry and generally also on our own investment" (Simon, 2011:17). Kenya intervened militarily in Somalia to safeguard its territorial integrity from the effects al-Shabaab will bring and Kenya has legal right to defend itself from any danger that threatens its sovereignty and integrity. Therefore inferring from the ideas above it is possible to link the cause of Kenaya’s military intervention in Somalia is seeking to protect the territorial integrity of Kenya.

5.1.1.3 Domestic military dynamics

Since independence in 1963, Kenyan soldiers have been largely content to collect comfortable salaries in return for their non-involvement in politics. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the good life in the military became a valuable source of patronage to ministers and other public officials. Recruitment and promotion was based on political connections, ethnic line, and loyalty to those in political power, rather than merit. As a result, with the exceptions of a brief mutiny in 1964 and a failed coup in 1982, Kenya suffered none of the overthrows and militaristic rule that blighted African states such as Uganda and Nigeria. In recent years, however, Kenya's armed forces have been trained and equipped to do much more than before.

From Washington's perspective, the rise of Islamism in the Horn of Africa put Kenya on the front lines in the global fight against terrorism. The State Department increased counterterrorism funding to Nairobi from $4.5 million in 2006 to an estimated $8 million in 2011 (Daniel, 2011). Kenya’s Senior officers regularly travel to the United States for counterterrorism and counterinsurgency training; such instruction has become a core part of the curriculum at the Kenya Military Academy and the United States’ increasing military spending to Kenya (Claire, 2013). As it is read from Table 1 below Kenyan spending on defense is rising steadily from year to years and it is due to Washington's funding to Nairobi.
Table 1: Value of Kenyan military spending, 2010–13 in Kenyan shillings (KES) and U.S. dollars*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>KES</th>
<th>$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2010–11</td>
<td>50.3 billion</td>
<td>587,479,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011–12</td>
<td>64.54 billion</td>
<td>753,796,211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012–13</td>
<td>70.29 billion</td>
<td>820,953,459</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* As per values on <http://www.xe.com> on March 20th 2013.

**Source:** Parliamentary Budget Office (2012: 30); email interchanges with Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Claire (2013).

This the rising of funding to Kenya from the treasury of Washington in the name of counterterrorism drive Nairobi's incursion into Somalia.

### 5.1.1.4 Internal Political dynamics

Kenya is home to more than 50 ethnic groups. Kikuyu, comprising just over 20% of the population, are the largest group, and they have long been perceived by many Kenyans to disproportionately dominate the country’s political class and the business community. Kikuyu led the Mau Mau insurgency against the British prior to independence. Under Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta, a Kikuyu, the community was seen to benefit disproportionately from the allocation of state resources, namely land, constituency funds, government jobs, and procurement contracts. When Kenyatta’s vice president, Daniel arap Moi, assumed office after Kenyatta’s death in 1978, many of these benefits shifted to his people, a smaller grouping of ethnicities collectively referred to as the Kalenjin (estimated at 12% of the population). In the first four decades after independence, the heartlands of these two communities the central highlands around Mt. Kenya for the Kikuyu and the central Rift Valley for the Kalenjin saw the greatest state investment in schools, roads, and health services. Other areas were marginalized and
remain comparatively underdeveloped, such as the predominately Muslim provinces of Coast and North Eastern, and the area of western Kenya near Lake Victoria that many from the Luo ethnic group call home. Some Kenyans have referred to the dynamic of ethnic favoritism with colloquial phrases such as “It’s our turn to eat.” Such favoritism and patronage politics also has reinforced a focus on “tribe” among many Kenyans that has origins in the colonial period (Luckystar, 2012:14). Such perceptions underpinned the resentment that fed hate speech and violence surrounding the 2007-2008 post-election crisis. Related state corruption and nepotism has also undermined the country’s economic performance and development. No single ethnic group constitutes a large enough voting block for its political leaders to obtain or maintain power alone Kenya’s electoral system requires them to form alliances with other groups. These alliances shift periodically; many of today’s key political figures have moved in and out of government and the opposition since the Daniel arap Moi Moi era (Ibid).

Kenya was essentially a one-party state until 1991. The ruling party during this period (the Kenya African National Union, KANU) subsequently retained its political dominance, in part through electoral manipulation and repression, until 2002, when long-serving President Daniel arap Moi stepped aside at the end of his fifth term under donor and domestic pressure. The elections that year were hailed at home and abroad as reflecting a fundamental shift in Kenya’s democratic trajectory. For the first time, the fractious and primarily ethnically based opposition parties came together, forming the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC), to defeat Daniel arap Moi Moi’s chosen successor, Uhuru Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta (Peter, 2013). After the election, though, NARC’s unified front slowly unraveled, revealing underlying ethnic grievances and patronage politics that belied the optimism of the 2002 polls. One of the NARC factions, led by Raila Odinga, accused the new president, Mwai Kibaki, of dishonoring a deal made prior to the elections, which would reportedly have created a power sharing arrangement with a prime ministerial post for Odinga. Instead, Odinga was appointed minister of roads. A then-ongoing constitutional review process might have provided a vehicle for the new prime ministerial post, Odinga’s team argued, as part of a widely popular push for more checks and balances in the political system. The draft
constitution proposed by the government in 2005, however, sought to maintain a strong presidency and create a ceremonial prime minister. It was defeated in a public referendum after an intense campaign led by Odinga and his allies. Odinga and another former NARC member, Kalonzo Musyoka, both challenged Kibaki for the presidency in the December 2007 general elections. In the parliamentary polls, deemed largely credible, parties opposed to Kibaki’s coalition made significant gains. Odinga’s party, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), fell seven seats short of an absolute majority. The presidential election, however, was seen by observers as deeply flawed, with evidence of rigging on both sides.

Despite significant irregularities in the vote tabulation process and indications that voter turnout in some areas was over 100%, the electoral commission declared Kibaki the winner, and he was quickly sworn in as president. Riots in urban areas followed the announcement of the election results, and the outrage expressed by Odinga supporters turned violent in many parts of Kenya, largely along ethnic lines. Some of the violence was spontaneous, but investigations found that multiple attacks were planned, with politicians on both sides implicated. In what became Kenya’s worst political crisis since independence, as many as 1,300 people were killed and some 500,000 displaced during the ensuing six weeks of violence, according to the State Department. Negotiations between the parties under the auspices of former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and several African former heads of state, combined with significant pressure from the United States and other aid donors, led to a power-sharing agreement on February 28, 2008. A coalition government was formed in April 2008, with Kibaki as president and Odinga in a new prime minister position. The parties agreed to draft a new constitution, and to address sensitive land rights issues (Daniel, 2011).

The Kenya’s war in Somalia, and the public's rally behind it, comes at a particularly vulnerable political moment in Kenya. Election was scheduled to be conducted a year after, and opportunists were trying to take advantage of a vacuum. President Mwai Kibaki was retiring. Two of the men once counted among his most likely successors, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, are awaiting an announcement by the International
Criminal Court. In January they will find out if war crimes charges against them relating to the post-election violence of early 2008 will go to a full trial (Daniel, 2011). The intervention c have been aimed at garnering up voters support in 2013 national election for the government and politicians who have shown their ability to defend the country and its citizens as well as reducing post-election violence. Therefore the intervention could also be linked to the elections of 2013. The election of the new Kenyan Government became calm and has reduced the perceived risk of Kenya and the President was elected on a pro-business, pro security and pro-progress ticket.

5.1.1.5 Strategic interest of creating a buffer zone

Kenya like Ethiopia is always watchful from Somali government that might seek the re-unification of greater Pan-Somali. Kenya is also always fearful that the predominantly ethnic Somali population in the Northern Frontier District may be tempted to separate from Kenya. This very fear drove Jomo Kenyatta in 1964 to sign a mutual defense agreement with Ethiopia’s emperor Haile Selassie. This agreement was renewed in 1979 and third time in 1989 (Ali, 2013). In addition to fear of greater Pan-Somali movement for political union Kenya’s interest is strategic and economic: a semi-autonomous Juba land as a buffer-zone from Al-Shabaab attacks on both its tourism industry and a massive Lamu port development project (LAPSSET); secure access to the Kismayo market; and influence over oil and gas deposits in a contested maritime zone. Stability could also facilitate plans to repatriate 500,000 Somali refugees now living in Kenya (Crisis Group, 2013). The potentiality of Juba land region is also described by Samira “Much of Somalia, particularly the Jubbaland region is both economically and geopolitically strategic. It is fertile, rich in industry and resources and Kenya will want sugar coated relations with Mogadishu in order to hold a presence in that part of the country” (Samira 2013:7). In order to achieve this Kenya had for several years been trying but unsuccessfull to create a buffer zone between itself and Somalia. According to Fredrick (2012) in October 14, 2011, Kenya announced that it was deploying troops to Somalia in pursuit of al-Shabab, the al-Qa’ida-linked Somali militant group that has abducted
foreign aid workers and tourists in Kenya. This is also stated on by Branch When Kenya dispatched some 2,000 troops across the border into Somalia on October 16, officials in Nairobi argued that they had little choice. After a series of cross-border raids by the Somalia-based Islamist militant group al Shabaab, Kenya's internal security minister, George Saitoti, said, Kenya has been and remains an island of peace, and we shall not allow criminals from Somalia, which has been fighting for over two decades, to destabilize our peace. A recent spate of kidnappings of tourists and aid workers inside Kenya, Saitoti and others said, was the final straw to fight Shabaab (Daniel ,2011).

However others argue differently for instance according to Menkhaus the kidnappings were the pretext for Kenya’s offensive against Shabaab, but the plans for a Kenya-backed military operation in the border area have been in place for some time (Menkhaus, 2012). Kenya, with international support, had planned to move into the Somalia conflict years prior to October 2011. This was before the kidnappings. This planned intervention was aimed at creating a buffer zone in the Juba area in southern Somalia, which is close to the border with Kenya. What is now widely believed to be the core aim of Kenya’s intervention is the creation of this buffer zone (Luckystar, 2012). Abayomi (2013) Supports as Kenya’s intervention in southern Somalia in October 2011 had been planned for at least two years. The release of WikiLeaks cables in 2010 documented the plans and the role of the State Department. In an article published by the Kenyan Daily Nation on December 17, 2010, it reports that “The cables also say the military action took years of planning and was not a spontaneous reaction to abductions conducted by the Islamist group on Kenyan soil as repeatedly stated by government officials. The abductions seemed to provide Kenya with a convenient excuse to launch the plan, which, officials argued, was necessary to ensure protection against threats posed by an unstable neighbor.” This secret plan, dubbed Jubaland Initiative, outlined the creation of an artificial state in southern Somalia in an effort to choke off Al-Shabaab from the border areas near Kenya. At a meeting in Ethiopia in January 2010, the Kenyan delegation led by the-then Foreign Affairs Minister Moses Wetang’ula appealed for U.S. support in the operation (Ibid).
Daniel Branch on his part states that Nairobi invaded its neighbor to secure its eastern border and to create a buffer zone inside Somalia (Daniel, 2011). So Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia has a link with the interest of creating a buffer zone on Kenya’s border.

5.1.2 Economic Causes

5.1.2.1 Oil

Somalia’s oil and gas potential has attracted oil exploration companies about 60 years ago (in early 1950s) Agip (Italian) and Sinclair Oil Corporation (American) began to study the petroleum geology of Somalia. Ever since, companies have flocked to Somalia whenever possible. Sinclair Oil Corporation drilled in the south more than 50 wells (some for stratigraphic and some for oil production purposes) and worked from the mid-fifties to mid-sixties without commercial oil discovery. Eni (previously known as Agip) worked from the fifties to the eighties and abandoned Block 31 (Puntland) in force majeure. From 1960 to 1969 oil companies were slowly coming in for oil and gas exploration. However, on the 21st October 1969 a military regime came to power and announced Scientific Socialism as its ideology, joining Somalia to the Soviet Block during the Cold War thus Somalia became un-accessible until 1977 when Somalia invaded Ethiopia to reclaim Western Somalia. Somalia was defeated and it turned to the West for friendship. In the eighties, companies aggressively came back Somalia to carry out exploration (Abdulkadir, 2013). Norway tried producing oil in Somalia after successful oil discovery in North Eastern part of the country (Puntland) and southern Somalia between Barawe to Jubba regions in southern Somalia. But some western countries that had more influence than Norway stopped the plan. President Siyad Barre was for the plan, but it was difficult to implement it without the consent of the powerful Western countries.

The collapse of Comrade Siyad Barre’s rule and the subsequent lawlessness, anarchy and the absence of a central authority in Somalia prevented the continuation of oil and gas farming in Somalia (Mohamed, 2011). Nowadays oil is emerging as a key resource of interest in East Africa. East Africa has become a hot spot for oil and gas exploration, spurred by new finds in waters off countries including Uganda, Tanzania and
Mozambique. In the Horn of Africa, Somalia’s semi-autonomous Punt land and Somaliland regions have also licensed exploration blocks. Kenya is one of a number of countries in the region that have discovered oil deposits in their territory. Kenya’s oil exploration and securing oil blocks sites between Somalia and Kenya led to military intervention by the later. Luckystar (2012:12) associates Kenya’s military intervention in Somalia with Kenya’s oil interest as follows “Oil explorations are on-going along the Kenya’s coast. Some of the areas where exploration is continuing lie in Somalia’s waters, implying that the advance of Kenya into Somalia might have been aimed at securing these sites to ensure Kenya’s smooth and uninterrupted exploration”.

Claire (2013:12) described that “Kenya and Somalia have an ongoing dispute over their maritime boundary. Kenya’s position is that the boundary should run due east from the point at which their border meets the coastline, while Somalia holds that the boundary should run perpendicular to their shared coastline. This issue is of growing importance due to the approximately eight oil blocks located in the disputed area and the quest for exploration rights that Kenya has been granting and Somalia says should not be explored until a bilateral agreement is reached”. Kenya’s oil interest for intervention in Somalia is also described by Abdillahi Mohamud, director of the East African Energy Forum as “Kenya’s involvement in southern Somalia was designed to gain the upper hand on offshore oil block concessions that right fully belongs to Somalia as stipulated in the 1982 U.N. law of the sea convention” (Business News, 2013:2).

Somalia from its side also reflected the oil interest of Kenya in the border area between the two by the words of Abdullahi Haji, Somalia’s minister of foreign affairs, for Reuters in Mogadishu “The issue between Somalia and Kenya is not a dispute; it is a territorial argument that came after oil and gas companies became interested in the region and If the argument continues unsolved, it will change into a dispute that may result at least in souring the deep relation between our two countries and (cause a) war at last” “,” he said (Kelly, 2012:11). The oil interest of Kenya in the border area between the two countries is bearing dialogue for Somalia it is a matter of international law.
Although Kenya recently identified eight new offshore exploration blocks available for licensing, and all but one of them are located in the contested area. French firm Total and Texas-based Anadarko companies so far holding licenses from Kenya to blocks in the disputed area are still declined to drill there because of boundary line issue (Kelly, 2012). Therefore the above sources imply that one of the motives or causes led Kenya to intervene militarily was oil exploration and securing oil blocks (the oil question) of deep-sea offshore between Kenya and Somalia to ensure Kenya’s smooth and uninterrupted oil exploration and benefit.

5.1.2.2 Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport Corridor (LAPSSET) Project

The Lamu corridor is a transport and infrastructure project in Kenya at its completion it will be the country's second transport corridor. Kenya's other transport corridor is the Mombasa port and Mombasa – Uganda transport corridor that passes through Nairobi and much of the Northern Rift. The Lamu corridor project was initially conceived in 1975 but never took off due to various reasons (economic –political). The project was later revived and included in Kenya's Vision 2030.

In 2009, the cost of LAPSSET was estimated as $16 billion. Recent estimates arrived after studies now put the cost of the project at between US$22 billion and US$23 billion (LAPSSET report ,2012). Mwai Kibaki and Gen. Salva Kiir of Southern Sudan were joined by the Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in the formal ground breaking ceremony on March 2nd 2012 at Lamu, jointly laying a foundation stone and committing their respective countries to one of the largest infrastructure project ever in Eastern Africa Fostering transport linkage between Kenya, Southern Sudan and Ethiopia. Dynamic promotion of regional socio-economic development along transport corridor especially in the hitherto underserved Northern, Eastern and North Eastern parts of Kenya. Promote economic development of the region through enhanced cross border trade (Kenya Vision, 2030). On 1 April 2013, Kenya's government announced the setting up of a government
agency, the Lamu Port Southern Sudan Transport Development Authority that will manage the project on behalf of the Kenyan government. The cost of the project was also put at KSh. 2.5 trillion ($29.24 billion) (LAPSSET report, 2012). The timeline of the project is not clear, including when it started and when it should be finished. Some projects like the Isiolo-Merille projects began in 2007. At the peak of the project, between 2013 and 2018, it is expected that the Kenyan government will be spending about 6% of the country's Gross Domestic Product or 16% of its annual budget on the project (Ibid). The project is in turn expected to contribute an additional 3% increase in Kenya's GDP by 2020. The aim of the project is to cut over-dependence on Kenya's main port of Mombasa as well as open up Kenya's largely under-developed northern frontier, through creation of a second transport corridor. Key towns in the project are Lamu and Isiolo in Kenya, Juba in Southern Sudan and Addis Ababa in Ethiopia.

The LAPSSET project under the Kenya Vision 2030 National Development Policy blue print comprises 7 major components – a port in Lamu, an oil pipeline from Juba, South Sudan to Lamu, Oil refineries in Lamu and Isiolo, a railway link to South Sudan and Ethiopia, three resort cities and airports at Lamu, Isiolo and Lokichogio and a High Grand Falls along the River Tana for Hydropower generation. The LAPSSET Corridor will link South Sudan and Ethiopia, both landlocked countries, with the Indian Ocean through Lamu, Kenya (Kenya Vision, 2030).

Claire (2013) marks as the need to protect the LAPSSET project led Kenya to intervene. The intervention is broadly considered to have been both strategically prudent and inevitable: neighboring Uganda, Burundi and Ethiopia were all involved in Somalia militarily; there was a growing perception of heightened insecurity; Somali piracy was on the increase; the LAPSSET project needed protection; and Kenya had for several years been trying unsuccessfully to create a buffer zone between itself and Somalia. New African Magazine (2013) also describes LAPSSET is a single largest investment project in Africa presently which is expected to assist Kenya’s prosperity in the future but inadequately policed border between Somalia and Kenya is bringing the security threat of the area in to surface kidnappings of tourists and aid workers and killing is becoming the daily news of that part of
Since LAPSSET is extends to this corner freeing it from insecurity is prior top task to the stakeholders of the project so the need to protect this huge business motivated Kenya’s involvement in Somalia. Even though Kenya, Ethiopia and Uganda (with the support of the US and EU) have secured their own economic and security interests by disrupting Al Shabaab’s terror links and curtailing piracy, a united Somalia complete with a universally recognised central government, remains a distant dream for now (New African Magazine, 2013). A closer look at Kenya’s Jubaland Initiative reveals Kenya’s intent to open up its northern region and assert its economic interests in the region. Kenya’s largest development project is dubbed LAPSSET, a $24.7bn project that seeks to link the sleepy Lamu Island on the Swahili coast with the rich oil fields of Southern Sudan, as well as serve both the 80-million plus Ethiopian market and the Indian Ocean maritime trade road (Ibid). Eugene tried to link Kenyan intervention with securing profit from a major new port (Lamu Port) according to him Kenyan intervention is rooted in the needs of Kenyan elites to secure profit. Al-Shabaab’s intimidating of Kenyan tourist areas is a significant blow to one of the nation’s largest, and growing, economic sectors.

More importantly, Kenya’s growing role as the central hub of regional trade is threatened by Al-Shabaab’s ability to attack ports and danger shipping way. Just 60 miles from the Somali border, for example, Kenya has a major new port project planned. Kenya hopes to create a buffer zone in southern Somalia where Al-Shabaab can not threaten its ability to capture the greatest share of the growing regional trade volume, as well as export its own goods (Eugene, 2013). Therefore it is possible that connecting Kenyan intervention in Somalia With its Economic interest of realization and securing LAPSSET project.

5.1.3 Social cause

The Refugees over influx and its burden

The fact that, unlike many African states, most of Somalia’s citizens have a common language, religion and culture but has not led to lasting stability. European colonization
left Somali-inhabited territory divided into five colonies that crossed clan boundaries and disrupted centuries-old seasonal migration patterns. As a result of the colonial legacy the North Eastern Province (NEP) of Kenya is inhabited by Somali people who maintain close social and economic ties across the border. Therefore Kenya has a substantial Somali population concentrated mainly in the North Eastern Province. Many Somalis found themselves in Kenya in 1925, after the British hived off a chunk of the Juba land region in modern day southern Somalia to form part of Kenya known as the Northern Frontier District (NFD). The rest of Somalia was ceded to Italy as a reward for its support of the Allies during World War I (Mwaura, 2013).

The population of the NEP more than doubled between 1989 and 1999, from 371,391 to 962,143. The 2009 census puts the population of the NEP at 2,310,757, a six fold increase since 1989 (Mwaura, 2013). However, Somalis had begun coming to Nairobi from NFD as railway builders and guards of such British Empire figures as Lord Delamere, one of the earliest settlers in Kenya, and Lord Frederick Lugard, who had served as governor of Hong Kong and governor-general of Nigeria. Colonial administrators must have held Somalis in high regard, because they were at first allowed to live in Kileleshwa, near the Europeans’ neighborhood. They were later relocated to Eastleigh, which was known as Kambiya Somali (Somali Camp) until the arrival of the Royal Air Force (RAF) in the 1930s. The suburb was named Eastleigh, because most of the RAF personnel came from the town of Eastleigh in Hampshire, England (Mwaura, 2013).

The Kenyan-Somali population was boosted by people who came from Somalia as colonial employees or independent traders and settled in Kenya. Later, more Somalis fleeing Siyaad Barre’s regime in the 1970s and 1980s made the country their home. Most of them became Kenyan citizens. Before the current crisis, the official (although unlikely to be the total) number of ethnic Somalis living in Nairobi and Mombasa was around 13,000, according to the 1989 census. When the civil war broke out in Somalia in 1991 and the state collapsed, approximately 300,000 refugees sought safety in Kenya. Initially they were settled in refugee camps. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHCR supported five camps, each catering for more than 40,000 Somali refugees along the Kenyan coast. Much of the population in these camps came from the Benadir coastal towns in Somalia and had been actively engaged in businesses there. In 1992 three more camps, designed to accommodate 90,000 refugees, were established near Dadaab in the NEP, about 100 km from the Somali border. By 1994 the refugee numbers had stabilized at just under 300,000.

In 1995, at the request of the Kenyan government, UNHCR closed the coastal camps. The remaining refugee population was transferred to Dadaab or to Kakuma, another UNHCR camp situated nearly 2,000 km from Dadaab near the Kenyan border with Sudan. At the end of 2005, the population of Dadaab’s camps stood at 127,000. In August 2008, and despite a costly transfer programme to Kakuma, UNHCR had to declare all three camps full and cease registration. By February 2009 the number had almost doubled to 255,000 (Farah, 2011). Human Rights Watch investigations during this period suggest that large numbers of refugees who fled Somalia at this time declared themselves ‘economically self-sufficient’ and opted to fend for themselves in Nairobi rather than seek the protection available in the UNHCR camps. Thus, despite the Kenyan government’s attempts to contain Somali refugees in the remote camps, many managed to move into cities and towns such as Nairobi, Garissa, Mombassa, Eldoret and Kisumu. Many refugees were eventually granted citizenship, although owing to political sensitivities their numbers are not publicly available.

Human Rights Watch mentioned Kenya’s Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) suspended registration of new Refugee arrivals in Kenya in fear of insecurity “In October 2011 Kenya’s Department of Refugee Affairs (DRA) suspended registration of new arrivals in Dadaab, supposedly in response to insecurity, and registration had not yet been resumed at this writing. However, Somalis continue to arrive at Dadaab and, absent registration, many new arrivals live on the outskirts of the camps with no formal addresses. There is no process to screen them in order to determine who may pose a security risk” (Human Rights Watch, 2012:8).The Refugee security risk in Kenyan also described by Daniel some Kenyan-Somalis and migrants from Somalia are working
actively in support of al-Shabaab in Nairobi. They play a vital role in the organization through raising and transferring funds for the insurgency, handling contraband, recruiting new fighters and providing medical treatment to the injured. Moreover, support for al-Shabaab has recently grown amongst the wider Muslim community in Kenya (Daniel, 2011). Eastleigh, Al-Shabab’s primary source of support in Kenya appears to revolve around the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque, located near Eastleigh in Nairobi Where more than 100,000 Somali refugees (Fredrick, 2012).

Also according to Crisis Group Kenya is now officially home to almost 500,000 refugees from Somalia. This has exacted an enormous charge on locals and the government. Nairobi is deeply alarmed at the fast-growing refugee population. But the problem is not simply the crisis in the refugee camps. The government is nervous about the growth of the native ethnic Somali population (nearly 2.4 million according to the 2009 census) and the increasing economic influence of Somalis. It is also aware of growing anti-Somali sentiments in the major urban centers. Documentation is a big problem. A large but unknown number have obtained Kenyan papers illegally, largely due to corruption, but also because it is often difficult to distinguish between Kenyan and other Somalis. Another concern is the movement of Somali refugees into Nairobi and Mombasa. The Somali population of Eastleigh, is now estimated at over 100,000. Demographic changes are closely watched, because they have direct political implications, a point brought home recently when an ethnic Somali, Yusuf Hassan, won the parliamentary seat in Eastleigh (Crisis Group, 2012).

Refugees bring their own humanitarian dynamics within the host communities and other areas which require development and humanitarian actions. The large number of refugees hosted in Kenya for nearly two decades has been perceived as a great burden on the host communities, in particular with regards to depleting resources and environmental degradation. Resources and infrastructure in the Dadaab camps are over-stretched beyond the capacity of its original target of accommodating and providing basic services to 90,000 people. The five-fold increase in refugee numbers since 1991 has compromised quality service delivery and further exacerbated the existing environmental concerns such
as deforestation and tensions between the host and refugee communities. The presence of large numbers of refugees in Dadaab and Kakuma has aggravated competition for scarce resources, particularly water and firewood and construction materials. The relationship between the host communities and refugees has suffered from scarring of resources and competition over scarce resources. This unsolved problem remained a social burden for Kenya’s government for decades (UN, 2012). Based on the above analysis, the fast-growing refugee population is resulting in demographic changes. This has social, economic and political impact for the host state, thus it is possible to link Kenya’s intervention in Somalia social issues.

5.2 Consequences of Kenyan Military Intervention in Somalia.

5.2.1 Casualties

War results material and human damage in its very nature at the beginning of the Operation Linda Nchi by October 19, 2011, the Kenyan defense force killed over 70 Shabab forces as they marshed towards the militia’s base at Afadawa, which encouraged the Kenyan defense force for further victory while weakening al-Shabaab (African Confidential, 2011). In the course of Operation Linda Nchi while Kenya was stepping up its aerial bombardments in Gedo and Juba, causing little harm to Al-Shabaab but significantly increasingly collateral damage. In one instance, an attack on Jilib, five young siblings were killed. This caused an uproar and, for the first time, an official apology and high level intervention (by the prime minister of Kenya), followed by promises of a joint inquiry (Crisis Group, 2012). According to Luckystar (2012:6) also “Civilian casualties of the intervention were also reported, both in Somalia and in Kenya. As the KDF launched its attacks in the al-Shabaab-controlled areas of Somalia using fighter jets, many civilians, including children, were reported to be among those who were killed and seriously injured in the process”. Al Shabaab in his part charged that the Kenyan military has “massacred” innocent civilians in southern Somalia during its
operations (Lauren, 2013). Although the exact number is unclear the Kenyan operations claimed the life of civilian and combatants.

5.2.2 Retaliatory attacks on Kenya

In October 2011 Kenya deployed ground forces in Somalia. After October 2011 Kenya experienced a number of attacks in its coastal regions and Nairobi. The invasion of Somalia may have made Kenya more vulnerable on the domestic front as the country risked its national security as a result of the offensive in Somalia. By intervening in Somalia, Kenya provided ample justification for al-Shabaab to finally make good on its threats to attack Kenya. The group subsequently announced that it would carry out reprisal attacks on Kenya’s home soil. It is clear that al-Shabaab militias are against any foreign intervention in Somalia. Small-scale attacks and violence, mainly through grenade attacks launched in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, the coastal region and the North Eastern border regions have escalated since the beginning of the intervention, providing evidence that threats of al-Shabaab counter attacks are real. Many of the attacks have not been carried out directly by al-Shabaab, some have been perpetrated by people inspired by or affiliated to the group (Luckystar, 2012).

Since the intervention was launched in October, Kenya has experienced more than twenty attacks linked to Al-Shabaab. In the first few weeks, these mainly targeted bars and nightclubs, including a Nairobi nightclub bombing on 24 October, but also churches. With the increasing of security across the country, particularly in Nairobi, the majority of subsequent attacks have been in North Eastern Province, along the Somalia border. These increasingly target military and other security forces. In the most recent major one, on 9 January 2012, insurgents raided a police post, killing at least six and taking two hostages (Crisis Group, 2012 /184). According to HIPS between 18 November and 19 December 2012, there were five separate grenade attacks in Eastleigh, killing 16 people and injuring 42, including Kenyan-Somali. The attack on 18 November, targeting a public service
vehicle, led to widespread rioting and violent reprisals against civilians of Somali origin (HIPS, 2013).

Although not all such attacks are listed, the following indiscriminately targeted civilians on 17 October 2011 one person was killed and 15 injured when a grenade was thrown into Mwaura’s pub in Nairobi, on 24 October 2011 one person was killed and eight injured by a grenade thrown at people standing at a bus stop, on 16 November 2011 attackers targeting East African Pentecostal worshippers killed two people in a grenade attack in Garissa, on 27 October 2011 four people were killed when a grenade hit a vehicle in Mandera, on 24 November 2011 three people were killed in twin grenade attacks in Garissa, in 4 April 2012 two people were killed and 30 injured in grenade attacks on a church service in Mtwapa, Mombasa, on 28 April 2012 one person was killed and 16 injured at the God’s House of Miracles International Church in Ngara, Nairobi, on 16 May 2012 a security guard was killed after two grenades were thrown into Bella Vista bar in Mombasa and on 28 May 2012 one person was killed and 30 injured after an explosive device detonated at the Assanands building on Moi Avenue, Nairobi (Anneli, 2013).

On 25 June 2012 one person was killed and several others injured in an attack on the Jericho pub in Mombasa, on 1 July 2012, 17 people were killed and 45 wounded in grenade attacks at the Garissa Catholic church and Africa Inland Church (AIC). Among the dead were two police officers guarding the AIC, whose guns were stolen by the attackers, on 19 July 2012, grenades thrown into a hotel restaurant and barber’s shop wounded four people in Kenya’s Wajir border region and on 30 September 2012 a child was killed and three seriously injured in a grenade attack on the St Polycarp’s church on Juja Road, Nairobi (Ibid). From all above reprisal attacks on Kenya’s home soil the Westgate –Mall attacks was very danger. It was a retaliatory attack on Kenya as Al-Shabaab’s justification. The excerpt below is taken from Al-Shabaab’s Twitter handle, @HSM_Press. This handle is based on the acronym for Al-Shabaab’s Arabic name; Harakat Shabaab Mujahideen (HSM). “HSM has on numerous occasions warned the #Kenyan government that failure to remove its forces from Somalia would have severe consequences...
The Kenyan government, however, turned a deaf ear to our repeated warnings and continued to massacre innocent Muslims in Somalia ... by Land, air and sea, Kenyan forces invaded our Muslim country, killing hundreds of Muslims in the process and displacing thousands more... the attack at #WestgateMall is just a very tiny fraction of what Muslims in Somalia experience at the hands of Kenyan invaders... The Mujahideen entered #Westgate Mall today at around noon and are still inside the mall...“(13)

The Westgate (west Mall) Attack

Westgate shopping mall in the West lands district of Nairobi is the country’s most well-known and prestigious mall and is the main shopping and leisure center for middle class Kenyans, expatriate communities and tourists. Westgate Mall the commercial, diplomatic and cultural hub of east and central Africa was opened in 2007. Westgate Mall has five (5) levels with 350,000 square feet of available retail space. There are 80 shops, with the largest tenants being the Nakumatt Super Market (a large Department Store that sells a variety of goods) and a Planet Media Cinemas (Movie Theaters).

Picture 2: Westgate-Mall outside view before the attack.

Source: Police Department City of New York ,2013.
Picture 3: Westgate-Mall inside view before the attack.
Source: Police Department City of New York, 2013.

Picture-4: West gate outside view during the attack.
Source: Police Department City of New York, 2013.
Other large tenants include clothing and home goods stores, two banks and the “Millionaires Casino” located on the second floor (18 gaming tables and 95 slot machines). Smaller rental units include outlets for international brands such as Adidas, Converse, FedEx, and Samsung Mobile. Westgate Mall is currently owned by a company called Sony Holding Ltd (no relation to the Sony Corporation), a commercial real estate business owned by Israeli national Alex Trachtenberg (Police Department City of New York, 2013).

On 21 September 2013, at about noon between 10 and 15 masked assailants attacked the upscale Westgate. Fighting with armed police continued over 48 hours later the Somalia-based Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack as retaliation for Kenya’s operation Linda Nchi, Kenya’s military operation in southern Somalia that was launched against Shabaab (START, 2013). The attack and subsequent four-day siege of the mall has left over 67 people dead and over 200 injured. This is the worst terrorist incident on
Kenyan soil since 1998, when al-Qaeda bombed the US Embassy in Nairobi (Manuel, 2013).

5.2.3 The repatriation of Refugee


In addition, Kenya has ratified other international instruments protecting human rights, including the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). In essence, the country adheres to its basic obligations under these instruments, in as much as asylum seekers are granted admission into Kenya and receive protection and assistance. Indeed, the country has a long tradition of providing asylum for refugees. In December 2006, Kenya enacted its first refugee legislation, which came into force on 15 May 2007. The Refugee Act allows the designation of areas in which refugees may reside (a) transit centers and (b) refugee camps. The Act does not indicate whether refugees shall be required to reside in these designated areas (ISS, 2014).

Since the start of Operation Linda Nchi, Kenya has suffered from growing insecurity with a series of low-level attacks in Nairobi, Mombasa and throughout North Eastern Province (NEP). Attacks are largely blamed on groups connected to al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab itself
has claimed direct responsibility for very few of these attacks. The attacks have led to reprisals against Somali populations living in Kenya including Kenyan-Somalis. Kenya is also attempting to repatriate more than half a million Somali refugees despite continued instability in Somalia, and in defiance of national and international legal obligations. The calls for repatriation gained momentum after a wave of attacks targeting churches, nightclubs and public service vehicles in Nairobi and the Somali-dominated North Eastern Province (NEP). This reactionary and impetuous shift in policy brought violence and harassment against Somali refugees and Kenyan-Somalis have been on the rise since calls for repatriation started at the end of 2012. Mistrust between Kenyan security forces and the Somali community in the Eastleigh neighbourhood of Nairobi - commonly referred to as ‘Little Mogadishu’ - has also increased, depriving police of cooperation and information sharing. According to Somali government and UN officials, almost 20,000 Somali refugees have voluntarily left Kenya since repatriation calls started (HIPS,2013) and according to ISS between 30 000 and 80 000 refugees had freely returned to Somalia since January 2013 (ISS, 2014).

On 10 November 2013 governments of Kenya and Somalia and UNHCR have signed the Tripartite Agreement governing the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya. The Agreement defines the roles and responsibilities of signatories and it includes internationally accepted standards that ensure voluntary character of refugees’ repatriation. Although HIPS argues the presence of Somali refugees in Kenya has little connection with increasing insecurity in Kenya. Indeed many suspects involved in the attacks are Kenyan citizens. With the 2013 election approaching, Somalis have become an easy target for aspiring politicians (HIPS,2013).

After the signing of the tripartite agreement Kenya’s Cabinet Secretary for Interior and Coordination of National Government, Joseph Ole Lenku, however, insisted that there was ‘no turning back,’ and that it was ‘time to say goodbye and wish Somali refugees the best as they go back home.’ Kenya has also argued that the repatriation of refugees will expedite their reintegration inside Somalia and form a basis for rebuilding this Horn of Africa nation. It is revealing that there were suggestions of differences between the Kenyan government and the UNHCR following the signing of the tripartite agreement.
Lenku implied that the process was inevitable, given that ‘it was in the best interest of refugees and their [Kenyan] hosts’, while the UNHCR representative in Kenya, Raouf Mazou, maintained that the return of the refugees would only be carried out on a voluntary basis as per the tripartite agreement, and that the process would take at least ten years to complete (ISS, 15 January 2014).

5.2.4 The formation of Juba land

Jubaland historically comprised of Lower and Middle Juba states. But military dictator and ex-President Siad Barre split up the region in 1975, adding Gedo (created as an enclave for Barre’s Darod-Marehan clan members), Bay, and Bakool states (Somalia News Room, on January 10, 2013). Now the region involved Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo, which are adjacent to Kenya and Ethiopia. They cover a combined area of 87,000sqkm and have a total population of around 1.3 million. This includes numerous clans, such as the Ogaden-Darod, Maharan-Darod, Sheekhaal, Coormale, Biimaal, Gaaljecel, Raxanweyn, Dir, Gawaaweyn, Murile, Bejuni Boni and various Bantu groups. Due to its natural resources and location, Jubaland has the potential to be one of Somalia’s richest regions, but conflict has kept it chronically unstable for over two decades. The region includes some of the most remote and marginalized areas of the country, some of which are entirely cut off during the rainy season for months at a time. The region’s most important city is the port of Kismayo, a lucrative prize for various warlords who battled for control of it following the 1991 fall of president Mohamed Siad Barre (IRIN News, 16 April 2013). Juba land was controlled by various powers at various times. Masters of Jubaland since the collapse of the central Somali state in 1991, as can be seen in the chart below:

Table 2: Masters of Jubaland since the collapse of the central Somali state in 1991.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Early 1991</th>
<th>United Somali Congress (USC)</th>
<th>General Farah Aideed’s faction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

63
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Region/Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Late 1991</td>
<td>Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM)</td>
<td>Colonel Hirsi “Morgan’s” faction (largely Ogaden and Harti/Darod)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SPM/SLA</td>
<td>Ogaden/Rer Isaq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Somali Democratic Movement (SDM)/SLA</td>
<td>Elay/Mirifle (Rahanweyn)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993 – 1997</td>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>Colonel Morgan and General Adan Gabyow (Ogaden and Harti)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 – 2006</td>
<td>Juba Valley Alliance (JVA)</td>
<td>Colonel Barre Hirale and Yusuf Seraar (Marehan and Habr Gedir/Ayr)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-2006 – 2007</td>
<td>Islamic Court Union (ICU)</td>
<td>Hawiye and Ogaden – including leaders from Ras Kamboni and Al</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Period</td>
<td>Group Description</td>
<td>Leader/Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-2007 – 2008</td>
<td>Transitional Federal Government (TFG)</td>
<td>Col. Abdirisaq Afgadud with the support of the Ethiopian army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 – 2010</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab, Hisbul Islam (another Islamist group) including Ras Kamboni</td>
<td>Ogaden and Hawiye/Habr Gedir/Ayr</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010 – December 2012</td>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>Mixed clan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source- Crisis Group (2013)

The idea of Jubaland initiative which was central for the formation of Juba land was started with the start of the idea to gain currency in 2009 as part of a desire among local clan, business and political elites with support from parts of the Kenyan state, including politicians of Somali descent to oust Al-Shabaab. It was a good fit with the U.S. government’s dual track policy conceived to support local security and stabilization in the absence of a strong central state (Crisis Group, 2013).

Kenya has long sought to establish a buffer zone along its border with southern Somalia in a project called the Jubaland Initiative. This project became increasingly urgent this year as hundreds of al-Shabaab militants moved into the region after being pushed out of Mogadishu by African Union troops. This led to a rash of incidents along the Kenya-Somalia border as the militants sought to assert their power. In 2010, Kenya backed the formation of Azania, a breakaway province in an area known as Jubaland. This initiative seeks to establish an autonomous region in an area inhabited by the Ogaden and Marehan...
clans. Jubaland declared itself independent in the 1990s but al-Shabaab militants gained control of most of the region in 2006. Officials argue that the buffer zone would protect Kenya’s borders and allow international relief agencies to distribute food to famine stricken residents. Meanwhile there are reports of large deposits of oil on the Juba land coast (Francis, 2011). From 2008 to 2011, Shabaab controlled the border areas of Somalia had to defer to local demands that they not upset working relations across the border, which guaranteed unimpeded trade and access to schools and health care posts on both sides of the border. Military buildups in 2011 by Kenya, Ethiopia, and their proxies drew hardline Shabaab figures to the border area and have upset these arrangements. The Kenyan military offensive could help clear out those hardliners. Importantly, Kenya need not eliminate Shabaab entirely from its border areas; it only needs to create conditions in which local communities can reassert their influence over and hence moderate the actions of whatever residual Shabaab units remain in the border areas. The result is likely to be a string of cross-border village, town, and district arrangements mainly managed by Somalis (Menkhaus, 2012).

Effort to form a regional, secular administration began in 2010, some two years before the SFG came into being. Kenya, keen to create a buffer zone to protect its territory form Al-Shabab incursions, played an important role in process, hosting talks among stakeholders and backing former defense minister Mohamed Abdi Mohamed (Gandhi) as the “president” of an entity then called “Azania”. Since the establishment of the SFG, these conversations have continued in the form of the Juba land Initiative. Neighboring Ethiopia has also been keen to see a buffer zone in southern Somalia - so long as its leadership is not sympathetic to the Ogaden National Liberation Front, an Ethiopian rebel group. And the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), which comprises several states in the region, has also supported the Jubaland Initiative (IRINNews, 2013).

Following the Kenyan military intervention in October 2011 in September 2012, an alliance of pro-SFG militias, Ras Kamboni militiamen and Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF), all under command of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), ousted Al-Shabaab from Kismayo and further Nairobi-based talks began in May 2012 (Crisis
In May 2012, talks aimed at the establishment of the state government of Juba land in southern Somalia convened in Nairobi, Kenya under auspices of IGAD. A task force comprising the representatives of IGAD secretariat, Ethiopia, Kenya and the TFG was formed to steer the process, which was labeled Grand Stabilization Initiative for Southern Somalia. A Somali technical committee, initially comprising members of the principal armed factions in the Juba Valley, was incrementally broadened to include over 30 representatives from all major clans. The negotiations aimed to unify the three administrative regions of lower Juba, Middle Juba, and Gedo under a single interim authority that would constitute a new federal member state of Somalia alongside Puntland. Kenya and Ethiopia, whose forces were engaged in fighting Al-Shabaab in those regions and who jointly provided political impetus behind the talks, both considered the stability of these regions vital to the security of their own borders. The Kenyan government, in particular, viewed the formation of a stable Juba land authority as the cornerstone of an exit strategy for its troops in Somalia and maintaining its future security (Matt, 2013).

In February 2013, as the IGAD initiative became deadlocked, the Somali technical committee relocated from Nairobi to Kismayo, pressing forward with preparations for a conference without IGAD official backing. On February 28, the conference officially convened with over 800 delegates reportedly from attendance. In early May 2013 the delegates approved the interim charter and on May 15 in the conference elected Ahmed Madoobe, leader of the Ras Kamboni force, as interim president of Juba land, then this become the formation of Juba land state and Kenya facilitated the formation process and its interest on this core issue was satisfied (Ibid).

5.2.5 Strengthening of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was deployed to Somalia in 2007 with an AU Peace and Security Council and UN Security Council mandate to provide
peace and stability for the Somali people. Since then, AMISOM has helped Somali security forces to protect Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, and other key strategic towns, freeing them from al Shabaab (AMISOM, 2012). Discussions between the UN and the AU began in late 2011 about boosting the mandate and strengthening of AMISOM beyond that figure, so that it can expand the areas of the country under its control. A new strategic concept has been agreed. It aims at joining all ongoing separate military operations in Somalia into a coordinated and coherent effort against al-Shabaab. A maximum option, increasing AMISOM to 35,000 troops, was rejected as infeasible, as was the minimum option of increasing the mission to 15,700. In the end, a slightly enhanced number of troops, 17,731, was agreed, plus what is described as a set of enablers and force multipliers, which means logistical support – including a maritime interdiction capacity. The AU endorsed the new strategic concept on 5 January 2012 (Francis, 2011).

The UN Security Council also did so later in the month, although final approval for the new mandate and troop ceiling did not come until 22 February, just before the London Conference took place, when Resolution 2036 was passed. The Resolution authorizes AMISOM to take all necessary measures as appropriate in coordination with the Somali security forces to reduce the threat posed by Al Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in order to establish conditions for effective and legitimate governance across Somalia (Jon and Gavin, 2012). Even if the Kenyan forces capture Kismayu, they lack the resources to hold the port for long. The dream of establishing a stable breakaway state in Jubaland is also highly improbable given the vastness of the region and logistical challenge of building a government from scratch. The only option, it seems, is for the Kenyan forces to link up with the African Union’s peacekeeping operation AMISOM (Francis, 2011).

In December 2011, the Kenyan forces already operating in Somalia formally asked to be ‘rehatted’ as part of AMISOM. The UN Security Council has approved this. However, harmonizing their roles and mandates with those of AMISOM is not an entirely straightforward matter, so this has not really happened on the ground yet and may not for some time yet. The planned strength of the Kenyan contingent, which will remain in the south,
is 4,700 personnel (Menkhaus, 2012) July 6th, 2012, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) assumed formal command of the Kenyan forces in Southern Somalia at a colorful ceremony held at the Kenyan Department of Defense headquarters in Nairobi. A total of 4,664 Kenyan personnel were integrated into AMISOM, bringing the AMISOM force strength to slightly over 17,000 troops out of a total authorized strength of 17,731 (AMISOM, 2012). The AMISOM force is today drawn from Burundi, Djibouti, Uganda, Kenya and Ethiopia. Since the KDF has been incorporated into AMISOM and the wait is on for the mandate of AMISOM to be revised, for now the Government of Kenya should encourage its forces to work well within AMISOM as it seeks to broaden its mandate to ensure that the terms of engagement are clear in the joint pursuit of al-Shabaab. This will help avoid situations whereby the two groups are seen as separate and pursuing different goals. In coordinating their efforts, the KDF and AMISOM will be able to contribute to efforts to stabilize Somalia and eliminate al-Shabaab and other militia groups from all parts of the country (Luckystar, 2012).

5.2.6 Kenya’s financial instability

War always comes at a great cost. For Kenya the invasion into Somalia has been very expensive. Estimates put the cost of the invasion at Kenyan shillings (Ksh) 210 million (US$2.8 million) per month in personnel costs alone. This is during a year where Kenya has recorded a Kenyan shillings (Ksh) 236 billion (US$3.1 billion) total budget deficit (Crisis Group Africa, 2012). The cost of supporting personnel, maintenance and procuring military equipment and hardware became too much for Kenya to bear alone. Therefore, the country turned to the international community, particularly the UNSC and regional organizations like the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the AU to support its invasion of Somalia in the hope that this support would ease the financial and legal burden of the invasion. The response was positive when, on 22 February 2012, the UNSC authorized an increase in the AMISOM force to 17,731 troops (Ibid, 2012). An increase in funding from US$300 million per annum to around US$500 million was also awarded. The now more than 4,000-strong KDF detachment in
southern Somalia was also formally incorporated into the AU mission, making it the AU’s largest single military intervention to date. Nonetheless, the KDF allocation still accounted for the largest increase in the 2012/2013 Kenya budget at Ksh.70 billion. This huge spending on the war continues to put pressure on the country’s budget as funds to the military are partly responsible for the diversion of spending from urgent social needs, including education, health and food security (Luckystar, 2012).

5.2.7 Further Militancy in Kenyan

Kenya is home to approximately 4.3 million Muslims, or about 9-10% of the country’s population, and they predominately live in North Eastern and Coast provinces. Many Muslims in Kenya also live in the Eastleigh neighborhood of Nairobi. Eastleigh, often called “Little Mogadishu,” is mostly home to Somali refugees who, over the years, have fled the violence and instability in their home country (Fredrick, 2012).

Certain territories in Kenya are susceptible to extremist or separatist ideology. Since Kenya’s independence in 1963, it has faced a number of secessionist challenges. From 1963 to 1968, ethnic Somalis in North Eastern Province attempted to secede and become part of “Greater Somalia” in the Shifta War. The war, as well as subsequent violence such as the Wagalla Massacre in 1984, was brutally suppressed, creating resentment among Somalis living in Kenya. As a product of these repeated conflicts, northeastern Kenya as well as parts of Coast Province lack basic services such as paved roads, schools and hospitals. These regions suffer from poverty, high youth unemployment, rapid population growth and general insecurity. Resentment toward the government is high, and extremists are able to exploit these factors; chronic youth unemployment, for example, it makes al-Shabab’s promise of limited income attractive (Ken Menkhaus, 2012). During the 1990s, some Kenyans were exposed to extremism from al-Qa’ida, as well as from the Somali militant group al-Itihad al-Islami (AIAI). As result Kenyans were involved in the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi and the Tanzania city of Dar es Salaam; the coordinated attacks, which killed more than 220 people, were Africa's first suicide bombings by Al-Qaeda's East Africa cell. In a 2002 dual car-bomb and suicide
attack on a hotel and plane in Mombasa, at least one of the suspects was Kenyan (Anneli, 2013).

The emergence of the ICU and then al-Shabab in 2006 contributed to radicalization in Kenya. Although it was not until 2011 that Kenya began to suffer frequent small-scale attacks related to developments in Somalia, al-Shabab has been building a formidable and secretive support network in the country since 2007. In the clearest case of domestic radicalization, the Muslim Youth Center (MYC) was formed at the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque in 2008. The MYC, also known as the Pumwani Muslim Youth, was established by Shaykh Ahmad Iman Ali purportedly to express the grievances of impoverished Muslim youth. In practice, however, the MYC has recruited hundreds of Muslims in Kenya to fight with al-Shabab in Somalia. It has promised to sustain attacks for the “al-Shabab brothers” until Kenya withdraws troops from Somalia (Fredrick, 2012).

Before evidence emerged of the MYC’s role in radicalization and militancy, Ahmad Iman Ali was a respected shaykh in Nairobi. He was secretary for the mosque’s planning committee, where he handled construction at the mosque complex. Ahmad Iman Ali was also raising money and finding recruits for al-Shabab’s fight in Somalia. In 2009, Ahmad Iman Ali overtly entered militancy and moved to Somalia, where he would become the leader of al-Shabab’s Kenyan recruits (Crisis Group, 2012). Since Kenya’s intervention in Somalia, authorities and analysts suspect that militant MYC members are responsible for much of the violence at home. In 2011, the United Nations Monitoring Group on Eritrea and Somalia cited in its report that the MYC is spearheading recruitment, fundraising, training and support of jihad in Kenya. Since at least 2010, Ahmad Iman Ali has called for jihad in Kenya, instructing MYC fighters in Somalia to hit back and cause blasts [in Kenya] similar to the Kampala bombings. His mention of the Kampala bombings refers to al-Shabab’s suicide attacks targeting civilians watching the World Cup in the Ugandan capital in July 2010. That attack killed 74 people.

Jihadist speeches and literature as well as the activities of the MYC at the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque have contributed to the formation of a radicalized, secretive group of Kenyan jihadists in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa, Mandera and other cities. This Kenya-
based group looks to al-Shabab as a source of emulation, while supporting its jihad by sending money and recruits to Somalia as well as attacking civilian targets in Kenya. According to Kenyan Police Commissioner Mathew Iteere, hundreds of Kenyan youth who trained with al-Shabab in Somalia have returned home to Kenya (Fredrick, 2012). Some analysts suggest that recruitment now not only includes the Somali community in Kenya, but also other Muslims living in the Kenyan and Tanzanian coastal regions. In recent months, due to increased government oversight, these mosques are reportedly no longer delivering extremist oratory overtly. According to international crisis group in 2012 that radicalization and militancy may have gone underground and increasing, possibly to people’s homes (Ibid).

5.2.8 Al Shabaab’s loss of strong holds

Following the collapse of the UIC and departure of Ethiopian forces in 2009, al-Shabaab initially launched a guerilla warfare campaign designed to overthrow the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and establish an Islamic state in Somalia. Through local alliances and the use of tactics such as armed ambushes and suicide bombings, al-Shabaab captured large amounts of territory in south and central Somalia. By August 2010, al-Shabaab had gained significant strength and shifted its strategy to employ conventional military assaults and direct engagements with TFG and AMISOM forces. This was particularly true in Mogadishu, where al-Shabaab launched a military offensive during the month of Ramadan [August 2010] that divided the city in half. However, the Ramadan offensive failed to take out of control of the city from the government, and al-Shabaab’s fortunes waned shortly the reaper. Facing mounting pressure from AMISOM and TFG forces in Mogadishu, al-Shabaab conducted a strategic withdrawal from the Somali capital in August 2011.

Following its departure from Mogadishu, al-Shabaab faced even greater challenges as Kenya began an incursion into southern Somalia, while anti al-Shabaab militias, such as Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ), and Ethiopian forces pushed southeast from the Ethiopian border. To address these challenges, al-Shabaab withdrew from most major
cities in Somalia. Some members fled to safe havens like the Galgala Mountains in the semiautonomous region of Puntland, and possibly other countries such as Yemen. In south and central Somalia, al-Shabaab shifted its strategy back to a campaign based on guerilla warfare tactics. On all fronts, including Mogadishu, al-Shabaab increasingly employed irregular attacks ambushing military convoys, assassinating government and military officials, and conducting bombings with grenades, and landmines. Despite the shift back to guerilla warfare, al-Shabaab has not been able to stop the advance of allied forces. On 29 September 2012, Kenyan forces took Kismayo, al-Shabaab’s home base from which it generated significant amounts of revenue through the taxation of local economic activities (HSPI, 2013). Al Shabaab’s loss of the strategic seaport of Kismayo, marked a victory for KDF. In response to the loss, al-Shabaab more than doubled its rate of attacks over the next three months launching over twenty per month against pro government targets. While al-Shabaab has not sustained this intensity in 2013, likely due to its continued loss of financial resources and public support, it nonetheless retains the ability to inflict significant violence.

5.2.9 Alienating Kenyan Somalis

On the home front, Kenya risks further alienating its large ethnic Somali population and inviting home grown and international attacks. The intervention risked adding insult to injury in already existing tensions with Kenya’s ethnic Somali community. Starting days into the invasion, the Kenyan government announced a parallel operation to root out al-Shabaab sympathizers in the country, asserting that al-Shabaab was ‘like a big animal with a tail in Somalia and a head in Eastleigh’ (a suburb of Nairobi that is home to many Somali-owned businesses and a large refugee community). Furthermore, reports document serious human rights violations, including cases of ethnic Somalis being profiled and discriminated against due to their ethnicity and in the worst cases being beaten and mistreated. Somalis are also reportedly arbitrarily detained and even deported unless they have documentation to prove their legal right to be in Kenya, or if they cannot afford to bribe local security forces (Luckystar, 2012). This kind of profile of local ethnic Somalis and Somali refugees clearly risks alienating them, with the potential that
al-Shabaab would consider Kenya an even more attractive recruitment pool and thus concentrate more efforts there.
Chapter Six

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

6.1. Conclusion

Kenya, which shares a long border with Somalia, entered the troubled Horn of Africa state in October 2011 in what was called Operation Linda Nchi (protect the nation in Kiswahili). The invasion was neither sanctioned by parliament as required by the constitution nor by the African Union or the United Nations Security Council.

For Kenya, bordering Somalia to the south, several factors seem to have motivated the intervention and the incursion resulted a number of consequences. The causes are political, economic and social. Political causes are defeating security threat, internal military and political dynamics, the need to protect territorial integrity and to establish a Kenya-dominated buffer state in the southern parts of Somalia in order to protect Kenyan national interests. Economic causes are securing oil blocks of deep-sea offshore and its exploration and the social cause is the refugees over influx and its burden. Subsequently the intervention brought a number consequences that are retaliatory attacks on Kenya, casualties, the repatriation of refugee, the formation of Juba land, strengthening of AMISOM, Kenya’s financial instability, Al Shabaab’s loss of strong holds, alienating Kenyan Somalis and further militancy in Kenyan.

Kenya finally succeeded in creating a buffer zone in southern Somalia weather it will serve its interest or not but for Nairobi it is hard to expect stability in its own border regions; indeed, instability also reached the centre. Creating stability in southern Somalia does not mean only defeating Al-Shabaab rather develop other mechanisms. The oil issue should be seen from the perspective of international law framework and only voluntary repatriation of refugees should be done. Kenya, with the help of its partners must now develop a political plan that includes attractive incentives for Kenyans bordering Somalia to work together and fair sharing of the country’s wealth and foreign assistance. That will
require careful planning and support, as well as continued international involvement in development and capacity-building.

6.2 Recommendation

For Kenya

- **Cross boarder incursion must be the last resort:** Because it entails heavy damage on material and human beings and claims huge financial cost. Therefore cross boarder incursion must be the last resort and other solutions has to be planned and implemented. So the followings are recommended

  - **Develop effective all inclusive national development policies:** Kenya’s northern district bordering Somalia due to its remoteness from the political capital of Nairobi and its neglect in development through the years since independence in 1963. It is characterized by Poverty, poor infrastructure, unemployment, and inter-clan competition (for grazing and water). This marginalization is being created a conducive environment for the anti Kenyan groups. The dissatisfied are becoming a human capital for anti Kenyan groups (al-Shabaab). Therefore, the issues of marginalization is need to be addressed urgently. Kenya Should try to incorporate development strategies that will improve the wellbeing of the people in the areas bordering Somalia that perhaps reduce the insecurity which has been endemic in Kenya’s periphery for decades than military incursion.

  - **Recognize the importance of inclusivity in trying to achieve a stable Somalia:** The conflict in Somalia has political, social and humanitarian dimensions to it that the Government of Kenya needs to recognize and take into consideration. Greater inclusion of the Somali government as well as regional and international stakeholders is important for efforts to stabilize Somalia. A military approach alone will not provide a long-term solution. Efforts should be made to hold consultations with several neighboring countries which are directly affected by the spillover of the Somalia conflict across their own borders. Additionally, Kenya should work with international organizations that have been operating
within Somalia for many years as the long-term goal is to achieve lasting peace and security solutions.

- **Develop effective security policies to secure border region:** The Kenya state’s effective rule far smaller than the boundaries drawn on a map, insecurity has been endemic in Kenya’s periphery for decades. This no-man’s-land makes up vast swathes of territory thousands of kilometers long and hundreds deep. The state’s presence is often invisible, policing inadequate and firearms readily available. So there is the question of inadequately equipped security agencies and their inability to police the country’s borders. Whilst Kenya has been made clear that the protection of the border region is at the heart of the Government’s decision to invade Somalia, more consideration needs to be placed on security efforts within Kenya. The government needs to refine current policies and explore alternative ways (reform) and means to effectively plus adequately securing porous borders. This may be legal and cost-effective solution other than military intervention in defeating foreign security threat.

- **Kenya Should approach voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya:**

  The Republic of Kenya has acceded to the 1951 Convention/1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. In addition, Kenya has ratified other international instruments protecting human rights, including the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child as well as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and In December 2006, Kenya enacted its first refugee legislation, which came into force on 15 May 2007. On 10 November 2013 governments of Kenya and Somalia and UNHCR have signed the Tripartite Agreement governing the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees living in Kenya. But the Kenyan government is keen to accelerate the process and have Somali refugees returned to Somalia. It has established a task force and allocated resources to expedite this process. Nonetheless it had better to the Kenyan government to suspend plans to repatriate Somali refugees and abide by international,
regional and domestic obligations. It is also important to understand that a sizable population of Somali refugees were born in the camps in Kenya and have little affinity to their parents’ country of origin. It is therefore, crucial that the refugee repatriation process is truly voluntary and that Kenya’s national security concerns are not prioritized over the rights of refugees. Any forceful repatriation could easily play into the hands of Al-Shabaab by forming a fertile recruitment ground if not a complete lack of cooperation from the refugees.

For Somalia

- Develop policies –strategies concerning returnees of Somali refugees: Kenya is determined to repatriate its Somali refugee population despite lack of conducive conditions in Somalia. The existence of more than a million IDPs demonstrates lack of capacity within Somalia to absorb returnees. In order to alleviate the would be challenges the Somali government has to develop policies regarding the return of Somali refugees and should work with the concerning international, continental and regional bodies.

For both Kenya and Somalia

- Deal oil interest with international law frame: Nowadays oil is emerging as a key resource of interest in East Africa. East Africa has become a hot spot for oil and gas exploration. Between Kenya and Somalia border approximately eight deep-sea offshore oil blocks are located interest of exploration and securing those oil blocks is being reflected from both Kenya and Somalia sides but both parties should go through the meaning of international law to cut unwanted expenses.
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Map 1 – Map of Africa
Map-2- Map of the Study area sowing Somalia & Kenya.