ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES

THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE SINCE 2004: ROLES, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

BY

ENDALCACHEW BAYEH AMSALIE

ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA
JUNE 2014
THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE SINCE 2004: ROLES, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

BY

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A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE SCHOOL OF GRADUATE STUDIES OF ADDIS ABABA UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

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<td>African Chiefs of Defense and Security</td>
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<td>AMIB</td>
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<td>AMU</td>
<td>Arab Maghreb Union</td>
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<td>APSA</td>
<td>African Peace and Security Architecture</td>
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<td>African Standby Force</td>
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>AUC</td>
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<td>CEWARN</td>
<td>Conflict Early Warning Mechanism</td>
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<td>CEWS</td>
<td>Continental Early Warning System</td>
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<td>COMESA</td>
<td>Common Markets for Eastern and Southern Africa</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<td>DPKO</td>
<td>Department of Peace-Keeping Operations</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EAC</td>
<td>East African Community</td>
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<td>EACDS</td>
<td>Eastern African Chiefs of Defense Staff</td>
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<td>EASBRICOM</td>
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<td>ECCAS</td>
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<td>ECCASBRIG</td>
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<td>ECOBRIG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>FOC</td>
<td>Full Operational Capability</td>
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FTX  Field Training Exercise
FTX13  Mashariki Salam 2013
HPSS  Humanitarian Peace Support School
IGAD  Inter-Governmental Authority for Development
IGADD  Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
IMF  International Monetary Fund
IOC  Initial Operational Capability
IPSTC  International Peace Support Training Center
LOGBASE  Logistics Base
LosgMAPEX  Logistics Mapping Exercise
LRA  Lord Resistance Army
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding
MSC  Military Staff Committee
NARC  North Africa Regional Capability
NASBRIG  North African Standby Brigade
OAU  Organization of African Unity
PLANELM  Planning Element
PSC  Peace and Security Council
PSO  Peace Support Operation
RECAM  Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity
RECs  Regional Economic Communities
SADC  Southern African Development Community
SADCBRIG  Southern African Development Community Brigade
SHIRBRIG  Standby High Readiness Brigade
SNM  Somali National Movement
SPLM  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement
SSDF  Somali Salvation Democratic Front
UK  United Kingdom
UN  United Nations
UNAMID  United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
<table>
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<td>UNOCI</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Cote d’ Ivoire</td>
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<td>UNPOS</td>
<td>United Nations Political Office for Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSAS</td>
<td>United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNSOA</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office for AMISOM</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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<td>WSLF</td>
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I wish to thank God for giving me the strength and patience to conduct this study. I am sincerely grateful to my advisor, Dr. Hussein Jemma, in providing me unreserved support throughout my study. Special thanks also due to my interviewees for their generous cooperation. I am also indebted to my friends who have always been on hand for giving me constructive advices and assistances.
ABSTRACT

This study examines the roles, challenges and prospects of Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) in the maintenance of peace and security in the Eastern Africa since 2004. The study employed qualitative methodological approach. Accordingly, data was gathered from both primary and secondary sources, in which case empirical data was gathered through key informant interviews. Findings of the study show that EASF has limited role in maintaining peace and security in the region. It has not yet been deployed as a regional peace-keeping force; rather, it has played only some supportive roles to the United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) peace support missions. The study identifies the following major factors that have impeded the role of EASF. These include lack of proper organization that embraces all states of the region at the time of EASF’s establishment, the hegemonic competition between Ethiopia and Kenya, the prevalence of several interstate and intrastate conflicts in the region, duplication of regional organizations working on the same area having overlapping membership and competition over funds, absence of strong legal basis that obliges member states’ contribution of troops and equipments, lack of adequate finance, and cultural diversity. Notwithstanding those challenges, EASF has a good future prospect as can be observed from its current activities. The organization has been conducting pre-deployment joint trainings, field exercises, and participating in the regional maritime trainings to maintain maritime security. For more successful future operation of the force, however, the study suggests cooperation among member states, developing unfettered commitment of member states to contribute force, finance and logistics as well as standardizing training and doctrines so as to create effective multinational forces.
CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Background of the Study

Africa is known to be a continent experiencing the most tragic war experiences. It has continued to be the site of many of the world’s deadliest conflicts. In the 1990’s, the conflicts in the continent cost the life of many Africans. In this regard, the Rwanda’s genocide, Somalia’s and Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) conflicts have a central place, among others. This fact put the Organization of African Unity (OAU) under criticism and motivated African leaders to adjust OAU in a way that it could provide security for the suffering African citizens (Coning and Kasumba, 2010).

Besides the conflict-ridden nature of the continent and failure of OAU, there was also another driving factor that pushed African leaders to restructure the OAU and establish a continental mechanism for responding crisis situations. This was the bad feeling of Africans by the failure of the international community to action during the 1994 Rwanda’s genocide. This event created resentment and urged African states to establish their own continental mechanism to intervene on similar occasions in a timely and effective manner (Kinzel, 2008; Aboagye, 2012).

Moreover, the need for robust response to the challenges of peace and security in the continent remained constant in the 21st century (Hussein, 2012; Aboagye, 2012). This was due to the fact that in this period conflicts especially intrastate conflicts continued to affect the peace and security of the people as well as the very survival of African states (Solomon, 2010). Besides, it has become also evident that such conflicting situations and political turmoils would remain persistent in the future (ibid). All the above discussed factors cumulatively forced African states to create a continental force.

Actually, the need to have a continental military force dates back to the call for its establishment by Casablanca group, led by Nkrumah, in 1961 to prevent external intervention, to undertake wars of liberation and defend the sovereignty and territorial
integrity of emerging independent states (Girmachew, 2008; Vines, 2013). However, no continental force was created during the age of OAU. Later, in 2002, the African Union (AU) replaced OAU with the aim, *inter alia*, of achieving peace and security in the continent. Consequently, African countries agreed to establish a continental force which is instrumental for maintaining peace and order. Accordingly, the concept of African Standby Force (ASF) was adopted by the African Chiefs of Defense Staff in the year 2003 through its document entitled *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee* (Levene, 2008; Aboagye, 2012; Coning and Kasumba, 2010; Girmachew, 2008).

African Union established ASF as one critical element of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to timely and effectively address any future conflicts in the continent (Solomon, 2010; Kinzel, 2008; Hussein, 2012). The rationale was, AU not to be paralyzed once again, like OAU in the previous crisis situations, and to intervene in crisis situations among member states without waiting for international interventions. This is the major departure from OAU’s cardinal principles of inviolability of state sovereignty and non-interference. AU, in responding to African problems, allows for intervention so long as certain requirements are met (Kinzel, 2008). Therefore, intervention is not an arbitrary interference; rather, it is undertaken based on decision and order of the Peace and Security Council (PSC). The instrument for the implementation of such decision and order of the PSC in a timely and efficient manner is ASF (Kinzel, 2008; Aboagye, 2012). The establishment of ASF is based on the presupposition that it would be fully operational by June 2010 and be capable of deploying forces in different scenarios, ranging from military observer missions to full-scale interventions in grave circumstances like genocide (Canter, 2009).

The ASF was supposed to consist of standby multidisciplinary contingents namely, civilian, police and military components positioned in their countries of origin, ready for fast deployment anywhere in Africa and possibly even outside the continent (Ciilliers, 2008). The ASF is not a single African army. Rather, it is a combination of five sub-regional standby forces from Eastern, Western, Northern, Central and Southern Africa that would act as force generation entities in the event of the activation of ASF for deployment.
These sub-regional standby forces are the Southern African Development Community Brigade (SADCBRIG), the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), the North African Standby Brigade (NASBRIG), the Economic Community of West African States Brigade (ECOBRIG), and the Economic Community of Central African States Brigade (ECCASBRIG).

The focus of this study is, therefore, the Eastern Africa sub-regional standby force named Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), formerly Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), consisting of Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Most importantly, the study focuses on the roles, challenges and prospects of EASF in maintaining peace and security in the region.

1.2. Statement of the Problem

As part of Africa, which is conflict-stricken, Eastern Africa region is one of the most conflict-ravaged areas in the continent. Eastern Africa region has been one of the world’s most conflicted regions, experiencing over 200 armed conflicts since 1990 (Williams, 2011). The region is characterized by intrastate conflicts, interstate wars and political extremism (IRSEM, 2011; Khadiagala, 2008). Moreover, mistrust is the central characteristic of relations between states in the Eastern Africa region. As a result, following the decision of AU to establish ASF, Eastern Africa countries came up with their own standby brigade under the auspice of Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) in 2004 (Carvalho, et al., 2010; Jacobsen and Nordby, 2013a). Accordingly, countries pledged to contribute their forces to EASBRIG. After successfully organized the brigade, IGAD was replaced by an independent Eastern African Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) to bring stability and peace by preventing crises or responding to crises whenever they arise in the region (Haile, 2006; Carvalho, et al., 2010). This change was necessitated due to the existence of disagreement among IGAD member states and the need to have an overarching organ, which would include all states in the region (Carvalho, et al. 2010; Vines, 2013). Thus, all-inclusive membership was made under EASBRICOM by including countries, which were not members of IGAD.
As has been discussed above, Eastern Africa is characterized by full of contradictions and turmoil, and, thus, regional insecurities have had wider global resonance, attracting international actors, institutions and resources (Khadiagala, 2008; Ohm, et al., 2011). Thus, what EASF has been doing in this regard is the crux of this study, notably the successes it achieved and challenges it faced as the Eastern African wing of ASF. The available literature focuses on ASF in dealing with African peace and security in general (for instance, Batware, 2011; Aboagye, 2012; Coning and Kasumba, 2010; Solomon, 2010). However, there is no comprehensive study, which addresses the role of EASF in maintaining peace and security in the region sufficiently. In other words, the available scanty literature on the subject does not go beyond the mere description of structure and purpose of EASF (for instance, Carvalho, et al., 2010; Kinzel, 2008; Varhola, L and Varhola, C, 2011). This study focuses on examining the roles, challenges, and prospects of EASF on security issue of the region, which have been overlooked by the available literature, thereby contributing to the literature in the field.

1.3. Central Argument

This study argues that Eastern Africa Standby Force has some roles and good future prospects in the maintenance of peace and security in the region. Although EASF has contributed its part for the maintenance of peace and security in the region, it has encountered several challenges in its institutional progress and operation. Nevertheless, EASF has good prospects for its future operation in the region.

1.4. Research Objectives

The overall objective of this study is to examine the roles, challenges and prospects of EASF in maintaining peace and security in the Eastern Africa region since 2004. The study has the following specific objectives.

- To examine the roles of EASF in maintaining peace and security in the Eastern Africa
- To explore major challenges that EASF is facing in carrying out its activities
- To examine the prospects for EASF to achieve its objectives
1.5. Research Questions

The core question of this study is that what are the roles, challenge and prospects of EASF in maintaining peace and security in Eastern Africa?

- What roles does EASF play in maintaining peace and security in Eastern Africa?
- What are the major challenges of EASF in carrying out its activities?
- What are the possible prospects for EASF to achieve its objectives?

1.6. Methodology and Methods of Data Collection

This study employed a qualitative approach. Qualitative research approach, as Dawson (2007: 14) outlines, explores "attitudes, behaviour and experiences through such methods as interviews or focus group discussions". Qualitative approach is used to address research questions that require explanation or understanding of social phenomena and their contexts (Ritchie and Lewis, 2003). The question of 'what ', 'how' and 'why' can be answered by using qualitative approach (ibid). Moreover, qualitative research attempts to interpret phenomena in terms of the meanings people attach to them. In other words, qualitative research is, basically, interpretive in that it involves analyzing data and finally making interpretation or drawing conclusions about the data analyzed meaning (Creswell, 2003).

This study intends to examine the roles, challenges and prospects of EASF in maintaining peace and security in the Eastern Africa region. This can be clearly understood through examining written documents and conducting in-depth interviews with pertinent personalities. Due to the nature of the study and since this study cannot be numerically addressed, it is the qualitative methodology, which best guides the collection and analysis of data.

To gather data for the study, I used both primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources like books, journal articles, reports, minutes, newspapers and some internet sources were used. Primary data were gathered through interviews. I employed semi-structured, open-ended interviews that has allowed for flexibility depending on the circumstances and more questions from the response of the interviewees. I interviewed officials from AU
Peace Support Operation Division, EASF Headquarters, EASF Logistics Base (LOGBASE) and also experts from the Institute for Security Studies.

Purposive/judgmental sampling technique was used to select key informants. I chose this technique since it enabled me to identify participants who had closer connection to and adequate knowledge of the issue. Applying random sampling technique may result in selection of individuals who have no knowledge of the issue. As a result, necessary information might be missed and information gained may not enable me to realize the purpose of the study. Hence, purposive sampling technique was used to trace pertinent persons who could provide relevant information on the issue.

1.7. Significance of the Study

The study has significance to those who are interested in the role of EASF in the peace and security issues of the region since the issue has not received adequate attention in the existing literature. The findings of the study will contribute to the available literature and motivates further researches on the subject. Moreover, I assume that the findings of the study will have policy implications for the concerned countries, as it calls for reassessment of the existing policies on the part of member states.

1.8. Scope of the Study

The study deals with the roles, challenges and prospects of EASF in maintaining peace and security in the Eastern Africa region since the time of its formation in 2004. Hence, it examines what EASF contributed to maintain peace and security in the region, what challenges it faced in its progress and operation, and what possible prospects it has for its better future operation. These are the main issues addressed in the study. Moreover, the study limits the role of EASF to Eastern Africa regional geography.

1.9. Limitations of the study

In the course of the study, I faced a serious challenge in securing the consent of key informants. Besides, as the issue is not well noticed by the available literature, I encountered shortage of secondary sources. Though I tried to get access to EASF archives, the concerned officials were reluctant to give me.
1.10. Ethical Considerations

I have tried to get an informed consent of respondents. The interviewees have given their oral consent in full knowledge of the purpose of the research and the consequences for them of taking part. Moreover, the names of some respondents have not been disclosed in the report to offer them some protection of privacy and confidentiality. Apart from that the names cited in this study are real names of the respondents.

1.11. Organization of the Study

This study is organized into five chapters. The first Chapter deals with background of the study, statement of the problem, central argument, research objectives, research questions, methodology and methods of data collection, significance of the study, scope of the study, limitations of the study and ethical considerations.

The second Chapter deals with literature review. The chapter first presents relevant concepts that will be used in the study, notably peace related concepts (peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-building) and conflict related concepts (conflict prevention, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation) as well as the concept of security in brief. Then the study presents relevant theories on the role of organizations in maintaining peace and security. Next to that, the study examines the role of United Nations (UN) in maintaining international peace and security with special emphasis to the role of the Security Council in its peacekeeping operations. Besides, it proceeds with AU and its effort to create peace and security in the continent. Under this, elements of APSA have been discussed. As an element of APSA, the PSC and the ASF have been discussed in detail in this chapter since they are the general framework within which the EASF operates.

The third Chapter presents the background and structures of EASF. The chapter also deals with Standardization of Doctrine and Training and the Aim and Mission Scenarios of EASF. Besides, it examines the role of EASF in maintaining peace and security in the region.
The fourth Chapter deals with the major challenges of EASF in maintaining peace and security in the region. Moreover, it examines the possible prospects for EASF to achieve its objectives. The fifth Chapter concludes the study.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1. Conceptual Perspectives

2.1.1. The Concept of Peace

In dealing with the concept of peace, positive peace and negative peace are inevitable issues. In this regard, Galtung’s classification of peace as negative and positive peace could serve as basis for others’ effort in understanding and conceptualizing peace. For Galtung (in McCandless and Bangura, 2007), negative peace implies the absence of direct violence, especially violent conflict or war and positive peace refers to the absence of structural violence and the presence of social justice. Many personalities, especially non-specialists in the area, focus on negative peace, whereas peace specialists focus on positive peace (ibid). Negative peace implies narrow understanding of the concept as it only stress on the mere absence of war or violent conflict, whereas positive peace denotes a more comprehensive understanding of the term since it focuses on addressing a multidimensional factors for the outbreak of violence and insists on the creation and institutionalization of justice and freedom. In other words, positive peace has to do with the creation of environment where violence is unlikely to arise, whereas negative peace is simply about the prevention of violence (Allan and Keller, 2006).

Moreover, in understanding peace, we need to also understand the following peace-related concepts as recommended by former Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his An agenda for peace to swiftly respond to threats to international peace and security (UN, 1992).

**Peace-keeping:** It is a situation where peace-keeping missions are sent to the conflicting area to stop violence and monitor a ceasefire, or serve as a buffer between conflicting parties (Abdi, 2012; McCandless and Bangura, 2007). The UN peacekeeping missions in different conflicting parts of Africa can be understood in this context. In the course of

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1 Structural violence is violence emerged from unequal social structures. (see McCandless and Bangura, 2007: 98)
keeping peace, military forces deal with hindrances of proper delivery of humanitarian assistance, assist in overseeing observance of peace agreements and foster mutual confidence (McCandless and Bangura, 2007). By doing so, they create an opportunity for prevention of conflict and the making of peace (UN, 1992).

**Peace-making:** It is a process of providing political, diplomatic and sometimes military interventions, which aim at bringing warring parties to agreement (Abdi, 2012; McCandless and Bangura, 2007). One can mention here the diplomatic efforts made by Norway, USA, IGAD and civil societies in bringing the historic peace agreement signed in January 2005, which put an end to the deep rooted armed conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, as a typical example. Hence, as stated under UN agenda for peace, peace-making is an action aimed at bringing hostile parties to agreement, basically using peaceful means as stipulated in Chapter VI of the UN Charter (UN, 1992).

**Peace-building:** If peace-keeping and peace-making are effectively undertaken, they lay a basis for post-conflict peace-building, which is instrumental in averting the recurrence of violence (*ibid*). Peace-building in addressing root causes of conflict and institutionalizing justice and freedom is regarded as building of positive peace (McCandless and Bangura, 2007; UN, 1992).

While conceptualizing peace, conflict inevitably comes to picture. Wallensteen (2002) defines conflict as “a social situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) strive to acquire at the same moment in time an available set of scarce resources”, which is difficult. Existence of incompatible goals is essential for the outbreak of conflict (Sandole, *et al.*, 2009; Wallensteen, 2002).

The most important thing in dealing with conflict is how to handle it. Needless to say, it is important to employ conflict preventing measures. However, once it occurs, the question will be how best we can deal with it. As Crawford and Bodine (1996: 7) noted, “conflict in and of itself is not positive or negative. Rather, it is the response to conflict that transforms it into either a competitive, destructive experience or a constructive challenge offering the opportunity for growth”.

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Once conflict occurs, it needs measures to be taken to halt it using different diplomatic initiatives. This is what is called conflict management (Paffenholz, 2009). Swanstrom and Weissmann (2005) argue that conflict management is a base for effective conflict resolution though it concerns mainly on armed aspect of a conflict. Wallensteen (2002) adds that though conflict management does not address the cause of conflict, it can lessen the magnitude of effect of the crisis and creates some confidence among the conflicting parties.

The other approach of peace-building is conflict resolution. This emphasizes addressing the underlying causes of conflict and restoring the relationships between the parties (Paffenholz, 2009; Swanstrom and Weissmann, 2005). Unlike conflict management, here the concern is to solve the root cause of conflict and to restore relationships of the conflicting parties. Wallensteen (2002) argues that conflict resolution deals with the basic incompatibilities. Thus, it is less likely for conflict to reoccur as compared to conflict management.

Conflict transformation approach, on the other hand, concerns with transforming deep-rooted armed conflicts to peaceful ones (Paffenholz, 2009). Conflict transformation denotes transformation of institutions and other grounds that lead to raise violence. It is analogous with peace building in addressing structural and cultural\(^2\) violence.

**2.1.2. The Concept of Security**

Security is a controversial concept, lacking common consensus. Many present security as absence of threat to respected values, notably threats that endanger the survival of certain objects (Schafer, 2013). Traditionally, the concept of security was associated with the national security, where state was the main concern (Brauch, *et al.*, 2011). This state-centric conception of security is stated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in its 1994 *Human Development Report* that “the concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a

\(^2\) Cultural violence refers to cultures which legitimize direct violence and structural violence. (see McCandless and Bangura, 2007: 98)
nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people” (UNDP, 1994). In the earliest time, security was understood as accumulation of power as the prime goal of the time was to protect the state sovereignty. This state-centric pattern of security did not show the possibility of citizens’ oppression by the government itself (Schafer, 2013). Hence, it was narrowly pursued with no concern to the security of the daily life of the people. However, UNDP came up with a new concept of Human Security focusing on the issue of human rights, protection from violence and sustainable development (UNDP, 1994). The concept of human security was derived from, inter alia, the “responsibility to protect”-the idea that if the government failed to protect its citizens or the government itself threatens its citizens, the international community has the responsibility to protect them (Schafer, 2013). The main concern of human security is humankind; they are at the center, unlike the earliest perception (Brauch, et al., 2011). The belief that state security is impossible without security of its citizens as well as citizens of others contributed to the emergence of this concept. For the purpose of this study, therefore, security involves the security of states (in terms of security of territory from external aggression) as well as security of the people because it is evident that the tendency of current conflicts is more of within states than between states. Hence, security in this study implies the well-being of states and human beings.

2.2. Theories of the Role of International Organizations in Maintaining Peace and Security

As regards the role of international organizations in maintaining peace and security, there have been divergent views. Some argue that international organizations are the representation of state self-interests and cannot satisfy what is expected from them. Others argue in favour of positive role of international organizations in promoting cooperation as well as peace and security. There are contending theories in this regard. For the purpose of this study, however, constructivism, neo-realism/structural realism and neo-liberalism/neo-liberal institutionalism have been discussed pertaining to the role of organizations in maintaining peace and security.
2.2.1. Constructivism

Constructivists argue in favour of international organizations. They argue that international organizations have the role of not only regulating state behaviour but also modifying the identity and interest of states, which, in turn, directs states action (Mitchell, 2006). Finnemore (in Hobson, 2003:154) believes that states are “normative-adaptive entities”. This means that, through international organizations, states adapt international norms of appropriate state behaviour to inform their policies and domestic structures (ibid). Thus, international norms push states to cooperate internationally even though states’ power as well as utility-maximizing interests is not achieved (ibid). Constructivists underestimate the relevance of relative gain, unlike the neo-realists, and propagate the more likelihood of cooperation among states (Nugroho, 2008).

Moreover, international organizations, by constraining self-interest of states and infusing new appropriate norm to states, control states not to deviate from international cooperation (ibid). This optimistic view on the role of international organizations makes constructivists to embrace neo-liberals. Above all, international organizations have the role of, inter alia, promoting democratization of member states and encouraging member states to pursue peaceful conflict management strategies (Mitchell, 2006).

2.2.2. Neo-Realism

As neo-realists or structural realists argue, organizations are the product of state interests, thus, they cannot independently function, rather, it is state interests, which determine the decision whether states cooperate or compete (Baylis, 2001; Meierhenrich, 2012; Sinclair and Byers, 2006). UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Union (EU) are international organizations through which states safeguard their interests. Arguing that they are formed on the basis of self-interest calculation, neo-realists reject the importance of international organizations in serving to achieve peace and security (Baylis, 2001; Meierhenrich, 2012; Nathan, 2012). International organizations could not have the role to prevent war (Nugroho, 2008). For neo-realists, organizations are reflections of the interests of states and states are unwilling to surrender their power. Thus, the cumulative effect of these constrained the independent role of international organizations.
Neo-realists are pessimistic about the possibility of international cooperation as they believe that states highly care for their relative position. An important point, which characterizes neo-realists’ assumption, is their focus on relative gains (Burchill, 2005; Brown and Ainley, 2005; Baldwin, 1993; Lamy, 2001). In this regard, Burchill (2005: 65) notes as follows: “Neo-realists, such as Waltz, argue that states are concerned with ‘relative gains’ – meaning gains assessed in comparative terms (who will gain more?)”. It is possible to deduce from this that, states care for their relative position (for their better position compared to others) in cooperating with others and if cooperation does not serve this ultimate interest, cooperation will be fragile. Neo-realists further assume that states cooperate and join international organizations when it is suitable to them (Sinclair and Byers, 2006). As a result, international organizations survive so long as they allow states to follow their own interests and assist states to achieve relative gain.

To sum up, as can be inferred from the above discussion, neo-realists underestimate the importance of international organizations. Rather, they believe that, international organizations are the means by which states achieve their self-interest. Thus, they are pessimistic about the role of international organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security.

2.2.3. Neo-Liberalism

Neo-liberals or liberal institutionalists argue in favour of the significance of international organizations in promoting cooperation and stability. Unlike the neo-realists, neo-liberals assert that “states are concerned with maximizing their ‘absolute gains’ – an assessment of their own welfare independent of their rivals (what will gain me the most?)” (Burchill, 2005: 65). This is vital for promoting cooperation among states and maintaining mutual benefit. In this connection, Boehmer, et al., (2004) argue that in a condition where states focus more on obtaining absolute gain, cooperation and collective security are more feasible. In other words, neo-liberals believe in collective security and argue that states can devote themselves to the preservation of joint interests through international organizations (Niou and Ordeshook, 1991).
Keohane, being optimistic about the relevance of those organizations, states that international organizations are capable of facilitating cooperation, and without them “the prospects for our species will be very poor indeed” (in Sinclair and Byers, 2006). Hence, he values organizations’ role in promoting cooperation. Besides, neo-liberals affirm that organizations “assume the role of encouraging cooperative habits, monitoring compliance and sanctioning defectors” (Burchill, 2005: 65). Hence, one can infer from this that, organizations have a pivotal role in facilitating cooperation between states.

Liberal institutionalists, though recognize the systemic anarchy, the importance of military power and the pre-eminence of states’ interests, argue that organizations are a framework for cooperation, which can help to address the risk of security competition between states and promote peace and stability (Sinclair and Byers, 2006; Boehmer, et al., 2004; Baylis, 2001; Burchill, 2005). Besides, they claim that since organizations feed states with information in the areas of security, they can lessen uncertainty and other risks that could emerge out of anarchy (Meierhenrich, 2012; Nathan, 2012). Generally, as Hobson (2003) notes international organizations are vital to make the world peaceful and cooperative. Thus, their argument is that international organizations do play significant role in maintaining peace and stability. To substantiate this argument, they present the role of Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in maintaining stability in South-East Asia, the role of OAU in contributing its part to address interstate differences, the role of European organizations in enhancing security in Europe as a witness for positive role of organizations in maintaining peace and security (Baylis, 2001).

In supporting the neoliberals’ assumption of the positive role of international organizations, Nathan (2012) came up with a concrete evidence. Taking into account the progress of regional organizations in the peace and security area, most importantly, through preventive diplomacy, mediation, post-war peace-building, arms control, and disarmament, Nathan argues that it will be irrational to argue that international organizations cannot bring peace. He substantiates his argument by explaining, inter alia, the role of AU in Kenyan civil violence and the mediation effort of IGAD in Sudan.
In a nutshell, as can be understood from the above discussion, neo-liberals believe that international organizations are very important in facilitating interstate cooperation and maintaining peace and security.

In the above discussion of theories of international organizations, it appears that global, continental and sub-regional organizations have roles in peace and security, while they are also, in a different line of argument, subject to interest competition. Similarly, the institutional progress and operation of Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) has been challenged by detrimental competition of member states, notably Ethiopia and Kenya (Kimathi, 2010). However, there exists an ongoing cooperation among Eastern Africa states in the area of security. Hence, an eclectic mix of these theories, particularly the last two (neo-realism and neo-liberalism), is employed to explain the institutional progress as well as operation of EASF. Constructivists, however, highly advocate the role of international organizations to the extent of molding the identity of the state itself, which is less visible in case of Eastern Africa. This means that, international organizations constitute the identity of the states in a way that motivates them to cooperate. Moreover, constructivists sideline power as well as utility - maximizing interests of member states while cooperating with others. Constructivists embrace the assumption of neo-liberals, but, constructivists are too extremists in portraying the role of organizations in maintaining peace and security and shaping the state itself. Thus, the theories of neo-realism and neo-liberalism are applied in this study.

In the following sections, the study begins with presenting the role of UN in the peace and security areas briefly, especially, the UN Security Council’s rapid deployment in crisis areas. In this connection, the concept of UN Standby force will be highlighted. And the study proceeds to detailed discussion of the efforts of AU in maintaining peace and security in the continent.

2.3. The Role of United Nations in Maintaining International Peace and Security

United Nations was founded in 1945 with the primary purpose of maintaining international peace and security. The Security Council, the primary responsible body, is mandated to
“pacific settlement of disputes” under Chapter VI of UN Charter. The Security Council suggests the appropriate means to be used by concerned parties when it believes that the issue would threaten international peace and security. However, it has no binding effect on member states (UN, 2007). More importantly, the Security Council is also mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter to decide on appropriate actions to be taken when there exists “any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression”. Such power of the Security Council involves the use of force “to maintain or restore international peace and security”. The collective security role of the UN is, thus, stipulated on the Charter providing power to the Security Council ranging from peaceful resolution of disputes to the use of armed force depending on the situations. Accordingly, Matheson (2001) presents that since the end of the Cold War in 1991, UN has played significant role in resolving intrastate and interstate violence as well as boundary conflicts either with the permission of the states or based on the power of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Since the maintenance of international peace and security is the primary responsibility of the Security Council, from its very establishment the Security Council has needed rapidly deployable force to respond to threats to international peace and security (Koops and Varwick, 2008; UN, 2003a). This means that there has been a great need for improvement of UN peace-keeping operations to effectively and promptly respond to numerous crisis situations. It was evident from the UN Secretary General’s (Boutros Boutros-Ghali) recommendation, in his “Agenda for Peace” and the “Supplement” to member states to cooperate with UN in peacekeeping operations through preparing their troops for rapid deployment with the same training standards and procedures (Koops and Varwick, 2008). Consequently, member states, refusing the earliest proposal of having a standing army (a permanent army similar to the army of a certain state) on the ground that will endanger their sovereignty, favoured this proposal of a standby arrangement (where forces situated in the country of their origin and deployable through notice) as a sensible choice (ibid).

Accordingly, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) has organized the United Nations Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS) since 1994 to strengthen the supports of states in the peacekeeping operations of UN (Mazzei, 2009). The UNSAS does not have its
own military force; rather it depends on contributions from member states of military units, equipments and personnel (UN, 2003b; Mazzei, 2009). Hence, the ultimate power whether to deploy resources or not is under member states’ will (UN, 2003a). States who pledge to contribute forces are required to provide their troops with training as per the UN standards and procedures (UN, 2003b; Koops and Varwick, 2008).

As discussed above, UNSAS is constituted by pledges of member states; hence, to support it, a group of like-minded states discussed to create rapidly deployable force within the framework of UNSAS. On December 1996, Austria, Canada, Denmark, The Netherlands, Norway, Poland and Sweden signed a letter of intent and forged the Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG), at Hovelmet Barracks in Denmark, with the intent of improving the rapid deployment of UN peacekeeping force (Koops and Varwick, 2008). Eventually, in supporting the UN, the SHIRBRIG deployed first in 2000 for United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) (UN, 2003a; Koops and Varwick, 2008). SHIRBRIG also assisted in planning activities for United Nations Mission in Cote d’ Ivoire (UNOCI) of the 2003 (Koops and Varwick, 2008). Moreover, on the request of DPKO for assistance, SHIRBRIG deployed in the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) in 2003 and 2004, respectively (UN, 2003b; Koops and Varwick, 2008).

The UN Security Council, though not in all case, has been able to minimize or prevent conflict across different corners through its peacekeeping operations (UN, 2007). Therefore, UN as an international organization has played a paramount role in the maintenance of international peace and security, though not without challenges.

The SHIRBRIG concept has been advised to be followed in other parts of the world, most importantly, in Africa due to its conflicting nature and problems with the international responses to African conflicts (UN, 2003b; Koops and Varwick, 2008). Accordingly, African leaders came up with their continental force, to be contributed from the five regions of the continent, following the UN model of standby force arrangement (Durch, et al., 2003). And the SHIRBRIG has been supporting the advancement of ASF, especially it has been working together with ECOBRIG and EASBRIG (Koops and Varwick, 2008), which is the focus of this study.
2.4. The African Union and Its Efforts to Maintain Peace and Security in the Continent

African countries suffered worst kind of exploitative colonialism besides the interstate and intrastate conflicts. As a result, pan African movement began abroad and subsequently the OAU was formed in 1963 (Kumar, 2009). African leaders showed strong commitment in joining hands for African liberation, adhering to the principle of ‘African solutions for African problems’ (Cervenka, 1977; Kumar, 2008). Since some African countries were still under the yoke of colonialism, OAU from its very establishment assumed the task of supporting collective struggles for liberation (Cervenka, 1977; Abubakar, 2008). Accordingly, OAU had played a great role in the liberation of the continent and the development of a common identity and unity in the continent (Hassan, 2006; Siradag, 2012). However, since OAU was pre-occupied with the program of anti-colonialism, it was found to be inefficient to respond to other challenges encountered, especially in the maintenance of peace and security in the continent. It was incapable of effectively addressing interstate and intrastate conflicts in the continent (Cervenka, 1977; Siradag, 2012).

Moreover, the OAU adhered to the inviolability of the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference. For this reason, it could be a silent observer of intrastate conflicts in the continent, leaving aside intrastate conflicts as an exclusive mandate of the concerned governments (Abubakar, 2008; Murithi, 2008; Kumar, 2009; Moller, 2009).

The weakness of OAU and partly the reluctance of international communities to address crisis situations that occurred in Africa urged African leaders to discuss the establishment of `AU in the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, on September 9, 1999 (Coning and Kasumba, 2010; Bogland, et al., 2008). Accordingly, AU was established in 2002 in the inaugural meeting held in Durban, South Africa, to deal with the multifaceted nature of problems in the continent. Unlike the OAU, the security concept of AU widened to include democracy, respect of human rights, accountability, good governance and political openness (Bogland, et al., 2008; Solomon, 2011). Member states in the Constitutive Act “determined to promote and protect human and peoples’ rights,
consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law” in the continent. This shows AU’s dramatic shift of focus from OAU’s state-centric conception to human-centered security as it is devoted to the rights and interests of citizens. It came up with a broad vision for African people to the extent of protecting citizens’ wellbeing within the member states. This is underscored in the introduction of the principle of intervention.

Accordingly, leaders of African states conceded to the AU’s power of intervention to rescue the people from a grave suffering, which is not provided for in UN Charter (Bogland, et al., 2008). In the interest of maintenance of peace and security in the continent, AU introduced the principle of intervention in the domestic affairs of individual countries in the cases of circumstances like genocide and severe violation of human rights. This is stipulated under article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act, being a major departure of AU from its predecessor. AU introduced this principle as a solution for the increasing nature of intrastate conflicts in Africa, which was apparent from the experience in Somalia (1990s), Rwanda (1994), DRC (1998 and 2003), among others.

African Union, which came as a panacea for the weaknesses of the OAU, made achievement of peace and security in Africa the main goal of its activities. This is clear from the preamble of the Constitutive Act of the AU, which was adopted at Lome Summit in 2000 and endorsed in 2002 at Durban meeting. It states that “the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and of the need to promote peace, security and stability as a prerequisite for the implementation of our development and integration agenda” (Constitutive Act of the AU, 2002: 3). One can easily deduce from this that highest concern and priority have been given to peace and security issues of the continent as a precondition to realize the other goals of the AU. This is further underlined under Article 3 (h) of the Constitutive Act, which stipulates promoting peace, security, and stability on the continent as the main objective of the AU.

Moreover, cognizant of adverse effects of wars and conflicts in aggravating insecurity, poverty and deterioration of human condition across the continent, AU gives due regard to conflict prevention, management and resolution (Aning, et al., 2010). The establishment of
APSA underscores this fact. APSA is one of the most important recent developments in Africa with the role of conflict prevention, management, and resolution (Ganzle and Franke, 2010; Vines, 2013). The whole purpose of APSA is fostering Africa’s capacity in addressing the peace and security challenges of the continent (Brett, 2013). The establishment of this continental architecture reveals the significant emphasis made by AU on the peace and security issues of Africa.

Generally, as can be understood from the above discussion and evident in the following capability areas of APSA, one can draw a conclusion that AU is the most ambitious institution Africa has ever seen as far as peace and security matters are concerned. Besides, one can deduce that, AU has come up with a broad objective in the area of peace and security.

2.5. The Main Components of African Peace and Security Architecture

African Peace and Security Architecture is an overall framework and its aims of peace-building and conflict management are achieved through the cumulative effort of its interconnected components (Fisher, et al., 2010; Vines, 2013; Coning and Kasumba, 2010). The main components of APSA are the PSC, the ASF, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the Panel of the Wise and the Special Fund. These components are discussed in the sub-sections herein under. For the purpose of this study, however, more focus is given to the PSC and ASF.

2.5.1. The Peace and Security Council

African member states adopted The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (the PSC Protocol) in July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, which came into force in December 2003 (Moolakkattu, 2010). Accordingly, the PSC, as the most decisive component of APSA, was established in 2004 to coordinate peace-building efforts in the continent. The PSC was created modeling the UN Security Council although there are some important differences (Kumar, 2009; Adamu, 2008; Brett, 2013). For instance, the PSC has fifteen members, which are elected on the basis of equal rights. However, there are no member states with the right to veto the decision of the PSC.
and no state is entitled to permanent membership, unlike the UN Security Council system. Ten members are elected for a two year period, while the remaining five are elected for a period of three years representing the five regions, namely North, West, Central, East and Southern Africa as defined by AU (Brett, 2013)³.

The establishment of the PSC brought significant emphasis to the restoration of peace and stability in the continent (Kumar, 2009). The PSC is the main mechanism of AU’s conflict prevention and management architecture with the support of the Chairperson of the AU Commission (Moolakkattu, 2010). This can also be understood from Article 2 of the PSC Protocol. Accordingly, Article 2 (1) of the PSC Protocol affirms that the PSC is “a standing decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts”, which operates as “a collective security and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa”. Hence, it is the principal decision-making organ of AU on all areas of security matters in the continent. In other words, it is this body, which decides, after analyzing the situation, whether certain action is to be taken so as to prevent, manage, or resolve conflicts. The decisions of the PSC are essentially made on the basis of consensus. If not possible to reach consensus, the PSC will adopt its decisions on procedural matters by a simple majority, while decisions on all other matters are made by a two-thirds majority vote (Article 13 of the PSC Protocol).

Besides, as a standing decision-making organ, the PSC has the power of legitimizing and coordinating the actions of all the other elements of the architecture, which are supportive agents to its broader function (Vines, 2013; Vines and Middleton, 2008). Thus, the PSC is the prime concerned body with the leading role concerning the security matters of Africa, which is analogous to the role of the UN Security Council in maintaining international peace and security.

³ The criteria for election includes, contribution to the promotion and maintenance of peace and security; capacity and commitment to shoulder the responsibility the membership entails; and participation in conflict resolution, peacemaking and peace building operations in Africa. For more details (see the PSC protocol, art. 5 (2))
As the primary responsible body of peace and security in the continent, the PSC has been provided with ambitious and broader functions to carry out on the area. Article 3 of the PSC Protocol stipulates wide ranges of functions of the PSC. These are advancing peace, security, and stability in Africa; predicting and averting conflicts; performing peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction activities; managing endeavors to avert as well as struggle against international terrorism; developing a continental defense policy; and encouraging democratic practices.

Thus, it is safe to say that the PSC is endowed with a significant power in the process of realizing the purpose of maintaining peace and security in the continent. However, it cannot unilaterally accomplish its purposes; rather it needs other agents to support its work. Accordingly, AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise, a CEWS, an ASF and a Special Fund are important instruments to support the work of the PSC pursuance to article 2(2) of the PSC Protocol.

To sum up, the creation of the PSC was taken as a historic turning point in the process of building a durable peace and security in Africa. This body made several discussions over peace and security issues of the member states and authorized peace operations, *inter alia*, in Sudan, Somalia and Comoros (Boutellis and Williams, 2013) (the areas where most tragic scene of conflicts prevail, especially the first two) within the most volatile region of East Africa.

**2.5.2. African Standby Force**

The idea of establishing a Pan-African military force is not a new phenomenon. It goes back to the early 1960s when Kwame Nkrumah proposed the establishment of African High Command for the primary purpose of safeguarding the sovereignty and territorial integrity of newly independent African states (Girmachew, 2008; Vines, 2013; Biney, 2012). Besides, this force was proposed to intervene in intra-state and inter-state conflicts in Africa (Girmachew, 2008). However, due to suspicion of its impact on states' sovereignty, the proposal was objected (Dier, 2010; Girmachew, 2008; Biney, 2008). The continental military force, thus, was not realized during the age of OAU.
Later, on the emergence of AU by the Constitutive Act of AU, African leaders took common position in the establishment of Africa-wide military force, which seems that they took the brainchild of Nkrumah. Accordingly, African Chiefs of Defense and Security (ACDS) adopted ‘The policy framework document on the establishment of the African Standby Force and of the Military Staff Committee (MSC)’ (the ASF framework) in May 2003 which was approved in July 2004 by African Heads of States (Cilliers and Malan, 2005; Coning and Kasumba, 2010). The establishment of ASF with the aim of providing AU with reliable deployable force is based on the model of the SHIRBRIG, which was created to improve the rapid deployment of UN peacekeeping force.

The emergence of ASF follows from the adoption of two historic documents. The first one is the Constitutive Act of AU, which provides AU the right of intervention in member states’ crisis situation while the second is the PSC protocol, which recommended the establishment of ASF for the implementation of this right of intervention. Hence, it is the executing wing of the PSC. ASF is a multi-dimensional force - consisting military, police and civilian components - intended to be trained in line with the UN training standards to effectively perform a wide range of functions. Taking into consideration of the existing nature of conflict in Africa (Abubakar, 2008), ASF is intended to operate, in performing its functions, in line with the possible incremental ranges of scenarios within their corresponding prescribed time limit. This is, ASF is assumed to respond to conflicts ranging from scenario 1 (simple military advise) to scenario 6, which is grave circumstances requiring a robust AU military intervention. To this end, according to the ASF framework and the roadmap for the operationalization of the ASF, the capacity development of ASF has intended to develop in two phases. In the first phase (up to 30 June 2005), ASF should develop the capacity to manage scenarios 1 and 2, while regions were anticipated to build standby brigade capable of handling scenario 4. Whereas in the second phase (1 July 2005 to 30 June 2010), ASF is expected to manage up to scenario 5, while all regions should develop their capability to a standby brigade level and those that already established the brigade should raise their capability of rapid deployment. The

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4 See article 13(3) of the PSC Protocol
5 See Paragraph 1.6 of the ASF framework
understanding was by June 30, 2010 ASF will achieve its full operational capacity (Williams, 2011). However, the goal was not achieved to the entire extent; the force still may not respond to scenario 5 or 6 to the expected level (ibid).

The ASF undertakes its responsibilities in two forms: peace support missions from scenarios 1 to 5 and intervention which is scenario 6 (Batware, 2011; Solomon, 2010). Hence, peace support missions are deployed in the different level of conflicts which fall under scenarios 1-5 with the consent of the host country, whereas deployment in genocide, crime against humanity and war crimes as embraced by scenario 6 does not need the consent or request of the concerned country (Batware, 2011). It is logical not to wait the consent of the hosting country and to deploy within 14 days (the shortest time limit compared to other scenarios) in the case of scenario 6 taking into consideration of the dangers it entails. Nonetheless, having a vigorous troop and adequate logistics to respond to it has been challenging.

African Standby Force is not a single army unit. Rather, it is a combination of standby forces from five regional brigades. It is made up of the pledge of member states or the contribution of sub-regional brigades. Hence, ASF established to comprise five sub-regional standby forces, namely the SADCBRIG established by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) members, NASBRIG first assigned to the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) but due to membership problem North Africa Regional Capability (NARC) formed to develop NASBRIG (Ciliers, 2008), ECOBRIG established under the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ECCASBRIG established by the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), and EASBRIG, which was organized by IGAD. The EASBRIG will be discussed in detail in the coming chapters. Each of the five regions with 3,000 – 4,000 troops with a sixth formation at AU’s Headquarters at Addis Ababa for a combined capacity of 15,000 to 20,000 peacekeepers constituted ASF (Neethling, 2005). All these constituting ASF expected to operate under the direction of a proper mandating authority.

Under Chapter VIII (article 52) of the UN Charter the role of regional arrangements in dealing with maintenance of international peace and security is recognized as long as it is in line with the purposes and principles of the UN. Thus, the regional arrangements need to
undertake peaceful settlement of disputes before pass them on to the Security Council. However, regional arrangements, as per Article 53 of the UN Charter, are not allowed to take any intervention without the authorization of the UN Security Council. According to the ASF framework, the PSC is the one which is assigned to authorize within Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. However, AU’s intervention is subject to authorization by the UN Security Council. According to the ASF framework, as the AU is subject to UN’s Security Council authorization for its intervention, sub-regional brigades are likewise subject to AU’s authorization for their interventions. Hence, African sub-regional arrangements are duty bound to secure AU’s approval first to intervene militarily in cases of grave circumstances. Nonetheless, they can undertake peace support operations in their respective regions so long as it is in line with AU and UN principles and informed the AU thereon.

Although emphasis is given to the PSC and ASF, the following components of APSA are also important in the maintenance of peace and security in the continent.

2.5.3. Continental Early Warning System

Continental Early Warning System was established within article 12 of the PSC Protocol of 2002 as one important pillar of APSA so as “to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts”. CEWS is an intelligence gathering and analysis mechanism that provides latest information on potential, actual and post conflict situations to the AU decision-making organs and operational arms (Brett, 2013; Vines and Middleton, 2008). Hence, it is important primarily for conflict prevention as it attempts to discover and informs timely the potentially serious threats to the Chairperson of the Commission, who, in turn, advises the PSC.

The PSC Protocol requires CEWS to consist observation and monitoring centre (the Situation Room) located at the AU’s Conflict Management Directorate and five regional observations and monitoring units, which are linked with the situation room. The situation room is assumed to be in a constant communication with the regional early warning centers to get information on the regional situations. In this regard, a good progress was
achieved after the 2008 Memorandum of Understanding, which strengthened the collaborative work of CEWS and regional early warning mechanisms (IPI, 2012).

The CEWS gathers security information from a variety of sources. It collects data from independent media, the AU’s Liaison Offices and Field Missions situated in crisis areas, and from the sub-regional organizations (Vines, 2013; Brett, 2013; Vines and Middleton, 2008). As stated in Article 12 (5) of the PSC Protocol, the data gathered from such sources will be used by the Chairperson of the Commission of AU to advise the PSC on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and suggests appropriate responses to be taken. The information will have paramount importance in guiding the decisions of the PSC and directing the subsequent deployment of the ASF (Vines, 2013; Vines and Middleton, 2008). However, this system is not without challenge. Lack of capacity of both AU and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) limits the full operationalization of the system (Kimathi, 2011; IPI, 2012).

2.5.4. The Panel of the Wise

The Panel of the Wise consists of individuals who have a highly dignified personality. The Panel of the wise is one mechanism of the AU in the process of ensuring peace through the effort of well known African personalities. The Panel of the Wise is composed of five individuals representing the five regions of the continent, which are nominated by the Chairperson of the Commission and appointed by the Assembly for the term of three years with the expressed purpose of supporting the PSC to prevent conflict. As per article 11 (3) of the PSC Protocol, the Panel of the Wise is mandated to “advise the Peace and Security Council and the Chairperson of the Commission on all issues pertaining to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa” (the PSC protocol: 16). It holds politically autonomous individuals assigned to advise the PSC and provide AU’s initial response to crisis situations in the form of personal mediation (Ganzle and Franke, 2010; IPI, 2012). They are supposed to perform actions pertinent to the prevention of conflict. As the Modalities for the Functioning of the Panel of the Wise, adopted by the PSC on November 12, 2007, reveals the Panel of the Wise is mandated to carry out fact-finding missions as a means for conflict prevention. Thus, like CEWS it has the role of conflict prevention.
Moolakkattu (2010) noted Kofi Annan’s mediation in Kenyan election crisis of 2007, Joachim Chissano’s participation in Northern Uganda crisis, Thabo Mbeki participation in Zimbabwe’s electoral tension as practical examples of wise men method of addressing crisis situations. This approach is applicable through employing the wisdom of the elderly and experienced personalities in addressing conflicting situations and maintaining peace and security (ibid). However, there is still a need to make the Panel of Wise more active, flexible and expeditious to serve its purpose effectively (IPI, 2012).

2.5.5. The Peace Fund

The Peace fund is associated with provision of financial budget for the purpose of undertaking different missions and operations in maintaining peace and security in Africa. Moreover, the objective of peace fund is designed to strengthening Africa financially to solve its problems by its own, promoting African unity and African overall development (Golaszinski, 2004). As illustrated in article 21 (2) of the PSC Protocol, the sources of peace fund may be AU’s budget, the contribution of member states as well as other private sources in Africa.

Besides, the fund also comes from outside Africa. As per article 21 (3) of the PSC, “the Chairperson of the Commission shall raise and accept voluntary contributions from sources outside Africa, in conformity with the objectives and principles of the AU”. As a solution to financial constraints, African leaders adopted a resolution at the African Union Summit in Maputo in July 2003, requesting the European Union to establish a Peace Facility from funds allocated to their countries under the existing cooperation agreements with the EU (Golaszinski, 2004). Accordingly, the European Council has taken positive step to promote African peacekeeping operations. Thus, the peace fund is a financial support of all activities in the area of peace and security.

In a nutshell, the whole purpose of all the aforementioned components under the umbrella of the APSA is to maintain peace and security in the continent and shows the significant focus made on the security policy of the continent. Components are characterized by uneven development; some components are relatively better developed (PSC, CEWS and the Panel of the Wise) than the others (ASF and the Peace Fund) (Brett, 2013).
Nonetheless, APSA as a whole has played a role in the reduction of conflict in the continent through its peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building and conflict transformation efforts (Addo, 2011). It has been responding to several crisis situations notably Mali (2012/2013), Darfur, Somalia, Northern Uganda, eastern DRC, Guinea-Bissau and South Sudan (Brett, 2013).

Needless to say, however, AU still has a number of shortcomings. AU requires a wider range of capabilities, beyond the above discussed APSA capability areas, to effectively address Africa’s diverse peace and security challenges, inter alia, security sector reform, counter terrorism and maritime security (ibid). APSA’s progress in these areas is negligible and it needs external support as well as partnership to effectively address those issues (ibid). AU is yet on the way of building up its capabilities in responding to crises; hence, it is confronted with multiple challenges. Thus, despite its ambitious plan and some practical contribution in the area, there are challenges ahead like coordination and capacity problem.
CHAPTER THREE
EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE

3.1. Background

This chapter deals with the following main issues. Firstly, the chapter tries to give the background of Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). Then it describes the structures of the organization with their respective functions. Besides, the chapter deals with Standardization of Doctrine and Training in relation with the EASF. It also reveals the Aim of EASF and the Mission Scenarios within which the EASF is supposed to operate. Lastly, the role of EASF in the maintenance of peace and security in the Eastern Africa has been examined.

While AU was assigning the role of coordinating the establishment of sub-regional brigades to Regional Economic Communities (RECs), IGAD (consisting of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, Eritrea, Uganda and Somalia) appeared to be the principal actor in peace and security activities in the region. Hence, IGAD assumed the mandate of establishing EASF. To better understand the institutional development of EASF, therefore, it is better to see IGAD first as it is the foundation for EASF’s establishment.

The creation of Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD), as early warning scheme, in 1986 was aimed at informing the international community about the humanitarian crises caused by drought and the subsequent famine in the Horn of Africa (Haile, 2006; Fanta, 2008; Siradag, 2012). While being confined to areas of drought, desertification and food Security, IGADD disregarded military or security aspects, which, in turn, endangered the security, social and political security of the region (Haile, 2006). To avert this problem, member states transformed IGADD to IGAD in 1996, with the view to deal with the issues of conflict management, prevention and resolution, which were overlooked formerly (ibid). Maintenance of peace and security in the Horn of Africa was the main objective of the organization (Haile, 2006; Fanta, 2008; Siradag, 2012). Accordingly, IGAD has played a significant role to defuse conflicts in Sudan and Somalia. Moreover, it established early warning and early response mechanism, known as the
Conflict Early Warning Mechanism (CEWARN), which came into force in August 2003 (Fanta, 2008). This role and function further inspired AU to grant the mandate of establishing EASF to IGAD (Fanta, 2008; Jacobsen and Nordby, 2013). IGAD assumed the interim mandate of creating EASF-formerly known as EASBRIG (Robinson, 2014).

Eastern Africa Standby Force is one of the five sub-regional brigades of ASF that was established in 2004 as the Eastern Africa wing. Following the decision of AU to establish ASF, Eastern Africa leaders arrived at a decision to establish their brigade in the region. During the establishment of EASF there were different RECs notably the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Markets for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). However, neither the EAC nor COMESA had a directly mandated security role (Allehone, 2008). Besides, these organizations did not encompass all the 13 member states of the region (Alusala, 2004). Due to its level of involvement in the peace and security area and its inclusion of majority of states of the region, the task of organizing the brigade was assigned to IGAD temporarily (Allehone, 2008; Siradag, 2012; Sousa, 2013; Jacobsen and Nordby, 2013).

Intergovernmental Authority for Development was given a range of coordinating role. Accordingly, IGAD held two consecutive meetings on the establishment of EASBRIG. The first meeting of experts held in Jinja, Uganda, from 13-14 February 2004, followed by a two-day meeting of Eastern African Chiefs of Defense Staff (EACDS) from Eastern Africa countries namely, Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda, and a representative from COMESA (Alusala, 2004; Neethling, 2005; Oloo, 2010). The meeting was accompanied by observers from the Multinational Stand-by High Readiness Brigade for United Nations operations (SHIRBRIG) and Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacity (RECAMP) (IGAD, 2014).

The EACDS decided that the interim coordination role of IGAD would include, coordination of all activities of the EASBRIG, calling meetings of the Council of Ministers of Defence and Security for EASBRIG and the East African Ministers of Defence and Security, undertaking fundraising in conjunction with other RECs, the AU and the UN to support the work of EASBRIG, providing and sharing information to facilitate planning for the EASBRIG and establishing an EASBRIG fund to coordinate donor funding and resources offered by the international community. (see the EASF Policy Framework)
2004). The understanding was that, once established, EASBRIG will include all the 13 Eastern African countries, including, in addition to those mentioned above, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mauritius and the Seychelles (Alusala, 2004; Hull, et al., 2011).

July 2004 was a time set for the Brigade’s establishment (Robinson, 2014). However, the policy framework adopted at the meeting of EACDS was approved by Heads of State and Government at a meeting in Kigali, Rwanda, on 9–10 September 2004 (Robinson, 2014). Subsequently, in September 2004, it was formally decided to establish EASF to undertake peace-keeping activities under the general framework of the AU (Neethling, 2005; Jacobsen and Nordby, 2013). Pursuant to Article 4 of Constitutive Act of AU and the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (the PSC Protocol), EASF was established.

Member countries participating in the establishment of the Brigade pledged to contribute troops and agreed to locate troops of the Brigade on their countries of origin (Neethling, 2005), which was identical with the arrangement of ASF. During the meeting, several states pledged their contributions to EASBRIG, while others needed time to consult and report back later. Just to mention a few contributions, Rwanda offered two light infantry battalions and one mechanized battalion; Sudan, Uganda and Kenya each offered one light infantry battalion; Djibouti offered one light infantry battalion (consisting of three sub-units) and two infantry companies and one de-mining team; Somalia offered one infantry company with 10 technicians (Alusala, 2004). As can be seen from the list above, the majority of those contributing states are IGAD member states.

However, this process of establishing the Brigade encountered a problem. As EASF was to be coordinated by IGAD member states, non-IGAD member states resisted this monopoly by a portion of states of the region (Cilliers, 2008; Robinson, 2014). The idea of integrating the Brigade to the IGAD structure was also challenged by IGAD member states, notably Kenya due to the dominance of Ethiopia in the organization (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2013). Moreover, according to anonymous (2014), IGAD was not ready or had no mechanism to support the force. Similarly, it is also stated that, IGAD had no command and control

7These are just some of the contributions, for more details (see Alusala, 2004).
structures required to give technical and political coordination (EACDS, 2005). These resulted in a number of EASF member states expressing their unwillingness to accept IGAD’s continued coordination role (ibid). After strong protest, Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM), as an independent and all-inclusive coordinating mechanism, was endorsed by the Second Extra Ordinary Meeting of the Council of Eastern Africa Ministers of Defense and Security on March 30, 2007 to take over the coordinating mandate of IGAD (Kimathi, 2010; Cilliers, 2008; Hull, et al., 2011; Robinson, 2014). EASBRICOM is located in Karen, near Nairobi, despite Ethiopian antipathy for Kenyan perceived dominance, which perhaps delayed the final decision of EASBRICOM’s location in favour of Nairobi (Robinson, 2014). EASBRICOM embraced non-IGAD member states, as well.

Currently, active members of EASF includes Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda despite the fact that EASF was expected to embrace all 13 countries of the region. Three previous members namely, Tanzania, Madagascar, and Mauritius withdrew their membership and joined the SADCBRIG (Kimathi, 2010; Cilliers, 2008; Robinson, 2014). Eritrea is not active participant due to its hostile relations with Ethiopia and Djibouti (ibid). As regards the newly born South Sudan, some discussion has been made to incorporate it into the EASF since the end of 2012, though not yet successful (Robinson, 2014). The South Sudanese were invited but fail to attend a meeting in Khartoum as well as the field training exercise held in Uganda in 2013 (ibid). A lot of efforts have been made for the country to join the organization. The reason why it has not yet joined the organization may be due to its internal problem.

It is to be stressed that EASF is in a formative stage. It is in the course of setting up structures and policies (Kimathi, 2010). Moreover, the name of the Brigade and the coordination mechanism is changing indicating the organization’s internal transformation. Accordingly, the name ‘brigade’ has been changed to ‘force’ by the Council of Ministers’ meeting held in Nairobi on June18, 2010 to show ‘multi-dimensionality’ (Robinson, 2014; Hull, et al., 2011). This is meant to indicate the Brigade’s incorporation of not only military but also police and civilian components, which were negligible until this period.
This means that police and civilian components of the EASF were not well staffed until that time (Hull, et al., 2011). Accordingly, the EASBRICOM was also renamed as the Eastern Africa Standby Force Coordination Mechanism (EASFCOM) (Robinson, 2014). Hence, EASF is still in its institutional establishment and transformation.

3.2. The Structures of Eastern Africa Standby Force

Eastern Africa Standby Force has three policy organs namely, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers of Defense and Security, and the Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff. The Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (MoU) outlined the functions of the three policy organs under article 6, 7, and 8, respectively. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government is the supreme organ of EASF with the function of formulating policy, directing and controlling the function of EASF, and authorizing the deployment of EASF. However, once EASF is deployed in a crisis area, it is to be under the control of the AU or the UN. The Council of Ministers of Defense and Security appoints the commander of EASF, while the Committee of Chiefs of Defense Staff has advisory role to the above two policy organs and oversees, directs and manages the Planning Element (PLANELM), the EASF Headquarters, and the LOGBASE. The whole mandate of these policy organs is to manage the EASF towards achieving its vision and mission. Member states assume the position of the chair, vice-chair and rapporteur of these policy organs through rotation (Allehóne, 2008).

EASF has also three basic structures namely, the EASF Headquarters, the LOGBASE, and the PLANELM. As discussed above, the first two are co-located in Ethiopia, while the third one is in Kenya. Their functions are outlined in the MoU under article 9, 10 and 11, respectively. The EASF Headquarters “serve as a command headquarters for force preparation and operational command” of the EASF (IGAD, 2005: 7). The PLANELM “serve as multi-national full time planning headquarters” for the EASF (ibid). LOGBASE, on the other hand, “serve as the Central regional base for maintaining, storage and management of the logistical infrastructure” of the EASF (ibid: 8). As agreed on the MoU, the head of PLANELM needs to be a military officer of the rank of colonel or equivalent.
Ethiopia, being the host of the Headquarters, appointed the first commander of the EASF, while other officers were seconded by member countries (Allehone, 2008). The commander of the EASF rotates annually in alphabetical order among member states (Hull, et al., 2011). However, at the time of deployment, the PSC will take over the mandate of appointing the commanders (Allehone, 2008). Countries appointing officers in the above discussed EASF structures shoulder the cost of paying their salaries; EASF pays only the allowances (ibid).

3.3. Standardization of Doctrine and Training

The expectation is that multipurpose and multinational capability constituted from different countries, having different background, techniques, doctrines, experience, values and traditions will work together towards the same goal, which is maintaining peace and security in the Eastern Africa. As stated by Cilliers and Malan (2005: 5), “A multifunctional peace operations capability for the ASF would require standardized doctrine and a clear concept of operations that are consistent with UN missions”. The same works for each of the sub-regional capabilities. Accordingly, countries that pledged to contribute troops are required to train and equip their forces in line with common standards. As can be understood from the ASF framework, ASF in general and sub-regional brigades in particular, need to follow the UN doctrine and training standard in a way fitting to African reality. Besides, member states need to harmonize their training cycle with UN and other external training plans. In this regard, EASFCOM is also intended to harmonize its training standards and, practically, International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) has attempted in standardizing the courses to be delivered for the trainees (UNDP, 2011). Besides, the EASF trained forces have been evaluated for their readiness through AU training doctrine and standards (Kilimo, 2013).

Moreover, to be effective in the joint peace support operations, multinational personnel need to have a joint pre-deployment training and exercise. This is crucial in order for diverse forces to have common understanding. To this end, there is a need to have common training centers. In this regard, Eastern Africa countries identified three centers of excellence for peace-keeping training. Accordingly, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda have
provided the Peace Support Training Centre (KPSTC). These are the IPSTC and the Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS) located near Nairobi, Kenya, the Military Academy at Nyakinama, in Rwanda, and the Jinga Staff College in Uganda (Cilliers and Malan, 2005; Kithami, 2010). These institutions are delivering training to forces contributed from member countries of the region.

More recently, EASFCOM signed MoU with two Regional Training Institutions in Sudan and Ethiopia to strengthen the training pillars of the EASF. Accordingly, EASFCOM signed MoU with the Sudan Peace Operations Training Centre on March 11, 2014 to Conduct Training in Khartoum (EASFCOM, 2014). EASFCOM also signed MoU with the Ethiopian Police University College, on the same day, on March 11, 2014 to Conduct Training in Sendafa (ibid). Thus, EASFCOM is in the process of expanding its centers of excellence to prepare trained forces to peace support operations.

In addition, in conducting joint field exercise, EASF is on the right track. EASF has successfully conducted multinational Field Training Exercises as well as Command Post Exercises at different times to evaluate the level of preparedness and interoperability of forces to respond to conflicts effectively (Bouhuys, 2011; UNDP, 2011). This has been discussed in detail in the next chapter.

Standardization of doctrine and trainings as well as provision of a joint field exercise enables states to have similar standards with regard to the training and preparation of forces to the EASF. It also improves interoperability of troops with diverse background and know-how thereby enhancing successful operation of the force (Bouhuys, 2011; UNDP, 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, 2011).

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8 Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines the term ‘Interoperability’ as “the ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (See Department of Defense, 2002). The term ‘Interoperability’ is, therefore, used in this study to mean the ability of diverse multinational forces to exchange and use information (or to effectively communicate) in the joint peace support operations.
3.4. The Aim of Eastern Africa Standby Force

The establishment of EASF has been strongly linked with the peace and security issue of the region, which is most volatile. As stated under Article 3 of the MoU on the establishment of the EASBRIG, the objective of the force is to undertake the functions of maintaining peace and security at the appropriate time in accordance with the authorization of the PSC. Member states committed themselves for the achievement of this objective. In the preamble of the MoU, they recognize maintenance of peace, security and stability as a precondition for improvement of cooperation and elimination of any form of threat in the region. To realize the aforesaid objectives, EASF needs to effectively work in handling various conflicts of the region. This is stated in the EASF’s vision, which is “to contribute to regional and continental peace through a regional conflict prevention, management and resolution capability able to respond effectively to crisis within Eastern Africa and across the African continent” (Bouhuys, 2011: 27).

In the realization of this vision, the EASF has a tough assignment to do. The stipulated mission of EASF is “to develop a fully operational and multidimensional integrated Eastern Africa Standby Force ready for deployment by 2015, with an initial operational capability by 2010” (ibid). Hence, through building its deployment capability in the aforementioned periods, the force intended to prevent and react to conflicts in the region. Based on the stated objective, vision and mission, it is apparent that the very establishment of EASF was aimed to serve as a regional mechanism of responding to the prevailing as well as future occurrence of conflicts in Eastern Africa thereby securing peace in the region (ibid).

3.5. Mission Scenarios of the Eastern Africa Standby Force

In realizing its ambitious objective, EASF is intended to act in line with its mission scenarios, which are identical with the ASF mission scenarios developed by the AU. It has six mission scenarios. In the first scenario, EASF intends to provide military advice to a political mission. In the second scenario, the force will co-deploy with the UN mission. This is similar to the case of United Nations – African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) (Abubakar, 2008; Allehone, 2008; Alusala, 2004). The third scenario,
however, requires EASF to be deployed as a standalone observation mission. This is evident in the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and AU Mission in the Comoros (AMIC) (Abubakar, 2008; Alusala, 2004). This means that, EASF will be deployed in the disputed area independently without being co-deployed with other forces. The fourth scenario is concerned with the role of regional peace-keeping missions as conceived by Chapter VI of the UN Charter, including preventive deployment\(^9\). The fifth scenario addresses peace-enforcement operations as envisaged in Chapter VII of the UN Charter (like operation in Burundi) and complex multidimensional missions (Allehone, 2008). The last and most difficult scenario, as envisaged by AU, is intervention. In this case, EASF is, up on the authorization of AU, fully empowered to conduct intervention whenever international community fails to respond quickly to grave circumstances like genocide and other massive violations of human rights \((ibid)\).

3.6. The Role of Eastern Africa Standby Force

Eastern Africa Standby Force is still in the process of formation to reach its planned full operationalization by 2015. The force is yet appraising its systems and getting ready for its future deployment role (Mumma-Martinon, 2010). Hence, EASF has played only a very limited role in the maintenance of peace and security in the region. It has attempted to prevent the outbreak of conflict in the region. In addition, personnel have been deployed to stabilize conflict situations in the region, though very minimal.

Eastern Africa Standby Force has undertaken conflict prevention activities in the region. Those activities include military advice, observer missions and fact finding missions (Mumma-Martinon, 2010). EASF sent fact finding mission to Somalia up on the request of the AU to observe the situation on the ground and inform the decision to deploy a peace-keeping force (Bouhuys, 2011). In addition, it is also stated that, EASF has worked as part

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\(^9\) Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines the term ‘Preventive Deployment’ as “the deployment of military forces to deter violence at the interface or zone of potential conflict where tension is rising among parties”. \((See\ Department of Defense, 2002)\). Hence, in this study, the term ‘Preventive Deployment’ implies the deployment of EASF multidimensional forces in the disputing area to prevent the escalation of conflict.
of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), which is mandated to prevent conflict in Somalia through facilitating negotiations between key political actors (Bouhuys, 2011; Omar, 2012). In collaboration with UNPOS, EASF has contributed in the overall political process to discourage the escalation of conflict in Somalia.

In addition, EASF has played some role in the AMISOM peace-keeping operations to stabilize conflicts in the country. EASF has cooperated with international offices to support the AMISOM. Accordingly, EASF has worked as part of the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and also EASF takes part in the UN Training Needs Analysis Team for TFG Military Forces (Bouhuys, 2011). Besides, EASFCOM was requested by AU in 2010 to deploy an engineer battalion to AMISOM (Hull, et al., 2011). After conducting a fact finding mission on the area, the Heads of State and Government pronounced at EASF Summit, held in January 2011, to deploy personnel to strengthen AMISOM, which is already in place stabilizing the situation in Somalia (ibid). Subsequently, EASFCOM has signed MoU with the African Union Commission (AUC) to augment the capabilities of AMISOM, specially, in the areas of operational planning, logistics planning and operations, training, medical support and assistance (AU, 2011; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, 2011).

Accordingly, as part of a technical team for the express purpose of assisting AMISOM, EASF has deployed 14 officers (including medical and logistics officers) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, 2011; Bouhuys, 2011). This is also underscored by Omar (2014) that EASF has played some role in Somalia through deploying officers in AMISOM, while it is also on the process to engage in different capability areas. EASF has also conducted the force generation workshop involving its member states to increase the AMISOM’s forces (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, 2011; Bouhuys, 2011; Miranda, et al., 2012). Moreover, EASF has helped the AMISOM operations through providing command and staff headquarters (Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2012).

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The above discussed contributions may make EASF the first and most advanced among the five sub-regional brigades of the ASF in terms of actively involving in the prevailing AU peace support operations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense, 2011; Miranda, et al., 2012). In line with this argument, Brett (2013) also presents the EASF’s deployment in AMISOM as an important move in the African peace missions.

Eastern Africa Standby Force, though to a very lesser degree, also contributed to the peace missions operating in Sudan. EASF provided pre-deployment training for UNAMID in collaboration with other trainers (UNDP, 2011). AMIS and UNAMID also received command and control assistances from EASF (Ekengard, 2008). Besides, some trained women police officers were also deployed from EASF to United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) (UNDP, 2011).

Thus, notwithstanding the above discussed contributions, EASF has limited role in terms of maintaining peace and security in Eastern Africa. The role of EASF in preventing as well as stabilizing crises situations in the region is negligible. The force has only participated to maintain peace in the region as part of UN and AU operations. It has not yet deployed its peace-keeping force in the crisis areas as a regional mechanism under the authority of the PSC since it lacks the capacity. An interview with Hamad 11 (2014) underscores the minimal role of the force in the region. Hamad noted that EASF is going to play a lot of roles in the maintenance of regional and continental peace and security, but not yet played significant role. The reason for minimal role of EASF in the maintenance of peace and security in the region is attributed to different challenges, which are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

11 Colonel Fathelrahman Hamad is a Chief of Operation and Training, EASF Headquarters, the interview as hold on February 28, 2014, Addis Ababa.
CHAPTER FOUR
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE

Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) has plenty of problems that hindered its institutional development, while having a promise to address security issues of the region in the future. This chapter essentially examines the main challenges facing the institutional progress and operation of the EASF. It also deals with the future prospects of the organization.

4.1. Challenges

The process of developing and operationalizing the EASF has been a difficult task and characterized by a multiplicity of interrelated challenges. Since its very establishment, EASF has encountered different problems. These are discussed below at some length.

4.1.1. Lack of an All-embracing Organization

As discussed under Chapter three above, the Eastern Africa has several regional institutions, but none of them is all-inclusive in terms of encompassing member states of the region. Compared to other organizations, IGAD better embraces the majority of states in the region, so initially it assumed the coordinating mandate of the force. The original monopoly of the coordinating role of EASBRIG by IGAD was highly opposed by non-IGAD countries. Hence, this absence of proper regional mechanism has contributed to the delay of the development of EASF (Burgess, 2009; Nibishaka, 2012). The protest of non-IGAD countries resulted in the establishment of Eastern Africa Standby Brigade Coordination Mechanism (EASBRICOM) in 2007 to include all members of Eastern Africa. However, the establishment of such coordination mechanism was not free from being a source of competition. As Omar (2014) confers, EASF is also subject to another problem, which is lack of a political umbrella. In other words, politically, EASF is not accountable to any organizations, like IGAD, which has an impact on the EASF’s over all development.
4.1.2. Hegemonic Competition

The Eastern Africa lacks a clear hegemonic power unlike the case of West Africa and Southern Africa where Nigeria and South Africa are hegemonies, respectively (Kimathi, 2010; Kagwanja, 2013). Notwithstanding their historical cordial relations, the two relatively powerful states, namely Ethiopia and Kenya, are in a state of constant competition to secure their respective supremacy in the region. Ethiopia is better in military terms, while Kenya is strong economically (Horn of Africa Bulletin, 2010; Tlalka, 2013). Competition between the two countries is also termed as “diplomatic competition” (Berouk, 2014). The competition between the two countries pertaining to the institutional formation of EASF was manifested at the very outset of its creation. Ethiopia has been considered dominant in IGAD and Kenya strongly resisted the establishment of EASF under the mandate of IGAD. This was because the event was felt to boost Ethiopian dominance in the region through the accumulation of military force under IGAD at the cost of Kenya’s interest to be the leading in the region (Jaducobsen and Nordbay, 2013a).

Basically, some maintained that Ethiopia uses IGAD as a tool for pursuing the country’s national security project under the cover of regional security (ibid). Given Ethiopia’s major influence in the organization, IGAD’s effort in the cases of Somalia and Sudan was considered to be instrumentality of maintaining the national interest of Ethiopia (ibid). The same holds true, though to a lesser degree, for Kenya. By recognizing this fact, Jaducobsen and Nordbay (ibid: 14) stated:

...... when supporting and strengthening military capacity in East Africa through the framework of IGAD, it is important to be aware of and make arrangements to avoid the potential risk that such capacity might be used to pursue the national interests of dominant states in the institution rather than to pursue genuinely regional security projects.

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12 Of course, the term hegemony emanates from Greek word ‘hegemonia’ meaning “dominant and oppressive status of one element in the system over the others” (See Yilmaz, 2010: 194). It is conceived as “the status of the most powerful country in the international system or the position of a dominant state in a specific region” (ibid). Hegemony requires not just ‘domination’, but the ‘consent’ of others (those dominated) (See Litowitz, 2000; Yilmaz, 2010). The term also implies leadership by one strong state over a group of other states (See Bates, 1975: 352; Collin 2004: 111).

13 Berouk Mesfin is a Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, the interview as hold on February 20, 2014, Addis Ababa.
That is why Kenya had reservation to incorporate EASF under the framework of IGAD, where Ethiopia might benefit given the advantage of its dominant position in the organization. Putting it differently, the endowment of IGAD with strong military element would provide Ethiopia with a military upper hand in the region, which may enable her to pursue her interests. This mistrust and unholy alliance of the two countries, therefore, hindered the institutional development as well as smooth running of the EASF (Burgess, 2009; Mungai, 2011). Consequently, the protest by Kenya and other IGAD and non-IGAD countries in the region led to the establishment of EASBRICOM, later EASFCOM.

The competition between the two countries remains intact even in the newly created coordinating mechanism, which is EASFCOM. This means that, Kenya considers EASFCOM, which is located on its soil, as the supreme organ of all other structures of EASF, while Ethiopia regards them as equal (Mandrup, 2012). Therefore, even though the EASFCOM was established as a solution, the discrepancy over its status continues to persist as one challenge to the smooth running of EASF.

The competition between the two countries for supremacy and influence in the region is also best manifested in the allocation of EASF structures. Internal rivalry between the two countries to assume regional leadership leads to separate allocation of elements of EASF in Ethiopia and Kenya (Wulf and Debiel, 2010; Vines, 2013). The EASFCOM and the PLANELM are located in Kenya, while the EASF Headquarters and the LOGBASE are co-located in Ethiopia. This has an adverse effect on the organization. This separate placement resulted in weak coordination among those structures of the EASF (Fisher, et al., 2010). Similarly, Vines (2013) noted that the placement of EASF Headquarters in Addis Ababa and the PLANELM in Nairobi is less efficient than situating all elements of EASF command in one place, which may further delay the rapid deployment of EASF. Moreover, the placement also affects EASF’s benefit from AU. In this connection, Allehone (2008) noted that the AU planning element is located in Addis Ababa; hence, the allocation of EASF’s PLANELM in Nairobi adversely impacts EASF’s joint work with AU and sharing of experience, and its benefit from structures, financial facilities, centers of excellence and other mechanisms that will be planned for the African Standby Force (ASF). Hence, the separate placement of EASF organs in different country is by itself
crippling EASF’s development and operation. In this regard, Kasaija\textsuperscript{14} (2014) also argues that decentralization of offices in different country hinders full operationalization of the force. As a result, it is suggested that all components of EASF should be in one place for more flexibility and effectiveness (\textit{ibid}).

Berouk (2014) argues that standby force needs to have well equipped resources, which is vital for the effective deployment. To this end, Logistics Base needs to have adequate munitions, fuels, artillery, air support, mortars, medicals, transport and other necessary equipments. However, it is difficult for EASF to have all these resources without the support of external donors (\textit{ibid}). Hence, competition between the two countries to host the LOGBASE and, thereby, to receive external fund also negatively influenced the development of the EASF (\textit{ibid}).

\textit{Anonymous} (2014) also underscored the adverse effect of competition between the two countries on the overall development of EASF, suggesting the need for their cooperation. It remains, however, an ongoing task to make these two countries cooperative (Burgess, 2009; Mungai, 2011). The bottom line is, thus, while states compete for their relative position in the region, the development and operation of EASF is lagging behind.

\subsection*{4.1.3. Conflicts in the Eastern Africa}

The Eastern Africa has experienced most tragic conflicts. Conflicts in the region, including interstate and intrastate conflicts, have detrimental effect on the development of strong regional standby force (Mandrup, 2012; Kimathi, 2010; Mumma-Martinson, 2010; Fisher, \textit{et al.}, 2010; Burgess, 2009). In this regard, almost all members of the region are in a constant turmoil, where one can mention the case of North and South Sudan hostilities, Ethio and Djibouti-Eritrea hostilities as well as the crises in Darfur, Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia and Uganda. Most importantly, the Somalia and Sudan conflicts have an immense contribution in retarding the development of EASF, given the magnitude of their impact (Mungai, 2011; Burgess, 2009). Besides, post-2005 election crisis in Ethiopia and post-war hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea have also contributed to the suppression of the

\footnote{Apuuli Kasaija is a Programme Manager, Institute for Security Studies, the interview as hold on March 17, 2014, Addis Ababa.}
progress of regional security architecture (Kinzel, 2008). Eritrea, due to its hostility with Ethiopia, is not active participant in EASF considering the institution as “an Ethiopian leaning entity” (Kagwanja, 2013: 16). Besides, “the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea could prevent smooth operations of EASF in the Eastern Africa region” (ibid: 18). Due to this fact, Vines (2013) suggests that EASF should address the ongoing tension between these two countries as it is unthinkable for both countries’ troops to serve together in the near future. Eritrea is also hostile with Djibouti pertaining to colonial boundary. In general, Eritrea is known to be a source of conflict in the region and will remain a challenge to security in the region due to low level of living standard of its citizens and governance problems (ibid). This shows the extent to which conflicts in the region are an obstacle to EASF’s development.

It is important to see the adverse effect of conflicts in the region from two angles. Firstly, the internal crisis in member states affects the development of EASF. Member states have been disturbed with internal insurgents. Hence, they are too busy with their own internal problems. As Berouk (2014) notes, they devote the available best troops, officials and equipments for domestic purpose, fighting against internal insurgents. This means that the resources may be mainly utilized for internal purpose and this inevitably reduces member states’ commitment to the EASF development. As he further elaborates, it is a matter of prioritizing issues in that the best troops and instruments will not be given to the EASF, which is a planned capability for the future deployment, while states are burning with recurrent, pressing and timely issues domestically. This idea is in line with the argument of Hamad (2014) that so long as member states are busy with their own internal problems, they may not send their military forces and may contribute only civilians. Similarly, Fisher, et al. (2010) contends that internal tensions as well as conflicts among member states could be hindrances to the development of the EASF. Generally, the prevailing conflict situation in the member states makes regional security less important than national security (Hull, et al., 2011). The whole effect of this internal problem, as anonymous (2014) notes, downsizes member states’ contribution to EASF.

On the other hand, the commitment of member states to the peace and security efforts in the other countries also affects the institutional development of EASF. Conflicts in the
region have become the focus of international community and, hence, UN and AU are involved in various peace-keeping operations. Several UN and AU missions have been deployed in different parts of Africa such as Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Abyei and Comoros. As Berouk (2014) states, EASF member states have been participating in these missions by providing their resources. Similarly, Mumma-Martinon (2010) also affirms that the crises continually occurring in the region compel most countries to involve in the situation or contribute their forces and resources to the peace-keeping missions, which would have otherwise been available to build up future capability of EASF. In this connection, one can cite the initial around 1,000 Ugandan and some other Burundian troops contributed to AMISOM, Ethiopian and Rwandan troop contributions to UNAMID, Kenyan troop support to UNMIS and UNMISS, the Ethiopian dominant troop contribution to United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA) (Williams, 2011). From this, one can deduce that the immense commitment of member states to those missions substantially reduces their contribution to the capacity development of EASF, even if their commitment was for the peace of the region.

Therefore, conflicts in the region hindered the attainment of EASF’s objective by shifting the member states’ commitment and resources to their domestic issues and other various missions underway in the region. In this regard, Mumma-Martinon (2010) stated that conflicts in the region strongly impacted EASF’s realization of its vision and mission through reducing member states’ contribution. Hence, what one can understand from this is that the available resources may be utilized in responding to the prevailing conflicts in the region, reducing the contribution to EASF.

The other problem one can raise as a challenge to EASF is the issue of mutual destabilization. States in the region are characterized by mistrust and mutual destabilization. Advancing the motto of ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’, many states of the region are known to support the internal decedent groups of neighbouring countries. For instance, Eritrea has supported rebel groups in Ethiopia and Somalia (Williams, 2011). The government of Somalia was supporting the rebel groups in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, such as the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF) until 1991 (Kidane, 2011). The government of Somalia was also supporting the Shifta wars in
Kenya’s Somali-inhabited Northeastern province. Ethiopia and Kenya have both backed armed groups in Somalia, such as the Somali National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), by providing weapons and assistance (Williams, 2011; Kidane, 2011). Sudan backed Eritrea’s liberation movements and also the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia, and the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) and other rebels in Uganda. Ethiopia and Uganda supported the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Sudan also assisted the Eritrean Islamic Jihad in 1993-94 and Eritrea supported the National Democratic Alliance in Sudan (Abbink, 2003; Kidane, 2011). Moreover, Eritrea and Ethiopia are still said to have supporting each other’s dissident groups (Kidane, 2011).

Therefore, it can be said that the mistrust and mutual destabilization actions reduce regional states’ active participation in the collaborative effort in the region. This is also underscored by Tlalka (2013) who writes that political tensions between member countries or their historical and present day’s international relations, which is characterized by numerous conflicts, crises and support of armed opposition groups in the neighbouring countries, create a climate of mistrust among member states of EASF. Likewise, Hull, et al. (2011) also stresses the impact of proxy wars on the regional states inability to actively work together towards regional security.

Generally, Kasaija (2014) noted that so long as the region is conflict ridden, states pay less attention to build EASF. He added that the prevailing conflicts in the region do not give an opportunity to develop EASF’s capability. From the very beginning, the EASF was established in a hostile environment, which does not allow for its progress. Hence, the whole effect of the above issues delayed EASF’s development.

4.1.4. Duplication of Regional Organizations and Their Membership

There have been various RECs during EASF’s establishment. Most importantly, the two RECs, namely IGAD and the EAC were competing to host the EASF. Hence, it appears that this fierce competition of the RECs creates confusion as to the determination of which regional block would take the leadership, direction and overall guiding mandate (Berouk, 2014). And once EASF emerged in the region as a regional peace and security architecture
under the umbrella of APSA, IGAD and EAC continue to take their own actions in the same domain of peace and security. Therefore, there are three regional security organizations in Eastern Africa namely, the EAC, EASF and IGAD. Each of the three organizations requires external fund for their activities in peace and security area, which has negative effect on EASF. In this connection, Hamad (2014) affirms that since the two institutions are undertaking the same activities with EASF in the peace and security area claiming support from external donors, it aggravates EASF’s ordeal pertaining to its problem of lack of fund. An interview with anonymous (2014) also supports this fact that the duplication of organizations creates a fierce competition for external fund. Thus, the existence of multiple security organizations in the region has inevitably complicated the external support for EASF.

On the other hand, Eastern Africa is characterized by overlapping memberships to the prevailing regional security organizations. Members of EASF at the same time belong to the COMESA, EAC, IGAD and SADC. The presence of several organizations in peace and security areas consisting of same member states results in the duplication of works and expenditures and competing interests (Kimathi, 2010). The states’ choice to actively engage in one of the prevailing organizations has substantial impact on the contribution for other organizations. Likewise, the active involvement of states in security activities of IGAD, EAC, COMESA or SADC reduces their contribution to EASF. As a result, unless security activities in the region become integrated, regional organizations would remain to be under the mercy of competition. Moreover, “the regional security institutions remain too nationalistic and self-interested for their own good” (Jacobsen and Nordbay, 2013b: 1). Like Ethiopia and Kenya, these regional security organizations strive to achieve hegemony in the region (Jacobsen and Nordbay, 2012). The existence of multiple competing security organizations with same members, therefore, does inevitably complicate the support of member states to the EASF, as it leads to confusion and duplication of pledges (Jacobsen and Nordbay, 2013a). This is also underlined by Kasaija (2014) that overlapping of membership creates conflicting obligations of states to those organizations. Moreover, Robinson (2014) argues that similar efforts of other RECs with EASF, having also overlapping membership, may divert the regional scarce resources meant for multi-national role of EASF. As a result of this problem, Jacobsen and Nordbay (2013a) suggest that the
existence of dual membership is “a significant structural defect” that needs to be resolved though it is not clear how such overlapping of membership can be settled.

Furthermore, duplication of memberships to organizations allows states to choose the institution, which best serves their interest. For instance, due to fear of Ethiopian dominance in IGAD until IGAD’s mandate is taken over by EASBRICOM, Kenya had either put its most effort to EAC or involved in crisis situations unilaterally, like its involvement in southern Somalia conflict (ibid). This shows that the existence of several organizations in the region gives chance to the regional states to actively participate in the organization of their choice. Hence, states may incline their commitment to other organizations putting aside EASF. In this regard, Hull, et al. (2011) states that Kenya and Uganda seem to prefer working with EAC, reducing their support to EASF. The whole idea is that the presence of diverse organizations with overlapping members greatly affects regional states’ as well as external donors’ support to EASF. This is due to the reason that multiplicity of organizations in the region in peace and security area creates, as anonymous (2014) also stresses, competition for fund, personnel and logistics.

4.1.5. Withdrawal of Member States

Departing of member states is also one main obstacle to the development of EASF (Tlalka, 2013). All member states of the EASF are not actively participating in the organization (Mandrup, 2012). Some member states resigned their membership to EASF. Tanzania, Madagascar and Mauritius have become active members of SADCBRIG (Cilliers, 2008). Eritrea is not also active in EASF due to its unfriendly relations with some member states, principally Ethiopia. Since EASF builds its capabilities out of member states’ contribution, the breaking away of those above mentioned members has a direct effect in reducing the effort of building effective deployable force in the region under the auspice of EASF. In this regard, Allehone (2008) states that given its large armies in the Sub-Saharan Africa, Eritrea’s involvement or lack of any meaningful role will have an impact on the success of EASF. Hamad (2014) also affirms the effect of members’ withdrawal that when member states withdraw the organization will miss financial, military and other contributions. He further states that departure of member states is not recommended because when the organization becomes big it will be strong and if small it will be weak.
In this connection, EASF is requesting South Sudan to join the force, though not yet a member (*ibid*). Given its resource potential, South Sudan would be a vital member of EASF once it joins. However, domestically, as a matter of priority, South Sudan needs to handle its own internal security problems. The whole idea of the above issues is, thus, withdrawal of member states inevitably reduces contribution to the organization (*anonymous*, 2014; Omar, 2014).

### 4.1.6. Weak Legal Basis and Lack of Commitment

The Eastern Africa Standby Force is operating with a weak legal basis (Fisher, *et al.*, 2010; Tlalka, 2013). EASF only has the MoU and a Policy Framework. These documents are not binding among members and, hence, have relatively low legal basis (*ibid*). Besides, EASF has no any other binding agreement pertaining to force deployment obligation of states (Fisher, *et al.*, 2010; Robinson, 2014). Due to the absence of binding legal document EASF member states have low commitment to support the organization (Kasaija, 2014). Member states may give lip service regarding their pledge of contribution, while being unwilling to make tangible sacrifices in actually sending their forces or financial contribution. This is evident from Mumma-Martimon (2010) assertion that despite the presence of personnel trained in the region from identified centers of excellence, the possibility of utilizing them at the time of deployment remains dependent on the political will of the countries concerned. From this, one can infer that the possibility of responding to sever crises in the region, assuming the high risk thereof, is very minimal. Hence, the issue will remain at the mercy of external support.

In this connection, Hamad (2014) explains that member states are required to pay annual financial contribution in ratio, based on what they have. However, military and other contributions are based on the consent of states. Due to this fact, member states are encouraged to contribute but not compelled (*ibid*). Robinson (2014) similarly presents that, so long as there is no binding deployment MoU, military and police contributions are contingent up on the will of each member state. Besides, contributions also depend on how each member state perceives the degree of the crisis situation, how each state feels threatened, and what each state might gain from a deployment (*ibid*). The challenge of weak legal framework in the development of EASF is also underscored by Omar (2014).
though he indicates the possibility of alleviating this problem after EASF’s full operationalization.

### 4.1.7. Lack of Funding

It is apparent that for an organization to successfully conduct a Peace Support Operation (PSO), which is an expensive endeavor a huge amount of funding is required. However, the reality in Africa as to the capacity to fund PSOs is different. The AU and sub-regional brigades have low financial capacity. This is a problem, which is difficult to fully resolve (Bachmann, 2011). AU highly relied on external support, especially from the USA, United Kingdom (UK), France and the European Union (EU) for every single one of its PSOs (Mumma-Martinon, 2010). Hence, as anonymous (2014) states, lack of fund is not only the problem of EASFCOM but Africa as a whole.

Financial problem has been a major challenge to the development of EASF from its inception (Hull, *et al*., 2011). EASF’s internal support is insufficient as it is only some of the member states that have regularly paid their membership payment (Hull, *et al*., 2011; Robinson, 2014; Allehone; 2008). Robinson (2014) notes that with the exception of Kenya many of the member states are in debt, especially since January 2009. Although as of March 2013 majority of the debts have been paid, there are still debts to be settled in some countries such as Seychelles, Uganda and Burundi (*ibid*). This shows that member states are not in a position to effectively finance the EASF annually. The assumption is that until EASF becomes fully operational, member states would contribute 50 percent and after full operationalization they cover 100 percent of financial requirement to EASF (*ibid*). However, it looks as if the current debt of member states will continue to increase in the future (*ibid*). This means that even after EASF acquired its full operationalization, the problem of member states’ inability to fund EASF is likely to remain intact. Similarly, Allehone (2008) also argues that the region has lack of resources and all member states of the EASF are not paying their membership arrears, thus, increasing the financial contribution of member states will be very challenging.

Therefore, since member states are incapable to fund all the activities, EASF has been supported by external partners. According to Hamad (2014) most of the funds come from
external donors instead of the member states. Donors fund the various exercises of the force, including educational programmes, real-life deployments as well as other activities it carries out, especially from Denmark with the coordination of support by a group called ‘Friends of EASF’ (Jacobsen and Nordby, 2012, 2013a). Jacobsen and Nordby (2013a:18) state that “the success of the EASF depends on funding and support” of donors. It is further stated that “without donors the EASF would not be where it is today and should it lose all its donations, it would return to an institution without any purpose” (ibid: 45). This shows the degree of EASF’s vulnerability once the donation changed in its amount, or if it is absent at all. It is unwise to always rely on outsiders’ support as there is a possibility for emergence of donor fatigue due to changing priorities or other commitments (Mumma-Martinon, 2010). Since EASF highly relays on external support for it’s over all operations, any substantial decrease in external funding inevitably affects the effectiveness of the force.

Thus, one can deduce from the above discussion that EASF is financially very weak to cover the cost of its various activities and even its existing status is acquired through external support. This may also lead to other problem. That means, due to poor internal funding and the possibility of occurrence of donor fatigue, states may refrain from actively committing their forces to the crisis area for the reason that no sufficient means exist to compensate costs they incurred (Allehone, 2008). This discourages, especially, states with less financial capacity thereby undermining the EASF’s multi-national effort towards peace and security of the region. Generally, the fund, which is an engine to the operation of EASF, is not readily available. In addition to lack of funding, Omar (2014) states that there is also mismanagement of the available funds, which exacerbates financial problems and thereby creates obstacles to the development and efficient deployment of EASF.

The other fund-related challenge, though less important, is confusion of ownership. In this regard, Bachmann (2011) argues that lack of funding continues to be a major obstacle not only to the progress of ASF, but also to African ownership of their own organization since AU and RECs contingent ‘almost exclusively’ on the support of partners. Donors’ involvement is not limited to financial contribution, but they also take part in other aspects. Donor countries are increasingly involving in various offices, as EASF is not only
challenged by a scarcity of funds, but also by lack of military, police and civilian experts that could contribute to the project of the EASF (Tlalka, 2013). As noted by Cilliers (2008) the number of officers seconded from donor countries to training institutions, PLANELMs and regional structures are rapidly increasing. They are in control of more resources and, by far, well paid than African employees (ibid). Hence, they are in possession of potential positions and imposing undue influence on essential aspects and decision-making processes at every level (ibid). This problem is apparent in West and Eastern Africa. The tendency of donors’ deep penetration into different key aspects of the institution challenges the African ownership of the undertakings and undermines the principle of ‘African solution to African problems’ (Tlalka, 2013; Mumma-Martinon, 2010; Cilliers, 2008). In other words, multidimensional involvement of external donors will make EASF in particular and ASF in general a foreign-mastered project, negatively affecting the sense of ownership. In this connection, Hull, et al. (2011: 9) claims that there exists a perception on EASF that “it in essence is an effort driven and sustained by international partners” (ibid).

Hence, identifying an internal alternative mechanism and substituting those external supporters to reduce their penetration is crucial. In this connection, EASF personnel seem conscious about the importance of operating the institution by their own. This can be understood from Karanji’s (2014: 14) statement in the 15th Ordinary Meeting of the Committee of Eastern Africa Chiefs of Defense Staff, which is stated as follows:

_They have helped us grow from the very initial faltering steps for which we are deeply grateful. Nonetheless, we must be courageous enough to acknowledge that we have outgrown being led by the hand and must take full control of our faculties and walk unaided! EASF must therefore stand up, gaze into the future, face its vision and march on to confront its destiny!_

### 4.1.8. Logistical Problems

As apparent in the past African PSOs, African armies possess ‘notoriously’ weak logistics capabilities (Bachmann, 2011). Thus, most African states are dependent on foreign intervention to protect their sovereignty (ibid). As Berouk (2014) states, successful PSOs need adequate logistics and equipment supplies such as helicopter, artillery assets and air defense capability. However, EASF in this regard is not capable, which compels it to remain under the mercy of western countries (ibid). Communication platform, aviation and
engineering must be adequately available. But, this is not the case in EASF, where lack of logistical support best characterizes the organization (Kimathi, 2010; Mumma-Martinon, 2010). Hamad (2014) also underscores this problem by explaining that EASF is facing logistic problems since it lacks adequate funding and dependent, mostly, on external supports. Similarly, Omar (2014) confers that operationally, one of the biggest problems of EASF is the question of logistics. He further states that EASF is not in a position to support logistically its troops.

As Robinson (2014) argues, better equipments such as artillery may be crucial for grave circumstances, like genocide. However, EASF member states would not agree on the use of such a material. This is because such weapons can be used in any states including those who contribute it, which is against their national security and thereby limits their commitments (Tlalka, 2013). Hence, if EASF deploys troops while it has shortage of better weapons like artillery, it may suffer the same fate as AMIS which had its both 18-man patrol and 20-man rescue teams kidnapped by one of the factions fighting in West Darfur (Feldman, 2008: 269). It is very unlikely that member states could provide air support to move such equipment even when it is available (Robinson, 2014). Similarly, Berouk (2014) also argues that grave circumstances that require robust force to be deployed within 14 days need airlift to transport troops, but EASF is very unlikely to do that due to lack of adequate logistical supplies. While rapidly deploying within 14 days, the force needs to be self-sustainable logistically at least for a month (Cilliers, 2008). However, how well equipped is EASF to do this is very doubtful. Hence, there is a lot to be done to develop a genuine logistical capability. This is because the question of logistical infrastructures comes before any deployment of force.

4.1.9. Cultural Diversity and Lack of Interoperability

An effective operation of combined forces in the PSOs is very crucial. However, this appears increasingly challenging particularly in Eastern Africa and also in Africa at large. Culture has significant impact in the process of establishing united forces from different African countries (Feldman, 2008). Religion, values and traditions can create various challenges (ibid). States of Eastern Africa have diverse background. In connection with this, Mumma-Martinon (2010: 27) contends that, “given the Eastern African Region
ethnic, cultural and religious diversities as well as the anglophone-francophone divide, substantial friction between (and even within) EASF itself may be unavoidable”. Such diverse cultures affected the progress of EASF (Kimathi, 2010). Member states have diverse doctrine, practice and way of tackling problems, though they have almost the same problems (Berouk, 2014). This creates problem of having common line of communication, command and understanding (ibid). Similarly, Hamad (2014) asserts that the multi-nationality of EASF, which consists of states with different doctrine, culture and language, has hindered the institutional development of EASF.

The major problem, in this regard, is associated with language differences. This problem is apparent in the AU peace-keeping forces. Feldman (2008: 268) noted that “military commanders might find themselves not only having difficulty of communicating with their counterparts from other nations, but also even with their own troops, as many individual African nations have numerous languages spoken within their borders”. It is difficult to create a well integrated force having such diverse linguistic backgrounds (ibid). In this connection, Berouk (2014) comments the negative effect of language difference among EASF personnel, by indicating its practical effect in AMISOM. This problem is also apparent in the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operation in Liberia (Haile, 2006). Similarly, Hamad (2014) argues that the presence of diverse language in EASF has affected the operation of EASF. He added that there are French, English, Arabic and Amharic speakers, which creates the problem of interoperability. This means that heterogeneous forces with their own language face an obstacle in exchanging and using information in their joint operation. Moreover, Tlalka (2013) argues that lack interoperability may remain the core challenge in the operationalization and future activities of the EASF. As member states in Eastern Africa have different colonial backgrounds and distinctive ways of organizing their armed forces, the prospect of achieving full interoperability would be “especially difficult” (ibid). Similarly, Hull, et al. (2011) argues that the prevailing diverse background of forces will continue to pose the problem of interoperability.
4.2. Future Prospects

Notwithstanding the challenges discussed above, EASF could be seen as a regional mechanism that could make positive contributions to conflict prone countries in the region. EASF has great promise for peace in the Eastern Africa Region (Allehine, 2008; Mumma-Martinon, 2010). Besides, it is argued that EASF has the potential to build trust between member countries and thereby contribute to the maintenance of security in the region (Jacobsen and Nordby (2012). Moreover, Hull, et al. (2011) asserts that EASF has the capacity to carry out observer mission and to be co-deployed with the UN mission. Most importantly, EASF intends to become a more effective security mechanism both in conflict mediation and military intervention in response to security threats (Mumma-Martinon, 2010). To this end, it is struggling to achieve its full operationalization by the year 2015. Accordingly, EASF has undertaken a series of preparatory exercises to make ready the force for full deployment in the aforesaid period.

In the first cycle of the exercises, EASF successfully conducted Command Post Exercise (CPX) in Nairobi, Kenya in 2008, a Field Training Exercise (FTX) in Djibouti in November 2009, and a Logistics Mapping Exercise (LosgMAPEX) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in November 2010 (Tlalka, 2013; Bouhuyss 2011). The first historical joint Field Training Exercise conducted in Djibouti consisted of about 1,500 troops, police and civilian personnel from 10 countries; and was carried out to develop multi-dimensional command, control and staff duties, operational capabilities and broaden the peacekeeping capacity of the region (Musoni, 2010). Besides, this exercise was intended to evaluate the level of preparedness and interoperability of the force to effectively respond to conflicts in the region (UNDP, 2011). This exercise shows that EASF is in a good move as it assembled all forces of the region, which have not ever met before. In this regard, anonymous (2014) argues that the 2009 Field Training Exercise can be taken as a positive development as it allows multinational forces to work together and to eat together for the first time. Likewise, Ismail Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti which hosts the 2009 Field Training Exercise, acknowledged the exercise as a major milestone and expressed the bright future of the EASF (Foos, 2009). Guelleh states that the force “will play a positive role for the region” (ibid). By successfully completing this and the
above mentioned exercises in the first cycle, EASF attained the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) (EASF Information Manager, 2014).

In the second cycle of the exercises, EASF conducted a second CPX in Khartoum, Sudan, in November 2011(\textit{ibid}). Besides, EASF also carried out an Integrated FTX 2013 Training Of Trainers Workshop at Humanitarian Peace Support School (HPSS), Embakasi, Kenya, from April 8–12, 2013, which enabled for building capacities of military, police and civilian personnel (Kilimo, 2013). The purpose of the workshop was to train the trainers of the upcoming planned second round field training exercise and to notify member states on EASF integrated training requirements, training standards and verification process for EASF pledged participants (\textit{ibid}). Eventually, this training ended with a successful Field Training Exercise known as Mashariki Salam 2013 (FTX13)\footnote{EASF adopted the code name “Mashariki Salam” for the Exercise. This was agreed on to be a representative expression in most official languages of the Member States. ‘Mashariki’ is a Kiswahili word for Eastern, while ‘Salam’ is Peace in many of the languages in the Region.} that was held in Jinja, Uganda, from May 5-26, 2013 (\textit{ibid}). The general objective of Mashariki Salam 2013 was to train and examine the level of readiness of the trained forces for Full Operational Capability (FOC) based on the AU training doctrine and objectives. The objectives of the exercise also include, \textit{inter alia}, to examine EASF’s ability to undertake a multi-dimensional mission as assigned by AU, practicing EASF’s doctrine and procedures that intended to be employed in its full operationalization, enhancing cooperation and interoperability of EASF components and equipment (Kilimo, 2013).

From the above discussion one can understand the effort of EASF to achieve its full operation by 2015. However, the possibility of achieving its FOC in the prescribed time is subject to different arguments by different authorities. Pertaining to the last field training exercise (FTX13), the EASF Commander, Brigadier General Jack Bakasumba, announced that the force would have full operational capacity, which means that the Force is capable “to undertake any mission assigned by the United Nations or the African Union” (Xinhua, 2013). Similarly, Tlalka (2013) argues the possibility of achieving FOC of EASF by 2015, considering the level of personnel involved in ‘Peaceful Eastern Africa’, which are more than 1,200 troops, police and civilian personnel. Above all, Raychelle Omamo, Kenya's
Defense Cabinet Secretary, states that the EASF will become fully operational by the end of 2014 (Hiiraan, 2014).

Conversely, Burgess (2009: 4) states that “…the sub-regional commands have a long way to go to full implementation. In fact, one must conclude that it is highly doubtful that the sub-regional commands will ever be fully implemented”. Omar (2014) also contends that the FOC of EASF could not be achievable by 2015 because of its logistical, operational and other problems. However, despite such limitations, currently the force is progressing and the future of EASF is bright (ibid). Similarly, Berouk (2014) asserts that the idea of African solution for African problem to avoid foreign intervention is good, but EASF as well as states of the region are still weak having multifaceted problems. Hence, the reality on the ground could delay the expected full operationalization of EASF by 2015 (ibid). Full deployment of EASF notably in grave circumstances needs adequate logistics and equipment supplies to deploy troops within short period of time. However, EASF is by far in short supply of it, which perhaps delays its full operation (ibid). Similarly, Kasaija (2014) argues that EASF will not be fully ready by 2015. He substantiated his argument stating that South Sudan can serve as a ‘testing case’ because had the force been ready for 2015, it could have at least been deployed there.

One can infer from the above discussion that the concept of EASF as a regional mechanism to prevent and respond to conflicts of the region is important. The concept of African solution to African problem is an imperative. And EASF has a good potential capability to contribute to efforts in addressing the region’s conflict in the foreseeable future. This can be inferred from all the efforts EASF is making in its move to achieve full operationalization by 2015. However, as regards the time of becoming fully operational, there exist different speculations. Hence, the achievement of EASF’s FOC by 2015 remains to be seen. Nonetheless, what is most important is the fact that EASF has a good prospect of maintaining the peace and security of the region, despite the fact that it may take some time in the future. In this connection, though the literature and the interviews conducted with officials and experts reveal the existence of two lines of views as to the operationalization of EASF by 2015, none of them challenges the positive contribution the force will have in addressing conflicts of the region in the future. Moreover, once the force
becomes fully operational, it will deploy in all scenarios of the ASF set by AU, including genocide situations and thereby assures the stability of the region. In a nutshell, even though EASF has played very limited role in the maintenance of peace and security in the Eastern Africa, it has a good future prospect.

The new initiative of EASF in the area of maritime security can also be considered as another potential and future prospect of EASF in the overall peace and security of Eastern Africa as well as the continent at large. There are good potentials of ports in the Eastern Africa, which serve as a transmission hub connecting African countries with other continents. One can mention the Port of Djibouti, Berbera in Somaliland and Mombasa in Kenya. These are potential economic engines as well as transmission belts to the other world through Gulf of Aden. Gulf of Aden connects the three continents, namely Africa, Asia and Europe. It also transmits around 70 per cent of the world’s maritime traffic and 12 percent of the world’s oil transferred by sea (Kolawole, 2011). Hence, the protection of maritime security in the region has a paramount importance. The expansion of secured port services can promote economic interdependence of countries in the region (Medhane, 2004).

However, the danger of maritime criminal activities is apparent in the Eastern Africa, which is detrimental to the human security. Eastern Africa region particularly the Horn of African is known by maritime piracy activities as evident from the attack of 240 ships from January 2009 to July 2010 (Kolawole, 2011). Somalia, especially Puntland, is considered as a base of the pirates. Pirates often hijack ships, cause a danger to human security and affect the economy. The reason why Somalia serves as a safe haven for pirates’ operation in the area is the fragility of the state (ibid). Generally, maritime crimes have very devastating effect on human security. As Hurlburt (2013) outlined, the crimes of piracy have caused enormous physical abuse, psychological trauma and economic impact. Thus, it needs high attention as one component of security threat by the concerned security organizations, including EASF.

Accordingly, as this burning issue demanded high attention, AU announced the incorporation of a Maritime Unit within the Department of Peace and Security (Potgieter, 2012). Similarly, EASF is aware of the cost of piracy and its impact on general security of
the region. Consequently, as a regional mechanism for security problems, EASF has also created maritime strategy to address the danger of human security resulting from maritime related activities. EASF has incorporated maritime cell in its agenda as maritime crime exacerbates the prevailing security problem in the region. The incorporation of a maritime cell within the Military Planning Element can be taken as one good progress in the EASF (Bouhuys, 2011). EASF in its Strategic Development Plan envisaged the establishment of a regional maritime element for Maritime PSOs and other Maritime Safety and Security tasks as one of its objectives to be achieved, when it becomes fully operational by 2015 (ibid).

In realizing its objective, EASF has been participating in maritime related activities in the region. There is an international maritime training exercise called ‘Exercise Cutlass’, which has been held annually since 2011, aiming at promoting skills to counter piracy, illicit trafficking and illegal fishing (Biermann, 2012). The exercise also emphasizes increasing regional cooperation and interoperability to improve maritime safety through information sharing and coordinated operations among international navies (Chavez Jr, 2013). In this connection, to improve information sharing, an Eastern Africa Standby Force boarding team - made of naval forces from Djibouti, Burundi, Comoros, Kenya, Seychelles, Sudan and Rwanda - was created (Biermann, 2012). EASF is acquiring the required skills in this training. This was manifested in the speech of EASF representative, Djama, in the third annual Exercise Cutlass when he said that, "Our nations have benefited greatly from Exercise Cutlass and we have met the goals that we wanted to achieve… The skills we have revisited during this exercise will greatly prepare us for more real situations that we may face, and we will be successful in those situations" (Chavez Jr., 2013).

What one can infer from the above discussion is the dimensions of security in the region that the EASF is working on. EASF, thus, has a promise to reduce maritime insecurity and thereby to promote the overall peace and security of the region. Hence, EASF has good prospects in responding to different dimensions of dangers to the security of the region. Generally, despite the problems hindering the development and operation of EASF, the prevailing efforts to create strong capability indicates a good future prospect of the EASF in the maintenance of peace and security in the region.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

This Chapter summarizes the major findings of the research pertaining to the research objectives. Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), which was established in 2004, is one branch of the African Standby Force (ASF) established in Eastern Africa as a sub-regional peace and security architecture to undertake the functions of maintaining peace and security in the Eastern Africa in particular and, the African continent in general. While EASF is still in the process of formation, it is planned to make it fully operational by 2015. To this end, the organization is undertaking different preparatory activities. Of course, as a regional mechanism of security issues, EASF has contributed limited roles to the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

Eastern Africa Standby Force has played some role in preventing conflict by providing military advice, dispatching fact-finding mission and facilitating negotiations between key political actors. It also has supported some of the UN and AU peace support operations to stabilize the prevailing conflicts in the region. In this regard, EASF supported the African Union Mission in Somalia through deploying very limited number of personnel including medical and logistics personnel, initiating member states to contribute troops, and providing command and staff headquarters. Besides, EASF also supported peace support operations in Sudan by providing pre-deployment trainings as well as command and control assistances to the African Union Mission in Sudan and United Nations–African Union Mission in Darfur, and trained police officers for United Nations Mission in South Sudan. However, EASF’s role is limited in terms of addressing conflicts in the region.

The study also identifies the reasons why EASF has not deployed its force or made fundamental contributions in the maintenance of peace and security of the region. These are many and much interconnected in their nature. The first challenge that the EASF faced was lack of an organization that embraces all states of the region.

The other prominent challenge to the operation of EASF is the hegemonic competition between the two influential countries in the region namely, Ethiopia and Kenya. Although the two countries have cordial relations, they constantly compete over regional leadership,
which has dragged back the institutional development as well as smooth running of EASF. The rivalry of the two states resulted in separate placement of the EASF COM and PLANELM in Kenya and the EASF Headquarters and LOGBASE in Ethiopia thereby weakening coordination of organs and EASF’s command and controls.

Conflicts in the region are also the other important factors that constrained the progress of the institution. States of the region are devastated by several interstate and intrastate conflicts. More importantly, they are too busy with internal conflicts. Besides, states have also commitment to peace-keeping missions operating in the region. The sum of these problems affected the capacity and development of EASF by diverting resources to the internal problems and to the prevailing peace support operations in the region.

Moreover, duplication of regional organizations has influenced the development of EASF. Several organizations, such as IGAD and the EAC are working like EASF on the peace and security of the region implying overlapping of membership. This has created competing interests among organizations thereby complicating the support of member states as well as external donors.

Furthermore, there is no obligation for member states to remain member of the EASF, as imposing obligation would mean intervening in the sovereignty of states. As a result, some member states of EASF have now withdrawn their membership thereby weakening the financial and military capacity of the organization. There also exists a weak legal framework in the sense that EASF lacks strong and binding legal basis that obliges member states to provide their support, inducing deployment of troops.

Funding problem is other major challenge to EASF. This means that member states are not in a position to support the organization financially, as a result of which, EASF is dependent on the support of foreign partners thereby undermining institutional progress, multinational effort and sense of ownership of EASF. The evidently observed financial problems further led the institution to be weak in terms of logistics that are crucial to maintain and equip the troops.

Cultural diversity among member states is another challenge. Disparity in terms of ethnic identity, language, values, tradition, doctrine and practice has hindered the effort of
creating effective and unified force. Having such differences, especially language discrepancy, exchanging of information and making clear communication among personnel is very difficult in the field operation thereby undermining the joint operation of the force.

As a result of all the above problems, EASF has not make significant contribution in maintaining peace and security in the region. EASF, as a sub-regional mechanism of ASF, has played only few supportive roles to the UN and AU peace support operations in the region, rather than deploying its own authorized, peace-keeping or peace-making forces. Hence, EASF has not yet deployed its own autonomous peace support mission in any of the crises in the region despite its ambitious objective, vision and mission.

However, EASF has a prospect to contribute to the peace and security of the region. Despite the fact that there exist different opinions regarding full operationalization of the force in 2015 as per its mission, it is not possible to underestimate its future prospects in addressing conflicts in the region, as the organization is working for its full operation. Accordingly, EASF has conducted a command post exercises, filed training exercises and logistics mapping exercise in the two rounds of exercises. Also, EASF is actively engaging in the international maritime trainings in the region to combat piracy, illegal trafficking and illegal fishing, which exacerbate the security threat of the region. The Force has integrated Maritime Cell into its planning element and is working towards maritime safety and security. Moreover, EASF is the only military organization that includes majority of states in the region, which provides a forum for discussion of leaders on a regular basis contributing to the reduction of mistrust among regional states.

The forgoing trends and activities of EASF show that the organization has good future prospects to make positive contributions to the maintenance of peace and security in the region. For more successful future operation of the force, however, the study suggests that member states, notably Ethiopia and Kenya should replace their hegemonic aspiration with regional security agendas, develop proper management of finance, including their unfettered commitment to provide forces, finance and logistics as well as standardize training and doctrine so as to create effective multinational force. The EASF should also
have a binding legal framework that obliges member states’ contribution of forces and necessary equipments in time of deployment.
REFERENCES

Books


**Articles**


Reports


Internet Sources


Newspapers


Annex 1: Interview Guide

1. What roles EASF has playing in maintaining peace and security in the Eastern Africa? Does it deployed military, police, civilians or any other personnel in the prevailing United Nations and African Union peace support operations in the region?

2. What are the challenges facing EASF in its institutional progress as well as operation?

3. How do you describe the future prospects of EASF?
Annex 2: List of Key Informants

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<th>No.</th>
<th>Informant’s Name</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Date and Place of Interview</th>
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DECLARATION

I declare that ‘THE EASTERN AFRICA STANDBY FORCE SINCE 2004: ROLES, CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS’ is my own original work and that it has not been submitted for obtaining any qualification in any other university. All sources used or quoted have been properly acknowledged.

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Endalcachew Bayeh

June 2014

This thesis is submitted for examination with my approval as an advisor of the candidate.

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Hussein Jemma (PhD)

June 2014